

WASHINGTON COLLEGE

International Studies Review



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
LYRASIS members and Sloan Foundation

WASHINGTON COLLEGE
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW

Cover photography by Gregory Waddell
Cover design by Jennifer E. Lubkin

Washington College
International Studies Review
300 Washington Avenue
Chestertown, Maryland 21620

©2008 by Washington College. All rights reserved.

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

WASHINGTON COLLEGE

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW

VOLUME V 2008



WASHINGTON COLLEGE

The *Washington College International Studies Review* is a student journal intended to provide opportunities for undergraduates to publish research articles that contribute to the body of knowledge in international relations and related disciplines, provide fresh insight into the complexities of world affairs, and introduce readers to areas of the world they themselves have not yet explored. The *Washington College International Studies Review* is intended to showcase the research of students of the international disciplines. The journal welcomes writers from all fields of study who have undertaken a project with international concerns at its core, including the areas of politics, economics, literature, art, anthropology, environmental studies, history, and health studies. Washington College students and alumni traveling, working and living abroad are encouraged to submit travelogues for the Notes From Abroad section of the journal.

Electronic submissions and other inquiries should be sent to is_review@washcoll.edu. For submission guidelines, to review past volumes and further information, visit our webpage at <http://isr.washcoll.edu/>.

The International Studies program is an interdisciplinary major that includes faculty from Anthropology, Business, Economics, Foreign Languages, History, and Political Science. In addition to the major, students may choose from five regional concentrations: Africa, East Asia, Latin America, Near East, and Western Europe. The academic program provides students with a strong foundation of theoretical knowledge and practical experience. The curriculum is enhanced with opportunities for internships; study abroad and foreign exchanges; extracurricular activities such as the Model United Nations and Model African Union as well as on-campus programming through the Goldstein Program in Public Affairs, International House and International Studies Council. Our majors have careers and advanced training in teaching, politics, business, journalism, international work, and public service.

Founded in 1782 under the patronage of George Washington, Washington College is a private, independent college of the liberal arts and sciences located in historic Chestertown on Maryland's Eastern Shore.

CONTENTS

Editors' Note	vii
<i>Brian Taylor, Kimberly Proctor, Tricia Bonman, Piper Owens, Christine J. Wade</i>	

ARTICLES

Bringing Womed Back In: Women and State Violence in Latin America <i>Kimberly Proctor</i>	3
Unitary Executive Theory, Signing Statements and the Expansion of Presidential War Powers under President George W. Bush <i>Andrew K. Mehdizadeh</i>	25
The Baha'is of Iran: History of Repression, Stories of Resistance <i>David Hosey</i>	57
"A Better Future for the World": The Short-term and Long-term Vision of the Atlantic Charter <i>Gillian Bourassa</i>	75
Machiavelli, The Medici, and The Making of The Prince <i>Brian Taylor</i>	103
Revitalizing Civil Society: Non-governmental Organizatons in Cambodia Post-UNTAC <i>Tricia Bonman</i>	129
Steam Power to Space Technology <i>Amanda Kirkland</i>	115

NOTES FROM ABROAD

A Matter of *Hawiyya*: Jerusalem, Identity, and
the Struggle for Things Unseen 147

David Hosey '07

Feet, Wheels, and Wings 153

Brenna Nan Schneider '06

Psychology: A Transcultural Perspective 159

Spencer Case '08

Contributors 165

Editors' Note

For anyone accustomed to reading and researching in the field of international studies, the idea of our world rapidly shrinking due to globalization has become a familiar one. As our access to the world around us grows, we struggle to face the challenges and realize the advantages of global forces from which we can no longer choose to isolate ourselves. With this in mind, we are proud to bring you this fifth volume of the *Washington College International Studies Review*. The *Review* was created to provide a formal opportunity for undergraduate students to share their research, experiences, and interests. This year we present a wide variety of articles touching on issues that travel not only across borders but through time in order to affect us. The reader will discover how Presidential signing statements, overlooked World War II agreements, violence against women in Latin America, 16th-century political theorists, Iranian religious communities, Japanese rockets, and NGOs among the ruins of Cambodian society, all present questions which haunt us no matter how far removed we are from them in distance or in time. This volume of the *Review* also continues our "Notes from Abroad" feature, which allows current students and alumni to share personal narratives of international experience. We encourage alumni to continue to contribute their extraordinary stories, and sincerely thank those who submitted to this year's "Notes from Abroad."

Of course, a shrinking globe affects more than the topics of our submissions. This year we have continued our policy of accepting submissions from our abroad partners at Rhodes University in South Africa, Lingnan University in Hong Kong, and Royal Holloway College, University of London and University of Hull in the United Kingdom. We hope to be able to publish works from these partners in the near future.

We would like to thank Dr. Tahir Shad, Director of the International Studies program and Curator of the Louis L. Goldstein program in Public Affairs, Dr. Austin Lobo, Curator of the Douglass

Cater Society of Junior Fellows, and Kevin Coveney, Vice President for Admissions, for their financial support. We are also grateful to Diane Landskroener for her excellent production design. Finally, we would like to thank everyone who submitted entries for consideration. Without your willingness and enthusiasm, the *Washington College International Studies Review* would not be possible.

Brian Taylor, '08, Editor

Kimberly Proctor, '08, Associate Editor

Tricia Bonman, '09, Junior Editor

Piper Owens, '10, Junior Editor

Christine J. Wade, Ph.D., Editor-in-Chief



ARTICLES



Bringing Women Back In

Women and State Violence in Latin America

KIMBERLY PROCTOR

Latin America, while vastly physically and culturally diverse, is a region widely characterized by a tradition of violence. Violence, especially for political purposes, is not abnormal for the region, and tales of conquest, civil war and intrastate terror plague its history. Yet, analysis of this violent history typically overlooks the gendered nature of armed conflict, and the unique stories of women are often missing from its pages. In order to formulate a holistic understanding of political violence, one must examine the structural nature in which political violence is used to specifically target women, both on the individual level and in regard to the woman's place within the social hierarchy. Using the cases of Guatemala, El Salvador, Argentina and Chile, it is the purpose of this article to examine both the direct and indirect ways in which women suffer from political violence, and how this phenomenon simultaneously reinforces and undermines women's agency as political actors.

Theoretical Considerations

Studies of conflict in Latin America have shown a significant lack of gender analysis, yet it is known that armed conflict and political violence affect men and women in sharply different ways. There are specific dangers and disadvantages that affect women, and a gender perspective recognizes that the experiences of men and women during conflicts are framed by the established gender roles within a society.¹ In Latin America, gender is often based upon the two distinct, yet intertwined, cultures of *machismo* and *marianismo*. *Machismo*, or the male culture, stresses masculinized power, aggression, patriarchy, paternalism, and sexual prowess, while *marianismo*, which is based upon the cult of the Virgin Mary, stresses chastity, nurturing womanhood, subservience, and the elevated role of mother and wife.² *Marianismo* rules out symmetrical relationships between men and women, as it encourages women to construct notions of femininity that are passive and deem service to the husband and family as elevated above service to self. Violence in Latin America is rooted in this culture- as there is a considerable amount of tolerance for violence against women and children, which leads to incredibly strong emotional repercussions.³ This puts women at a strong political and social disadvantage: not only are they denied public space and culturally trained to be subservient, but they are also the victims of social injustice and left with few avenues to address their problems.

Stereotyping women as 'victims' and men as 'perpetrators', however, is unrealistically simplified. Both men and women are dynamic actors, with a multitude of social experiences that shape their ability to process and cope with such events. Agency is the recognition of the individual actor's ability to process these social experiences; it is the acknowledgment that social actors are "knowledgeable" and "capable."⁴ Thus, a gender analysis of women's agency acknowledges that women's experiences as political actors are not singular or static, and that "multiple realities,"⁵ such as gender, class, cultural norms and location, all contribute to the construction of identity. This constructed identity affects how the individual actor copes within a given situation. In analyzing the agency of Latin American women, understanding the gendered power relations of

marianismo and *machismo* is integral in providing a framework from which to understand women's experiences as actors.

There is a link between agency and armed conflict and political violence. Both armed conflict, which is the violent pursuit of incompatible goals by various societal actors,⁶ and political violence, which is a politically motivated intentional or half-intentional act of physical violation,⁷ threaten actors' agency. In Latin America, from a gender perspective, physical violence is systematically designed and implemented during periods of armed conflict, based on culturally appropriate constructs of gender, to assault women's physical and psychological integrity while constantly embodying the power imbalances inherent to a patriarchal society.⁸ This entails that men and women experience periods of armed conflict differently, as a reflection of their socially constructed identities. A thorough analysis of these experiences is necessary in order to reinstate women's agency.

The case studies of Guatemala, El Salvador, Argentina and Chile were chosen to analyze this assault because, comparatively, they serve as representative case studies of the Latin American region: they are representative of both intrastate terror (Argentina and Chile) and civil war (Guatemala and El Salvador), Central America and the Southern Cone, as well as forms of racially motivated violence and genocide. The primary basis of this analysis stems from information contained in individual truth and reconciliation reports from the four countries. Truth and reconciliation reports are the official reports of truth and reconciliation commissions, which are "official bodies set up to investigate and report on a pattern of past human rights abuses."⁹ These reports were chosen because, while their aim is to clarify the "truth" of the past, this truth is often selective, and they lack an adequate gender analysis. In failing to clarify women's truths as actors, they too contribute to the undermining of women's agency, and unless a gender analysis is performed, truth and reconciliation will continue to exist solely for the few.

Women as Indirect Victims of Political Violence

Within the framework of *machismo* and *marianismo*, women are confined to the domestic realm. This means that they are re-

sponsible for the daily operations of the home and family life; thus, women are in charge of ensuring that everything within the home functions smoothly and properly. Their primary responsibilities include feeding and clothing the family, managing finances, and child rearing and raising. Because their role within the home defines their social status and personal worth, when the home is destroyed, an integral part of a woman's womanhood is lost. Regardless of whether armed conflict ever physically or directly assaults women, when homes are broken into, families destroyed, personal belongings raided, or children kidnapped and disappeared, the invasion is a direct assault on the woman's domain.¹⁰ Women's indirect suffering most commonly manifests itself in terms of economic loss, effects on children and family life and an assault on women's supportive role.

Economic Loss

In these countries, economic loss not only affected women in the sense that it hindered their ability to manage family finances; it also affected their economic future in that the death or disappearance of a family member diminished earning power. In poor families, the death or disappearance of a family member had the ability to determine an entire family's survival. This, in turn, inhibited women from fulfilling another one of their culturally designated tasks- providing for their children. A Guatemalan woman described the suffering of this economic loss:

They killed my husband. And from then on, I suffered like a little girl. I couldn't manage money, or work, or support my family. You see, the life of a woman among men is hard; and the life of a woman alone with her children is worse yet. They left me like a bird on a dead branch.¹¹

In El Salvador, the civil war so disrupted families that today almost 38 percent of all households are headed by women, and it is women who have been fighting the subsequent economic war for survival.¹²

As women are confined to the domestic realm, men are those

primarily responsible for engaging in warfare. Thus, males are those most commonly killed in civil war or by disappearance. This further exacerbates the problem because not only is the primary breadwinner deceased, but he is also typically killed at an age when he has not yet started, or has only just started, contributing monetarily to the family. For example, in Argentina, students constituted 21 percent of the disappeared, 97 percent of whom were males.¹³ In Chile, males were a similar 94.5 percent of those disappeared and executed.¹⁴ A spouse of one such person related the suffering of her family due to her husband's death. She stated, "*His wife and children, we underwent poverty and deficiencies of every type, economic and of health.*"¹⁵ This information demonstrates a regional trend- that a staggering amount of women lost their male family members, who were their only source of income. Often, this forced them to compete in the public sphere for income, a task for which they were largely unprepared.

In addition to losing family within the home, the actual home itself was destroyed in many cases. This destruction of the home, often in conjunction with destruction of the entire community, rendered it impossible for women to manage their households. Forced displacement adversely affects women and children, who constitute 90 percent of the displaced.¹⁶ The destruction of their homes left women to fend for their children without the physical protection of a home, while also suffering from the loss of their male protector. In Guatemala, one million people (predominantly women and children) were forcibly displaced, and another 400,000 were forced into exile.¹⁷ In El Salvador over 30 percent of the entire population was displaced.¹⁸ In countries such as Argentina and Chile, where the home was invaded for the purpose of kidnapping and forced disappearance, the woman's realm of domesticity was assaulted and forever transformed, because it demonstrated women's inability to protect their families, and changed the home from a place of shelter to a scene of violence.

Cultural Loss

First and foremost, Latin American women suffer socially when they lose their spouse. In a culture that defines women in terms

of their husbands, being a single woman is simply unacceptable; when women lose their husbands, they also lose their social status. Although men suffered most of the casualties between warring factions, women suffered indirectly because of the social status they lost in losing their husbands. With this said, it is important to note that in periods of armed conflict, political violence often manifests itself much more sinisterly in terms of women. In Latin America, political violence targeted indigenous women as cultural symbols in acts of genocide.

The most startling example of this is in Guatemala. Both the REHMI (Recovery of the Historical Memory) Report and the CEH (Commission for Historical Clarification) Report reported that the Guatemalan military committed acts of genocide against the country's Mayan populations. Women were often the specific targets of cultural genocide due to their responsibility for passing the Mayan culture onto their children. They are central to its continuity, serving as cultural emblems and being celebrated as sites of tradition.¹⁹ Evidence of mutilated women's bodies and the murders of pregnant women demonstrate that the Guatemalan military sought to manipulate the entire Mayan community through the bodies of women. One Mayan man explained, "*Women definitely are a symbol, the symbol of life, of the perpetuation of life. In other words, to kill a woman is to kill life.*"²⁰ In addition to this, the military's scorched earth policy sought to destroy nature, or 'Mother Earth,' which has a profound significance linked to the collective identities of the Mayans.²¹

Effects on Children and Family Life

Armed conflict in Latin America led to the breakdown of basic family life, which is the domain of the woman. The disappearance, enlistment, and death of family members eroded basic familial relations and left women without even basic control over their families. In Guatemala and El Salvador, this is starkly evident in the number of village massacres. In Guatemala, as Mayans were viewed as the collective enemies of the state, many Mayan villages were massacred. In addition to this, military persecution forced civilians to constantly be on the run, and this shredded the social fabric while

weakening families and cultural ties. In particular, women became defenseless and could no longer protect themselves or their children.

El Salvador is notorious for the atrocious massacres of its civilians, particularly the El Mozote massacre. In *From Madness to Hope*, the El Mozote massacre is used as a representative case study of the larger systematic extermination of the family unit. In El Mozote, families were rounded up, separated by gender and age, and systematically slaughtered. Women, congregated with their children, were forced to listen as their husbands were murdered. In most of these massacres, entire families were destroyed, and many were tortured and killed as their community watched. One account from El Salvador detailed the ability of the women involved in the El Mozote massacre to hear their young daughters (some as young as ten years old) being raped, and then being forced to listen to the soldiers *"talking and joking, saying how much they liked the twelve-year-olds."*²²

Additionally, threats to the family also accompanied the torture of women. Salvadoran human rights activist, María Teresa Tula, described the difficulties she felt as a woman responsible for her family when she stated:

After they administer all of these psychological tortures, you get to a difficult point. They tell you that they are going to kill your whole family. They told me that they had my sister and my children and they were going to kill them all. When they tell you that, you prefer that they kill you instead.²³

There are also numerous cases of women who were forced to watch the torture of their children as a form of indirect torture. *Nunca Más* details several accounts of families tortured together and the use of children to target women. One account states:

After beating my wife, they took the youngest child and held her upside down by the feet and hit her, saying to the mother, 'If you don't talk we will kill her.' The children were crying and it was extremely frightening. The mother shouted and implored them

not to hurt the child. Then they decided to do the *submarino* torture on my wife in front of the children.²⁴

The military used this type of torture as a systematic assault on women. They knew that as protectors of the home, and those responsible for the well-being of children, witnessing the torture of their children would be particularly painful for women.

Women's Supportive Role

One interview from REHMI stated, "*I believe that there was an intentionality in the way women were treated, a policy to harm women and communities. . . I feel that women bore the brunt of a lot of it, as mothers, as women, even because of their husband's attitudes. . . There were things designed just for women – for families – because women are the ones who preserved the family and care for others.*"²⁵ Women were obviously expected to assume the burdens of other family members, both physically and psychologically. In the case of a deceased or injured spouse, they were forced to assume responsibility and silently find a way to provide for their family. In psychological terms, women had to remain mentally strong for their children, especially in terms of village massacres, as they were forced to comfort their children as they listened to their family members being slaughtered. In many of these instances, women led the search for their children in the face of brutal repression. They were the only people petitioning the police, the military, and the courts; they assumed the burden of locating their children and finding justice for them. And finally, even in the testimonial process, women put the needs of others above their own. In most places where torturers have done their worst, women have constituted the majority of testifiers, but they seldom speak of their own experiences.²⁶

Direct Victims

While women overwhelmingly constitute those indirectly affected by armed conflict, they also represent a large number of those directly affected. Women as direct victims of armed conflict suffered directly in both physical and psychological ways. Physically, wom-

en were tortured, raped and denied medical care. Psychologically, political violence threatened women's identity by targeting women as mothers, turning them into sexual objects and threatening them with sexual abuse. The processes of direct and indirect violations were constructed in such a manner so as to destroy the independent agency of women.

Physical Torture

According to Jean Franco, there is a distinct feminized torture experience, in which the threat men face while tortured is namely an attack on their manhood, while the threat women face is much more sadistic and sexualized in its roots.²⁷ While the pain stemming from this torture is genderless, it is applied in a gendered fashion. Torturers used torture tactics to reaffirm their manhood over their victims, often performing torture under macho aliases to reinforce their manliness. This physical attack forced male prisoners to live as women for the first time, as they were constantly aware of their bodies and ridiculed, and they were forced to find comfort in mundane activities such as talking to friends.²⁸ Women on the other hand, bore the brunt of the brutal and sadistic fantasies of their guards, thus, transforming the torture of women into something uniquely feminized.

Physical torture took many forms throughout Latin American during the periods of armed conflict, and these reports detail this with great specificity. Some of the most prominent forms were: *submarino*/dry *submarino* treatment (submerging someone's head under water, a plastic bag or fecal matter to the brink of asphyxiation), placing someone on the 'grill' (a large metal table, usually equipped for electric currents), placing electrodes on sensitive areas of the body (typically the genitals, gums or forcing prisoners to swallow them), being skinned alive or buried alive, subjecting people to brutal beatings referred to as "softening up," distorting spatial awareness, being subjected to constant blindfolding which often led to conjunctivitis (the infestation of the conjunctive by maggots), and systematic rape (both by humans, electric devices, and in some more extreme cases, dogs).²⁹ The purpose of this torture was to produce pain, which in turn became an emblem of the regime's

strength and power.³⁰ This, in turn, reinforced the patriarchic paradigm, and reminded women of their proper and subordinate place in society.

While both men and women systematically suffered from these types of brutal torture, and neither of their experiences can be diminished, women's torture took a distinctly sexualized form. One testimony from *Nunca Más* further demonstrates this point. It reads:

Women were interrogated in the same manner. They were stripped naked, laid down on the bed, and the torture session would begin. With women, they would insert the wire in the vagina and then apply it to the breasts, which caused great pain. Many of them would menstruate mid-torture.³¹

This demonstrates that not only did women face the same interrogation and torture methods as men, but that there was also a uniquely gendered form of sexual assault added to the repertoire to further humiliate and degrade women.

Rape

Rape is a torture tactic designed to deny women of their physical agency; because as women are systematically raped, power is exerted over them, and they are denied of ownership of their bodies. Rape reinforced the weakness of women while exalting the power of men over their victims, and it used women's bodies against them. That the armed forces utilized rape as a war tactic is evident in reports from each country. In Guatemala, some reports detail that the raping of women in the Quiche Province was so widespread that nearly every single woman between eleven and fifteen years was subject to sexual assault at the hands of the military.³² The CEH report states that 99.1 percent³³ of those who suffered from sexual abuse were female, while the Valech Report from Chile makes similar claims.³⁴ One testimony from the REHMI Report demonstrates the brutality of this. It reads: "*All the soldiers left their packs and dragged her like a dog to the riverbanks. They raped and killed her.*"³⁵ In Argentina, the military used especially perverse tactics to attack women's bodies. An example of this is a form of torture

called the rectoscope. The rectoscope worked by inserting a tube inside a woman's anus or vagina, and then placing a rat or rodent inside the tube so that it could eat through the woman's internal organs.³⁶

In Chile, women were often raped in front of their spouses or family members to further shame them. There are numerous testimonies in the Valech Report which demonstrate the obtrusive and systematic nature of Chilean rape scenes. The testimony of a female prisoner clearly demonstrates this:

In the Police Station, I suffered violation by bottles, genital injuries, blows to the head. . . By violation of the torturers I was pregnant and I had an abortion in jail. I underwent electric shocks, suspension, "*pau-arara*," *submarinos*, mock executions, and cigarette burns. They forced me to take drugs, I underwent sexual violation and harassment with dogs, and the introduction of live rats in the vagina and all the rest of my body. They forced me to have sexual relations with my father and brother who were detained.³⁷

It is obvious that rape was a war tactic, a signal of military victory and a method to reinforce the *machista* cultural that stressed the power and authority of masculinity.

Systematic rape and sexual abuse were also methods used to transfer women's personal assets into the hands of men.³⁸ This is largely because women's assets reside in their productive and reproductive labor, or in their access to land or livestock. This was particularly destructive in Guatemala and El Salvador, where a majority of the massacres took place in rural areas, and where destruction of peasant land was a systematic military policy. Armed actors used rape to control women's productive labor by forcing them into sexual enslavement, or abducting them to serve as cooks, cleaners, tailors or launderers. In regard to targeting women's reproductive capacity, it is no coincidence that specific age group was targeted. While there are cases of menopausal or post-menopausal rapes, the highest incidences of rape occurred against pre-pubescent women and women of childbearing age.³⁹ Not only does this often destroy

the raped woman's capacity to bare children, it also typically makes her an unsuitable partner within her community due to *marianismo's* emphasis on sexual purity.

Withholding of Medical Care

While most prisoners, both male and female, were denied medical care after torture sessions, the withholding of medical care took uniquely gender specific forms during armed conflict. This is namely because of the prevalence of rape and forced pregnancy. Rape was a specific military tactic used to demonstrate victory; thus, leaving women to die, raped and bloody, conveyed a specific military message. Mark Danner's *The Massacre at El Mozote* provides evidence of this in that the Salvadoran military left women's genitals, "torn and bloody, bespeaking repeated rape."⁴⁰ Testimony from Chile reiterates the intentional destruction of women's wombs: "*They had to extirpate the uterus and the ovaries because of internal bleeding.*"⁴¹ Another Chilean woman testified: "*Neither of my two daughters has been able to have children after what they did to them during the raid on our house.*"⁴² Images such as these were intended to demonstrate to others that the armed forces were willing to conquer the population with such a totality that even the empty womb was defenseless against them.

An even more specific form of the withholding of medical care occurred in Argentina. In Argentina, the military implemented a strategy to disappear women, allow them to live long enough to carry their pregnancies to term, execute them, and then finally distribute their children among military families. These women were not only subjected to torture while pregnant, they were also forced to give birth without medical care and while imprisoned. A testimony in *Nunca Más* conveys the brutality of this process:

Finally, after twelve hours, she was taken to the prison kitchen and put on a dirty table, blindfolded, and in front of all the guards, she had her child, assisted by a so-called doctor who did nothing except shout at her while the others laughed.⁴³

There is also evidence in other TRCs that conveys the destruction

of unborn children. In *From Madness to Hope*, the details of the destruction of a pregnant woman's womb during the El Mozote massacre⁴⁴ is representative of a policy employed throughout the country. Thus, it appears that the armed forces *wanted* pregnant women to be denied medical care, as this would serve as a glaring signal of power and victory for the rest of the population.

Psychological Torture

As with physical torture, psychological torture manifested itself in many forms, both for males and females. In general, the types of psychological torture included: isolation, space and time disorientation, exhaustion, threats, stress from rape, torture and rape of family members in front of one another, burying prisoners alive, and mock executions. Psychological torture's main focus was to disintegrate the victim's psychological defense mechanisms.⁴⁵ One Argentine prisoner describes it as:

The most vivid and terrifying memory I have of all that time was of always living with death. I felt it was impossible to think. I desperately tried to summon up a thought in order to convince myself that I wasn't dead. That I wasn't mad. At the same time, I wished with all my heart that they would kill me as soon as possible.⁴⁶

As with physical torture, psychological torture affected both men and women. But the methods of psychological torture were specifically designed to target and undermine women in their traditional gender roles. This is because traumatic experience undermines the foundations that form one's place in the world,⁴⁷ and for women, psychological torture undermined their foundation as wife, mother and defender of the family.

Attack on Women's Identity as Mothers

The foremost form of the psychological torture of women was its attack on women's identity, particularly as mothers. When armed forces invaded the home or community, they invaded the woman's domain. Often, armed forces showed extreme cruelty towards chil-

dren as a way to target the woman as mother, as it was her duty to protect them. They would torture children and even babies, so that women began to associate motherhood and pregnancy with negative emotions and fear. As the culture of *marianismo* exalts motherhood, this created a vast amount of confusion and conflicting feelings within women.

Details of the harassment of infants are particularly troubling. The armed forces' strategies demonstrate a clear pattern to obliterate women as the source of life, and redefine this ability as subversion. The REHMI Report offers many striking examples, such as:

The women who were pregnant. One of them was in her eighth month and they cut her belly, and they took out the little one, and they tossed it around like a ball. Then they cut off one breast, and they left it hanging in a tree.⁴⁸

Murdering a pregnant woman, and destroying her fetus in front of the other women, was a deliberate attack against other pregnant women, meant to distress them and threaten their motherhood. As detailed above, the abduction of pregnant women and the theft of their infants was one of the ultimate forms of this type assault on women's identity. In losing the ability to protect their children or fetuses, women lost their place within their culture.

Turning Women into Sexual Objects

Another form of distinctly gendered political violence was the transformation of women from their traditional culturally pure form into shameful sexual objects. The rape of women left severe psychological impact and transformed the traditional notions of womanhood in Latin America. Women were often abandoned by their husbands and families after returning home to their communities, which served as another source of shame. Or, in many cases, they were forced to exchange sex for freedom. A testimony from *Nunca Más* illustrates this: "*He offered to save my life if in exchange I would agree to have sexual relations with him. I agreed to his proposal, in the hope of saving my life and of having the blindfold removed.*"⁴⁹ A Guatemalan woman, who was gang raped,

summarized how humiliating the sexual violence was. She stated: *"Each time I started to come around, I saw a different man on top of me. And I remember when I could no longer feel that someone was with me. I was in a pool of urine, semen, I guess blood too. It was truly humiliating, incredibly humiliating."*⁵⁰

In Chile, this form of torture was specifically used to make it impossible for women to relate to the body, the world, or other people.⁵¹ The purpose of turning women into sexual objects was so that they felt as if they were accomplices in what were often ambiguous sexual situations. In Latin America, this took a uniquely cultural form, as this form of psychological torture linked aggression and violence with sex. Thus, women who were supposed to function in society as sexually pure and chaste were forever marred by a psychological perception of sex as violent and aggressive. Victims are often plagued by flashbacks of the rape scenes, and many suffer from sexual dysfunction,⁵² linking female sexuality to shame.

Conclusion

In times of armed conflict, when societies are riddled with political violence, all people suffer. Citizens are killed and disappeared and lose land or family members. But women suffer, and are targeted by armed actors, in specific, culturally appropriate manners. The effect of this is that women's agency as cultural actors is destroyed, along with their identity. The values that their culture exalts them for are attacked, while their place as a subordinate actor is reinforced. This creates a confusing and problematic state for women, who lose their niche in society and are often without institutional support or adequate protection. Perhaps the worst ramification is the shame that plagues the female populace after a period of armed conflict. When men die in battle, their status rises to that of hero. A Chilean woman, in her testimony, displayed her pride in this when she said, *"I want to be able to shout out proudly to the world that my father died for his ideas."*⁵³ However, when women are killed, they are cast down as doubly subversive for defying both cultural norms and the state. In their silent suffering, both directly and indirectly, women are denied their voice, and only in a thorough analysis of this voice, can their agency as actors be reclaimed.

ENDNOTES

1 Caroline O. N. Moser and Fiona C. Clark, "Gender, Conflict, and Building Sustainable Peace: Recent Lessons from Latin America," in *Gender and Development* vol.9, no. 3 (November 2001): 30,<http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost>

2 Ximena Buster-Burotto, "Surviving Beyond Fear: Women and Torture in Latin America," in *Women and Change in Latin America*, edited by June Nash and Helen Safa, (Massachusetts: Bergin & Garvey Publishers, Inc., 1986), 298.

3 M.B. Rondon, "From Marianism to terrorism: The Many Faces of Violence against Women in Latin America," in *Archives of Women's Mental Health* No 6., Vol. 3, 2003: 163.

4 Caroline O. N. and Fiona C. Clark, "Introduction," in *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors?: Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence*, edited by Caroline O. N. Moser and Fiona C. Clark, (New York: Zed Books, 2001), 4-5.

5 *Ibid.*, 5.

6 *Ibid.*, 6

7 *Ibid.*

8 *Ibid.*

9 Priscilla Hayner, *Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity*, (New York: Routledge, 2001), 5.

10 Iain Guest, *Behind the Disappearances: Argentina's Dirty War against Human Rights and the United Nations*, (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1990), 54.

11 Guatemala, *Never Again! The Official Report of the Human Rights Office, Archdiocese of Guatemala*, (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1999), 82.

12 Nancy Caro Hollander, "The Gendering of Human Rights: Women and the Latin American Terrorist State," in *Feminist Studies*. Vol. 22 No. 1 (1996): 65. <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost>.

13 Argentina, National Commission of the Disappeared, *Nunca Más: The Report of the Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared*, (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1986), 448.

14 The Republic of Chile, *Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation*, (United States Insti-

tute of Peace Library: Truth Commissions: Reports: Chile, February 1991), appendix 1, page 2, <http://www.usip.org/library/truth.html#Chile>.

15 The Republic of Chile, *Informe de la Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura*, (June 1, 2005), Chapter 8, page 11. Reads: "Su esposa e hijos sufrimos pobreza y carencias de todo tipo, económico y de salud" http://www.gobiernodechile.cl/comision_valech/prologo.asp.

16 Argelia Londono, "Women, Youth, and Girls in the Armed Conflict," in *Women & Environments International Magazine*, Issue 58/59 (2003): 25. <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost>.

17 Guatemala, *Never Again*, 55.

18 El Salvador, *From Madness to Hope: the 12-Year war in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador*, (United States Institute of Peace Library: Truth Commissions: Reports: El Salvador, March 15, 1993), part 4, chapter 3, http://www.usip.org/library/tc/doc/reports/el_salvador/tc_es_03151993_toc.html.

19 Catherine Nolin Hanlon and Finola Shankar, "Gendered Spaces of Terror and Assault: The Testimonio of REMHI and the Commission for Historical Clarification in Guatemala," in *Gender, Place & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography* 7, no. 3 (2000): 266 <http://search.ebscohost.com/>.

20 Guatemala, *Never Again*, 80.

21 *Ibid.*, 41.

22 Mark Danner, *The Massacre at El Mozote: A Parable of the Cold War*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 71.

23 Leigh Binford, *The El Mozote Massacre: Anthropology and Human Rights*, (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1996), 157.

24 Argentina, *Nunca Más*, 208.

25 Guatemala, *Never Again*, 80.

26 Temma Kaplan, "Reversing the Shame and Gendering the Memory," in *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* vol. 28, no 11 (2002): 180, <http://search.ebscohost.com/>.

27 Jean Franco, "Gender, Death, and Resistance: Facing the Ethical Vacuum," in *Fear at the Edge: State Terror and Resistance*

in *Latin America*, edited by Juan E. Corradi and Patricia Weiss Fagen, (University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1992), 106.

28 *Ibid.*, 109.

29 Guatemala, *Never Again*; Guatemala, *Guatemala: Memory of Silence*; The Republic of Chile, *Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation and Informe de la Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura*; Argentina, *Nunca Más*; El Salvador, *From Madness to Hope*.

30 Eliane Scarry, *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 56.

31 Argentina, *Nunca Más*, 37.

32 Hollander, "The Gendering of Human Rights," 63.

33 Guatemala, *Guatemala: Memory of Silence: The Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification*, (United States Institute of Peace Library: Truth Commissions: Reports: February 25, 1999), conclusions part II, <http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/toc.html>.

34 The Republic of Chile, *Informe de la Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura*, Chapter 5, page 30.

35 Guatemala, *Never Again*, 77.

36 Argentina, *Nunca Más*.

37 The Republic of Chile, *Informe de la Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura*, chapter 5, page 31. Reads: "En la Comisaría [se omite] sufrí violación con botellas. Lesiones genitales, golpes en la cabeza, que provocaron mi estadía por una semana en la enfermería del Fuerte, sin medicamentos. . . Al quedar detenida fui incomunicada en una sala donde luego me violó un soldado raso mientras me interrogaban. Me decían cosas horribles, me apuntaban el cuello con un sable y que iba a ser violada por una cuadrilla si no hablaba. Por violación de los torturadores quedé embarazada y aborté en la cárcel. Sufrí shock eléctricos, colgamientos, «pau-arara», «submarinos», simulacro de fusilamiento, quemadura con cigarros. Me obligaron a tomar drogas, sufrí violación y acoso sexual con perros, la introducción de ratas vivas por la vagina y todo el cuerpo. Me obligaron a tener relaciones sexuales con mi padre y hermano que estaban detenidos. También a ver y escuchar

las torturas de mi hermano y padre. Me hicieron «el teléfono», me pusieron en la parrilla, me hicieron cortes con y atagán en mi estómago. Tenía 25 años. Estuve detenida hasta 1976. No tuve ningún proceso.”

38 Meredeth Turshen, “The Political Economy of Rape: An Analysis of Systematic Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women During Armed Conflict in Africa,” in *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors?: Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence*, eds. Caroline O. N. Moser and Fiona C. Clark, (New York: Zed Books, 2001), 55.

39 Meredeth Turshen, “The Political Economy of Rape,” 59.

40 Mark Danner, *The Massacre at El Mozote*, 25.

41 The Republic of Chile, *Informe de la Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura*, Chapter 8, page 10, Reads: “Me tuvieron que extirpar el útero y los ovarios por hemorragias internas.” Mujer, detenida en 1974, a los 27 años, Región Metropolitana.

42 The Republic of Chile, *Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation*, part 4, page 9.

43 Argentina, *Nunca Más*, 291.

44 El Salvador, *From Madness to Hope*, part 4, chapter 3.

45 Inger Agger, “Sexual Torture of Prisoners: An Overview,” in *Journal of Traumatic Stress* vol.2, no. 3 (1989): 306.

46 Argentina, *Nunca Más*, 23.

47 Antjie Krog, “Locked into Loss and Silence: Testimonies of Gender and Violence at the South African Truth Commission,” in *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors?: Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence*, eds. Caroline O. N. Moser and Fiona C. Clark, (New York: Zed Books, 2001), 211.

48 Guatemala, *Never Again*, 74.

49 Argentina, *Nunca Más*, 46.

50 Guatemala, *Never Again*, 153.

51 Agger, “Sexual Torture of Prisoners,” 307.

52 Agger, “Sexual Torture of Prisoners,” 309.

53 The Republic of Chile, *Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation*, part 4, page 20.

Bibliography

- Agger, Inger. "Sexual Torture of Prisoners: An Overview." *Journal of Traumatic Stress* vol.2, no. 3 (1989): 305-318.
- . *The Blue Room: Trauma and Testimony Among Refugee Women: A Psycho-Social Exploration*. New York: Zed Books, 1994.
- Argentina. National Commission of the Disappeared. *Nunca Más: The Report of the Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared*. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1986.
- Binford, Leigh. *The El Mozote Massacre: Anthropology and Human Rights*. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1996.
- Buster-Burotto, Ximena. "Surviving Beyond Fear: Women and Torture in Latin America." *Women and Change in Latin America*. Eds. June Nash and Helen Safa. Massachusetts: Bergin & Garvey Publishers, Inc., 1986.
- Chaney, Elsa M. *Supermadre: Women in Politics in Latin America*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979.
- Corradi, Juan E., Patricia Weiss Fagen and Manual Antonia Garretón, eds. *Fear at the Edge: State Terror and Resistance in Latin America*. University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1992.
- Danner, Mark. *The Massacre at El Mozote: A Parable of the Cold War*. New York: Vintage Books, 1994.
- El Salvador. *From Madness to Hope: the 12-Year war in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador*. United States Institute of Peace Library: Truth Commissions: Reports: El Salvador. March 15, 1993. http://www.usip.org/library/tc/doc/reports/el_salvador/tc_es_03151993_toc.html.
- Franco, Jean. "Gender, Death, and Resistance: Facing the Ethical Vacuum." *Fear at the Edge: State Terror and Resistance in Latin America*, edited by Juan E. Corradi and Patricia Weiss Fagen, 104-118. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992.
- Goldblatt, Beth and Sheila Meintjes. *Gender and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission*. Witwatersrand: University of Witwatersrand, 1996.
- Guatemala. *Guatemala: Memory of Silence: The Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification*. United States Institute

- of Peace Library: Truth Commissions: Reports: February 25, 1999. <http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/toc.html>
- Guatemala. *Never Again! The Official Report of the Human Rights Office, Archdiocese of Guatemala*. Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1999.
- Guest, Iain. *Behind the Disappearances: Argentina's Dirty War against Human Rights and the United Nations*. Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1990.
- Hanlon, Catherine Nolin and Finola Shankar. "Gendered Spaces of Terror and Assault: The Testimonio of REMHI and the Commission for Historical Clarification in Guatemala." *Gender, Place & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography* 7, no. 3 (2000): 265-87. <http://search.ebscohost.com/>.
- Hayner, Priscilla. *Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity*. New York: Routledge, 2001.
- Hollander, Nancy Caro. "The Gendering of Human Rights: Women and the Latin American Terrorist State." *Feminist Studies*. Vol. 22 No. 1 (1996): 40-80.
- Kaplan, Temma. "Reversing the Shame and Gendering the Memory." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* vol. 28, no 11 (2002): 179-199. <http://search.ebscohost.com/>.
- Koonings, Kees and Dirk Kruijt. *Societies of Fear: The Legacy of Civil War, Violence, and Terror in Latin America*. Zed Books: New York, 1999.
- Krog, Antjie. "Locked into Loss and Silence: Testimonies of Gender and Violence at the South African Truth Commission." In *Vicims, Perpetrators or Actors?: Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence*, edited by Caroline O. N. Moser and Fiona C. Clark. New York: Zed Books, 2001.
- Kruijt, Dirk. "Exercises in State Terrorism: The Counter-insurgency Campaigns in Guatemala and Peru." In *Societies of Fear: The Legacy of Civil War, Violence, and Terror in Latin America*, edited by Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt. Zed Books: New York, 1999.
- Logan, Kathleen. "Personal Testimony: Latin American Women Telling their Lives." *Latin American Research Review* vol. 32, no 1 (1997):199- 211. <http://search.ebscohost.com/>.

Londono, Argelia. "Women, Youth, and Girls in the Armed Conflict." *Women & Environments International Magazine*, Issue 58/59 (2003): 25-27.

Moser, Caroline O. N. and Fiona C. Clark. "Gender, Conflict, and Building Sustainable Peace: Recent Lessons from Latin America." *Gender and Development* vol.9, no. 3 (November 2001): 29-39. <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost> .

———. "Introduction." In *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors?: Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence*, edited by Caroline O. N. Moser and Fiona C. Clark. New York: Zed Books, 2001.

Moser, Caroline O. N. and Fiona C. Clark, eds. *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors?: Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence*. New York: Zed Books, 2001.

Rondon, M.D. "From Marianism to terrorism: The Many Faces of Violence against Women in Latin America." *Archives of Women's Mental Health* Vol. 3, No 6. (2003): 157-163.

Scarry, Eliane. *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.

The Republic of Chile. *Informe de la Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura*. June 2005. http://www.gobierno-dechile.cl/comision_valech/prologo.asp

The Republic of Chile. *Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation*. United States Institute of Peace Library: Truth Commissions: Reports: Chile. February 1991. <http://www.usip.org/library/truth.html#Chile> . Turshen, Meredith. "The Political Economy of Rape: An Analysis of Systematic Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women During Armed Conflict in Africa." In *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors?: Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence*, edited by Caroline O. N. Moser and Fiona C. Clark. New York: Zed Books, 2001.



Unitary Executive Theory, Signing Statements, and the Expansion of Presidential War Powers under President George W. Bush

ANDREW K. MEHDIZADEH

In recent years, President Bush has sparked controversy by issuing “signing statements” on many new laws, declaring his authority to set aside said laws when they conflict with his interpretation of the Constitution. Though previous presidents have used signing statements for similar purposes, President Bush has expanded the scope, character, and usage of these statements. Critics have argued that these statements run “contrary to the rule of law and our constitutional separation of powers.”¹

Earlier presidents used such statements to announce their interpretation of legislation they were signing into law. For example, on May 30, 1830, President Andrew Jackson issued a signing statement stating that he would interpret a law appropriating money for the construction of a road from Detroit to Chicago “with the understanding that the road...is not to be extended beyond the limits of the said territory.”² Modern Presidents have also used these statements to declare entire sections of laws to be unconstitutional and unenforceable.³ For example, in 1971 President Nixon signed a defense appropriations bill, but objected to a provision in it that

set a final date for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Indochina as being “without force or effect.”⁴ President Ford objected to provisions in a defense appropriations bill that required congressional approval as a prerequisite for the obligation of certain funds.⁵ More recently, President Clinton refused to abide by a provision of the 1996 Defense Authorization Act that required the discharge of HIV positive service members.⁶ Congress later repealed this provision, so the signing statement never actually had an impact.⁷

From George Washington’s election in 1789 to the year 2000, presidents produced signing statements containing fewer than 600 challenges to the bills they signed.⁸ President George W. Bush, however, has made at least 800 such challenges within his first seven years in office.⁹ President Bush has greatly expanded their usage, scope, and character,¹⁰ which has sparked political controversy regarding not just the number of challenges he has issued, but the ways in which these signing statements have been used, particularly regarding issues related to President Bush’s “War on Terror.”¹¹ When defending these statements, Bush has often invoked the unitary executive theory, a relatively new legal doctrine supporting a powerful presidency.¹² The theory is based on parts of the Constitution vesting the President with the “executive power.”¹³ For Bush, this legal argument is essential in justifying not only the use of these statements, but their content.

This article examines Bush’s use of signing statements by first considering the historical and legal background that led to the use of the statements themselves. In order to determine which statements have had the greatest impact in expanding presidential power, the statements have been grouped by their relationship to both the unitary executive theory and Bush’s “War on Terror.” The paper finds that the unitary executive theory allowed the president to make broad assertions about presidential power in matters of national security.

The New Imperial Presidency

Over the past seven years, the Bush Administration has sought to expand the power of the Presidency. According to Jack Goldsmith, a former official within the Bush Administration, Vice President

Cheney and his top aide David Addington had intended to reverse Congress's "intrusions" on "unitary executive power" long before the September 11, 2001 attacks.¹⁴ He also noted that Addington and Cheney hold extraordinary influence in the White House. Cheney, having served during the Nixon and Ford Presidencies, was displeased with the political consequences of the Watergate scandal. In the early 1970s, Congress imposed restraints, including the 1973 War Powers Act, on the President and his executive authority. In a 2002 interview with Cokie Roberts on ABC's *This Week*, Cheney referred to such restraints as "unwise compromises" that resulted in "a constant, steady erosion of the prerogatives and power of the president."¹⁵ Cheney, along with other conservatives, had set out to restore the Presidency to what he believed was a more proper role in American government. "Restore power & auth to exec branch – need strong ldr'ship. Get rid of War Powers Act – restore independent rights," urged Cheney in a November 1980 handwritten note to James Baker, who was about to become President Reagan's Chief of Staff.¹⁶

President George W. Bush himself expressed his support for greater presidential power upon election. At the beginning of Bush's first term, associate counsel Bob Berenson was told by Alberto Gonzalez, then head White House legal counsel, that he was instructed by Bush "to make sure that he left the Presidency in better shape than he found it."¹⁷ The Bush Administration's lawyers were thereby instructed to seize any opportunity to expand the president's power. "Well before 9/11, it was a central part of the administration's overall institutional agenda to strengthen the Presidency as a whole," Berenson concluded.¹⁸ In addition, Bush repeatedly made statements indicating his agreement with Cheney's views about executive power. "I have an obligation to make sure that the Presidency remains robust. I'm not going to let Congress erode the power of the executive branch," he noted in 2002.¹⁹

President Bush's repeated use of signing statements reflects his support for a stronger presidency. Both his rhetoric and actions suggest that his Administration views Congress and the President as two entirely separate institutions with few overlapping roles and responsibilities. Since, according to this interpretation, the Presi-

dent is an independent and unitary political actor with his own prerogatives, it is unconstitutional for Congress to interfere with or regulate the conduct of his executive branch. For example, a signing statement issued on October 28, 2004 cites the “separate powers of the Congress to legislate, and the President to execute the laws.”²⁰

The Birth of the Unitary Executive Theory

Bush and Cheney’s support for the expansion of presidential power was the result of an earlier movement built by a circle of conservative lawyers who favored this agenda. The development of their views should be seen as a conservative reaction to the post-Watergate reforms of the 1970s. This movement manifested itself during the years of the Reagan Administration, when a conservative president sought unilateral methods of circumventing a liberal Congress. Young conservative lawyers developed an organization known as “The Federalist Society.” Many of the group’s members had worked in the Nixon and Ford Administrations, and many were hired to work in Reagan’s Justice Department under Attorney General Edwin Meese III. There they began developing new legal theories to advance the President’s policy goals.²¹ A 1986 internal report disseminated within the Justice Department noted that such conservative activists were “finding separation of powers frustrating because it is sometimes an obstacle to the conservative political agenda.”²² It added that these conservatives were inclined to “make an exception to their usual respect for separation of powers and advocate a very strong President – primarily for the practical reason that an activist conservative currently sits in the White House, and they fear he may be the last.”²³

These lawyers soon developed a new constitutional doctrine known as the “unitary executive,” a legal argument granting sweeping constitutional and policy prerogatives to the President.²⁴ In the words of Kelley (2005), the “unitary executive” theory is based on the power of the president to “resist encroachments on the prerogatives of his office” and to “control the executive branch.”²⁵ The theory found one of its strongest advocates in young Federalist Society lawyer Samuel A. Alito Jr., now a Bush-appointed Supreme Court Justice. In 1986, Alito, then a Deputy Assistant Attorney

General in the Reagan Administration, wrote a memo recommending that President Reagan use signing statements on a regular basis. The memo broke with previous precedents about presidential signing statements in urging President Reagan to use the statements as “legislative history” for courts to interpret.²⁶

Traditionally, signing statements had been used for a variety of purposes. They often explained to the public the likely effects of a bill’s adoption, explained to subordinate officers within the Executive Branch how to interpret the legislation, and informed Congress and the public that the Executive Branch believed that a particular provision would be unconstitutional and would not be enforced.²⁷ Alito, however, advised the President to move beyond these precedents. “Our primary objective,” Alito wrote, “is to ensure that presidential signing statements assume their rightful place in the interpretation of legislation.” He continued, arguing that “the President’s understanding of the bill should be just as important as that of Congress.”²⁸ Therefore, Alito wrote, presidents should issue “interpretive” signing statements in order to “increase the power of the executive to shape the law” and to “curb some of the prevalent abuses of legislative history.”

Alito only cautiously recommended that President Reagan begin issuing interpretative signing statements. “As an introductory step, our interpretative signing statements should be of moderate size and scope...,” he wrote, adding that, “the first step will be to convince the courts that Presidential signing statements are valuable interpretative tools.”²⁹ Although Alito’s memo encouraging the use of signing statements as “legislative history” would largely fail, it nonetheless served as a philosophical basis for the Bush Administration’s expansive use of presidential signing statements. Alito’s argument for a stronger president was a source of inspiration for the “presidentialists” within the Bush Administration.

Steven G. Calabresi, an influential Federalist Society lawyer who served in the Reagan-Meese Justice Department, wrote an article entitled *The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary*. As one of the fathers of the “unitary executive theory,” Calabresi’s views, as expressed in this article, describe the logical reasoning behind the unitary executive theory.³⁰ Calabresi argues

that the Constitution itself bestows the president with the powers of a Unitary Executive. This logic is based on the Vesting Clause of Article II, which reads "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." Since the vesting of power in the president places *all* executive power in his hands, the clause thereby creates a hierarchical, unitary executive department under direct control of the President.³¹

Therefore, the Vesting Clause gives the president the authority to supervise and control all subordinate officials that execute existing constitutional and statutory provisions. Moreover, the president possesses "all of the executive power" and can "direct, control and supervise" inferior offices or agencies who seek to exercise discretionary executive power.³² The legal theory renders unconstitutional independent agencies, such as the Social Security Administration, because they exercise power belonging solely to the President.³³ In sum, Calabresi advocated that the federal bureaucracy be placed under the exclusive control of the president himself. In his opinion, "all federal officers exercising executive power must be subject to the direct control of the President." Congress has no authority in such a case; it cannot "deprive the President of his constitutional power to control the department."³⁴

Constitutional scholar Sakrishna Bangalore Prakash cites the Constitution's "Take Care Clause" to argue that the Framers intended the President to be a "Chief Administrator."³⁵ According to this theory, because the President himself is to be charged with executing federal law, other executive branch officials must therefore submit to his orders and wishes. The proponents of the theory cite the Constitution's Article II, Section 3, Take Care Clause, which requires the President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."³⁶ Although lower level officials may assist him in these tasks, they are ultimately working at his command. At any time the President may overrule or even dismiss them. Furthermore, the theory holds that there is no constitutional basis for independent and administrative agencies that execute federal law without presidential control and supervision.³⁷ The President alone has the constitutional responsibility to execute federal law. The establishment of

independent agencies conflicts with the Constitution, as these agencies constitute an illegitimate “fourth branch” of government.³⁸

The unitary executive theory was tested in a 1988 Supreme Court case known as *Morrison v. Olson*. The case involved a dispute between the Environmental Protection Agency and the Justice Department.³⁹ An independent counsel was appointed to investigate possible abuses of power by the Reagan administration. The executive branch rejected the counsel’s request for documents. Instead, the administration, invoking the unitary executive theory, questioned the constitutionality of the counsel itself, calling it a “fourth branch” of government, and demanded its removal. Subsequently, the Supreme Court rejected the unitary executive theory and upheld the independent counsel.⁴⁰

Justice Antonin Scalia rejected the decision and wrote a legal opinion advocating the administration’s position. In a lone dissent, he argued that the Constitution gives the President control over “all exercises of executive power.”⁴¹ Therefore, he reasoned, the President must also have the authority to remove independent counsels. Scalia supported an “unlimited presidential removal power” over independent counsels.⁴² Other legal scholars such as John C. Yoo extended the unitary executive theory to the President’s war powers. In 1996, Yoo argued that the Framers created a “unitary, independent executive” in the form of the presidency.⁴³ In his opinion, the Framers wanted the president to have “energy and independence” in war.⁴⁴ Yoo argued that the Framers constructed a constitutional framework designed to “encourage presidential initiative in war.”⁴⁵ In terms of its constitutional authority, Congress can only express its opposition to executive war decisions by exercising its powers over “funding and impeachment.”⁴⁶ Therefore, the “declare war” clause actually does not vest Congress with the power to initiate war. The President alone has the prerogative to make decisions about military deployments and war-making policy.

In Yoo’s opinion, the war making powers of the president were crafted by the Framers to ensure a “unity in purpose and energy in action.” Indeed, Yoo wrote that the Framers intended for *all* federal power to “be given to the President.”⁴⁷ He, like many other unitary

executive theorists, invoked Alexander Hamilton's *Federalist Paper* No. 70:

Decision, activity, secrecy and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number...Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks.

Yoo claimed that Hamilton advocated the centralization of power in the hands of the President. "A unitary executive," Yoo wrote, "can evaluate threats, consider policy choices, and mobilize national resources with the speed and energy that is far superior to any other branch."⁴⁸ Yoo would later become a prominent and influential lawyer within the Bush Administration, authoring legal opinions favoring stronger presidential powers.

In sum, the "unitary executive theory" protects the executive from congressional encroachment and establishes a hierarchical and corporate-like environment within the executive branch. The unitary executive theory defends the executive branch from Congressional and legislative interference. It also rejects the notion that Congress can regulate or constrain presidential behavior; it views the legislative and executive branches of government as entirely separate institutions.

Signing Statements and Unitary Executive Theory

The unitary executive theory provides a logical and constitutional basis for the use of presidential signing statements. Since the unitary executive theory holds that the Vesting Clause places all executive power in the hands of one president, it naturally follows that all other executive branch officials who exercise executive power must do so by the implicit delegation of the president.⁴⁹ Furthermore, Calabresi and Lev (2006) argue that signing statements give the president the instrument he needs to provide guidelines to his subordinates within the executive branch.⁵⁰ With these instructions

in mind, executive branch officials can understand the ways they must carry out and execute the law. Executive branch officials need these orders to understand the proper way of interpreting legislation approved by Congress. Calabresi and Lev argue that signing statements can be used to direct or order executive officials and are vital to making the executive branch function in practice the way the Constitution says it should.

The Constitution's "Take Care" Clause also serves as a basis for presidential signing statements. Since the "Take Care" Clause implies that the president alone is responsible for taking care that the laws are executed properly, subordinate officials ultimately possess no discretion independent of the president. Thus, the president may need to craft signing statements detailing the ways in which his officials must interpret and execute the law.

The Bush Administration's use of the unitary executive theory to justify its signing statements has met with a torrent of criticism in recent years. A 2006 report by the American Bar Association (ABA) denounced presidential signing statements as "unconstitutional," arguing that the President must either sign and enforce a bill or reject and veto it.⁵¹ Additionally, Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) and Representative Carol Shea-Porter (D-NH) introduced the Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2007. The bill would prohibit courts from relying on the statements in their dispositions and would give Congress standing to challenge the statements if used.⁵²

Relationship between the Theory and the Statements

In order to find the statements with the boldest assertions of presidential power, I analyzed certain statements according to their content. First, I examined all signing statements, from 2001 to 2007, containing the phrase "unitary executive."⁵³ I then considered only the statements relating to national security and President Bush's "War on Terror." As the table below demonstrates, the number of statements referring to national security is almost the same as those referring to a "unitary executive."⁵⁴ This correlation exists because, in his signing statements, Bush has used the theory to bolster his national security powers.

Table 1. Signing Statements Referring to a Unitary Executive and National Security, 2001-2007.

	NUMBER OF SIGNING STATEMENTS	UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY	NATIONAL SECURITY
2001	24	2	2
2002	34	13	13
2003	29	11	11
2004	25	12	12
2005	14	10	6
2006	23	14	10
2007	5	1	1
TOTAL:	154	63	55

The 63 signing statements vary in their content and substance. Nevertheless, the statements regarding the “unitary executive branch” make some of the boldest assertions of presidential power. It is important to understand the linkage between the statements, the theory, and the War on Terror. The theory not only provides the justification for the use of signing statements, but is also used in the statements themselves. Indeed, one of Bush’s primary reasons for rejecting legislative provisions and expanding his national security powers involves his authority to “supervise the unitary executive branch.” This phrase appears repeatedly throughout the signing statements.

The primary justification that President Bush gave when invoking the unitary executive theory involved legislative provisions that he felt imposed burdensome requirements on the executive branch to make recommendations and proposals to Congress. Of the 132 legislative provisions that Bush rejected, 48 were directly related to the president’s responsibility to make recommendations to Congress. For example, in a signing statement issued on November 27, 2002, President Bush rejected section 827 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.⁵⁵ That particular section required the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to submit annual reports to Congress about foreign companies who invest in American capital markets while contributing to

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.⁵⁶ This provision was targeted at Chinese companies thought to be investing in Iranian and Iraqi weapons programs. Despite these concerns about the behavior of such companies, the Bush administration nevertheless issued a signing statement declaring that it would interpret the provision in “a manner consistent with the President’s authority to supervise the unitary executive branch.”⁵⁷ Such a statement gave the president the right to edit or cancel the publication of the reports. The unitary executive theory justifies such measures, as it posits that the President has the constitutional authority to exercise control over all executive branch agencies and officials, including the CIA.

The second most common way that President Bush used the unitary executive theory involved legislative provisions that, in his opinion, unfairly required the executive branch to disclose information to Congress. Of the 132 legislative provisions that President Bush decided to challenge, 32 rejected Congressional requirements for the executive branch to make regular recommendations to Congress. For example, on November 2, 2002, President Bush issued a signing statement rejecting section 530(D) of the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Act.⁵⁸ That particular section instructed the Attorney General to: “Submit to Congress a report of any instance in which the Attorney General or any officer within the Department of Justice...establishes or implements a formal or informal policy to refrain from enforcing...any Federal statute.”⁵⁹ This provision, therefore, was intended to ensure that Justice Department officials properly enforce federal laws. By requiring the Department to submit reports about situations in which federal officials refused to enforce the law, Congress was trying to make sure that executive officials carry out the law as it is written.

The Bush Administration, however, rejected this provision. The 2002 signing statement declared that the President would enforce section 530(D) in a manner:

consistent with the constitutional authorities of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and to withhold information the disclosure of which could impair foreign relations, the

national security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive's constitutional duties.⁶⁰

The President, therefore, was claiming the right to direct his Attorney General not to obey the requirement about reports. This assertion of presidential prerogatives has its roots in the unitary executive theory, which gives the president full and complete control over the behavior of subordinate executive branch officials, including the Attorney General.

In the wake of the recent U.S. Attorney scandals, this particular signing statement is especially relevant. In 2007, the Democratically-controlled Congress held hearings investigating the possibility that the Justice Department had been politicized and was not properly enforcing federal law.⁶¹ Few noted that the Bush Administration's use of the unitary executive theory might have provided the legal basis for the firing of the U.S. Attorneys, and even fewer realized that the 2002 signing statement might have provided the Administration with the ability to block the oversight that could have prevented the firings from happening. The statement also suggests that the submission of such reports might disclose sensitive information, putting the nation's security in jeopardy. President Bush made the same argument in many other signing statements when he refused to abide by legislative provisions requiring him to submit information and reports to Congress. In these statements, the President cited his constitutional authority to protect the nation.

On November 6, 2003, President Bush made another signing statement rejecting a legislative provision requiring the disclosure of information. Title III of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, created an Inspector General for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which at the time was overseeing US military operations in Iraq.⁶² The legislation had intended to "prevent fraud and abuse" in the programs that the CPA was managing.⁶³ It would also keep the CPA informed about problems and deficiencies in its own programs, thereby encouraging greater efficiency. The Inspector General was to conduct audits and inves-

tigations on a regular basis. This would create accountability and transparency, improving the CPA's performance.

The signing statement issued by the Bush administration, however, declared that the Inspector General would refrain from carrying out investigations and audits that might require access to "sensitive information."⁶⁴ Such investigations, the administration argued, "would constitute a serious threat to national security."⁶⁵ As a result, the administration stated that it would interpret the Act "in a manner consistent with the President's constitutional authorities to conduct the Nation's foreign affairs, to supervise the unitary executive branch, and as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces."⁶⁶ This language provides the administration with an immense amount of latitude and flexibility to interpret the law in whatever way it deems appropriate.

Even though the Bush administration ultimately allowed the Inspector General to perform his tasks and duties, the statement is still significant because it reserved the right for the Administration to disobey the provision. The unitary executive theory gives the president the full authority to control, hire, and fire such officials, including an Inspector General, because they are ultimately part of his executive branch and are subject to his wishes.

Signing Statements and the War on Terror

The Bush administration also used the unitary executive theory to issue signing statements rejecting legislative provisions that it considered to be constraining on the president's "constitutional authority" to command the armed forces. Even though the phrase "armed forces" appears in only 10 of the 132 legislative provisions, the statements often made broad assertions about the president's control over the military.

For example, on October 28, 2004, President Bush made a signing statement challenging section 1021 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005.⁶⁷ This particular section banned US military personnel from engaging in combat operations in Colombia except if they were acting "in self defense."⁶⁸ For years the U.S. military had been providing assis-

tance to the Colombian government, an effort known as “Plan Colombia.”⁶⁹ The section placed parameters on the nature and scope of that assistance. The Bush administration said that the section would be interpreted “in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and to supervise the unitary executive branch.”⁷⁰ Again, the administration was arguing that the president, as both unitary executive *and* Commander-In-Chief, had the exclusive authority to control and direct the Armed Forces without interference from Congress. Therefore, the President argued, the executive branch reserved the right to flout the provision.

Perhaps the most controversial of these “Armed Forces” signing statements was issued on December 30, 2005. On that day, the Bush administration issued a statement rejecting Title X of the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006.⁷¹ Senator John McCain (R-Arizona), a longtime opponent of torture and coercive interrogation, inserted Title X into the 2006 defense appropriations bill.⁷² It banned the torture and mistreatment of detainees held in U.S. custody. Concerns about the mistreatment of U.S. detainees had been circulating for some time.⁷³ Title X was intended to reverse any such policies that might have sanctioned torture or coercive interrogation. It read as follows:

No individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.⁷⁴

Soon after signing this bill into law, the Bush Administration released a lengthy signing statement. It said that the President would interpret the law “in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief.”⁷⁵ The statement effectively argued that the president, as Commander-In-Chief and Unitary Executive, was not bound by this legislative provision and might not enforce it. Senator McCain, as well as Senator John Warner, later con-

demned Bush's use of the signing statement in this situation. Their worst fears were confirmed when information later emerged suggesting that the administration had indeed chosen to disobey the ban. The allegations of torture and mistreatment have continued unabated.⁷⁶

The same signing statement also rejected Section 8104 of the 2006 Defense Appropriations bill. Citing the president's authority as Commander-In-Chief and unitary executive, the statement said the President might not abide by the section's rules regarding the integration of foreign intelligence information.⁷⁷ That particular section had declared that, "None of the funds provided in this Act shall be available for integration of foreign intelligence information unless the information has been lawfully collected and processed."⁷⁸ This section is particularly significant because it seems to warn the President, his administration and its agencies that they can not conduct unauthorized surveillance for intelligence purposes. This section was also particularly relevant in December 2005, during which a controversy concerning illegal surveillance methods had recently emerged. On December 16, 2005, *The New York Times* revealed that just months after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the President had authorized the National Security Agency to wiretap Americans to search for evidence of terrorist activity without the traditional warrants previously required for domestic surveillance.⁷⁹ The President's signing statement exacerbated the controversy by declaring that he would interpret the legislation in a manner "consistent with the President's constitutional authority as Commander-In-Chief."⁸⁰ Thus, Bush reserved the right to continue his controversial intelligence policies. Later on, it became apparent that the President had indeed chosen not to comply with the intelligence provision, and that warrantless wiretapping may have continued.⁸¹

President Bush again invoked his status as Commander-In-Chief in a signing statement issued on October 28, 2004. This signing statement rejected parts of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005. The statement took issue with Section 574 of the Act, which banned officials within the Department of Defense from interfering with the ability of Judge Ad-

vocate Generals (JAGs) to give independent legal advice to military commanders.⁸² At the time, this section was particularly relevant because it was issued in the wake of the controversial Abu Ghraib prisoner scandal. The scandal had suggested that torture might have become institutionalized as a policy for interrogating and obtaining information from suspected terrorists.⁸³ Moreover, the grotesque scenes depicting interrogation techniques suggested that perhaps inferior military officials had been given faulty advice from executive branch officials. The legislation had intended to provide military commanders in Iraq with proper legal advice when interrogating prisoners and suspected terrorists; it would have allowed them to know what the proper interrogation techniques should be. The signing statement, however, seemed to prevent the JAGs from giving advice about proper interrogation techniques, thereby blocking them from providing advice to commanders that might conflict with the administration's own guidelines for the use of interrogation techniques.

President Bush flatly expressed his disagreement with the provision in the October 28, 2004 signing statement. He declared that he would interpret the section "in a manner consistent with the President's constitutional authorities...to supervise the unitary executive branch...and as Commander-in-Chief."⁸⁴ As the Unitary Executive, Bush was claiming he had the authority to subordinate military officials to his executive control and discretion, barring them from giving commanders the important advice they needed.

One of the other ways that President Bush used his signing statements was to exercise complete and full control over his staff, as well as other executive branch officials. Of the 132 legislative provisions that the President decided to challenge with the unitary executive theory, 21 are directly related to presidential control over staff and executive officials. Usually, such signing statements refer to the president's authority to "supervise the unitary executive branch" and reiterate the President's belief in a hierarchical and top-down governmental structure.

For example, on December 13, 2004, President Bush issued a signing statement regarding the passage of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.⁸⁵ That legislation contained a

section, 341(b), requiring the Director of the CIA to act through a particular official when establishing an inspection process for all agencies and departments of the U.S. Government that handle classified information. The process would determine who was to be given access to classified information.⁸⁶ President Bush, in his signing statement, wrote that Section 341 might not be followed, as it did not recognize the authority “committed exclusively to the President...to faithfully execute the laws and supervise the unitary executive branch.”⁸⁷

In other words, the President was arguing that Congress cannot require his officials to act through other officials when making policy, since their ultimate power resides with him alone. This statement, therefore, may simply reiterate the President’s views on the hierarchical structure of White House decision-making. Nevertheless, the statement also implies that the President can set intelligence disclosure policies himself, without the approval of the CIA Director. Moreover, the statement gives the President the authority to interfere with intelligence disclosure policies and, potentially, decide to set his own set of standards for the release of classified information. He could even overrule the wishes of his own CIA Director when creating these rules and regulations. The statement thereby gives the President the exclusive authority to determine who is given access to classified information.

Another major way President Bush has invoked the unitary executive theory has been through signing statements asserting his constitutional powers to “conduct the Nation’s foreign affairs.” In fact, he has challenged over 24 legislative provisions of this kind. For example, after Congress passed the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006, President Bush issued a signing statement challenging its Section 9.⁸⁸ Section 9 required the United States Executive Director at international financial institutions to vote against financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority.⁸⁹ President Bush rejected this requirement, declaring that such mandatory requirements would “impermissibly interfere with the President’s constitutional authorities to conduct the Nation’s foreign affairs.”⁹⁰

Another example can be found in a signing statement issued on September 30, 2002, which regarded the passage of the Foreign

Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003.⁹¹ The Act's Section 408 required the United States government to prevent violators of "internationally recognized human rights" from attaining membership on the United Nations Human Rights Commission.⁹² In addition, the Act had required the United States to "use its voice and vote" in international financial institutions to support programs "designed to raise the standard of living for the Tibetan people."⁹³ Also, Section 1343 directed the United States representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency to oppose Agency programs inconsistent with the "nonproliferation and safety goals" of the United States government.⁹⁴ The 2002 signing statement disregarded all of these sections, declaring them to be all "advisory," not mandatory.⁹⁵ The statement argued that only the President has the constitutional authority to "conduct the Nation's foreign affairs," and Congress has no authority to direct the nation's foreign policy in any way.⁹⁶

Most Recent Signing Statement

Since the beginning of 2008, Bush has issued only one signing statement. This particular statement was written in regard to the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008. The statement declared that four sections of the law, Sections 841, 846, 1079, and 1222, if followed, would limit the President's ability to "supervise the executive branch, and to execute his authority as Commander in Chief."⁹⁷ Bush's rejection of Section 1222 was the most controversial part of this statement. The Congressional reaction to this individual signing statement was quite strong. Section 1222 had limited funding for the construction of permanent military bases in Iraq.⁹⁸ Senator Robert P. Casey (D-PA) implied that the President's signing statement indicated that he would ignore the law's limits on the construction of permanent bases in Iraq. "Every time a senior administration official is asked about permanent US military bases in Iraq, they contend that it is not their intention to construct such facilities," he said. "Yet this signing statement issued by the president yesterday is the clearest signal yet that the administration wants to hold this option in reserve."⁹⁹ Speaker Nancy Pelosi made similar comments, saying she rejected "the notion in his sign-

ing statement that he can pick and choose which provisions of this law to execute.” “His job, under the Constitution, is to faithfully execute the law - every part of it - and I expect him to do just that,” she added.¹⁰⁰

General Trends

President Bush, using the unitary executive theory, has used signing statements to expand his presidential power in the “War on Terror.” Through these statements, he has asserted his power to detain and interrogate suspected terrorists, exercise full control over the nation’s foreign affairs, control the flow of government information, conduct unwarranted surveillance policies, and reject what he views as congressional encroachments on his prerogatives as both unitary executive and Commander-in-Chief. These statements are consistent with his, and the Vice President’s, views on the proper separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches of government.

From examining these signing statements, some general trends are observable. For example, the statements grew both bolder and broader in their scope, as time went on. Only in 2007, with the election of a Democratic Congress, did the President scale back his use of signing statements. There were only five signing statements in 2007, with only one containing a reference to the unitary executive theory. By comparison, 23 statements were issued in 2006. Whether or not this change resulted from a change in Congressional leadership cannot be known for certain, but it can be asserted that the election probably caused a shift.

The Future

Presidential candidates Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and John McCain have all pledged not to use signing statements if they are elected to the White House.¹⁰¹ But if a Democratic President is elected in 2008, he or she may find it difficult to control a bureaucracy that has become increasingly dominated by conservative appointees. Even a liberal president might find the signing statement, along with the unitary executive theory, to be useful methods when battling bureaucratic opposition and circumventing a hostile Con-

gress. And in an age of terrorism and national security threats, any president might deem it necessary to reject legislative provisions that might put the nation's security in jeopardy.

If future presidents do indeed continue to use the signing statement, it will be politically difficult for Congress to limit the use of this tool. Unless Congress suddenly confronts the president over issues of presidential power through the mechanisms of impeachment or the cutoff of federal funds, it would be quite unlikely that future presidents would refrain from using the increased level of power that President Bush and Vice President Cheney have brought to the White House. Such a confrontation remains unlikely because Congress, as a large institution that can only make decisions through the aggregation of members' preferences, faces "collective action problems" preventing it from mounting a "consistently effective defense against presidential encroachment."¹⁰² A confrontation is also unlikely because many of the statements are related to national security; Congress is often reluctant to challenge the president on these grounds.

But a recent report on signing statements, issued by the Government Accountability Office in June 2007, casts doubt on whether the federal government has actually been obeying the president's statements. The report examined signing statements regarding 2006 appropriations acts, finding that the president objected to a total of 160 legislative provisions.¹⁰³ They then determined whether the agencies responsible for their execution carried out the provisions as they were originally written. Of the 19 provisions sampled in the study, only six were not executed as written, with 10 of the 19 provisions being implemented as Congress had intended.¹⁰⁴ Thus, President Bush's signing statements have often been ineffective in reshaping federal law according to his wishes.

Nonetheless, the legacy of President Bush and Vice President Cheney will probably live on long after they leave the White House. These two men have left an indelible mark on American history, fundamentally altering power relationships in Washington. The legal theories they use grant presidents potentially limitless powers. The signing statement is effectively a line-item veto that gives the president the prerogatives of both the judicial and legislative branches

of government. In an interview for a History Channel documentary, Vice President Cheney expressed satisfaction with these changes. "I think, in fact, there has been over time a restoration, if you will, of the power and the authority of the president."¹⁰⁵

ENDNOTES

1 "President v. Congress: Signing Statements and Non Enforcement," *American Bar Association*, <http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/conference/2006/handouts/signing.pdf>.

2 John Wooley and Gerhard Peters, "Presidential Signing Statements," *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63928>.

3 U.S. Department of Justice, *Memorandum for Bernard Nussbaum, Counsel to the President*, (Washington, DC: DOJ, 1993).

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 "President v. Congress: Signing Statements and Non Enforcement," *American Bar Association*, <http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/conference/2006/handouts/signing.pdf>.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Charlie Savage, "Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws," *The Boston Globe*, April 30, 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/04/30/bush_challenges_hundreds_of_laws/

11 John Wooley and Gerhard Peters, "Presidential Signing Statements," *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63928>.

12 Ibid.

13 Steven G. Calabresi, Kevin H. Rhodes, "The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary," *Harvard Law Review*, 105, no. 6. (1992).

14 Jack Goldsmith, *The Terror Presidency* (New York: Norton, 2007), 85.

15 "The Vice President Appears on ABC's This Week," *The White House*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20020127.html>.

16 "Memorandum to James Baker," *The Washington Post Online*, http://blog.washingtonpost.com/cheney/sidebars/cheney_advice_to_baker/comments.html

17 Charlie Savage, *Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presidency* (New York: Little, Brown, 2007), 43.

18 Ibid., 75.

19 "President Bush Holds Press Conference," *The White House*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020313-8.html>

20 "President's Statement on the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act, 2005," *The White House*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/10/20041029-6.html>.

21 Christopher S. Kelley, "Rethinking Presidential Power: The Unitary Executive and the George W. Bush Presidency," Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 7-10, 2005. Quoted on Cageprisoners.com, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/downloads/kelleypaper.pdf>.

22 Savage, 43.

23 Savage, 43.

24 Aberbach, J. D., et Al, "The Contemporary Presidency: Who Wants Presidential Supremacy? Findings from the Institutions of American Democracy Project," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 37, no. 3 (September 2007): 515-530.

25 Christopher S. Kelley, "Rethinking Presidential Power: The Unitary Executive and the George W. Bush Presidency," Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 7-10, 2005. Quoted on Cageprisoners.com, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/downloads/kelleypaper.pdf>.

26 U.S. Department of Justice. *Memorandum to the Litigation Strategy Working Group*. 1986, (Washington, DC: The National Archives).

27 U.S. Department of Justice, *Memorandum for Bernard*

Nussbaum, Counsel to the President, 1993, (Washington, DC: DOJ, 1993).

28 U.S. Department of Justice. *Memorandum to the Litigation Strategy Working Group*. 1986, (Washington, DC: The National Archives).

29 Ibid.

30 Steven G. Calabresi, Kevin H. Rhodes. "The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary," *Harvard Law Review* 105, no. 6, (1992): 1165.

31 Ibid., 1177.

32 Ibid., 1166.

33 Ibid., 1158.

34 Ibid., 1168.

35 Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, "Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and the President's Administrative Powers," *The Yale Law Journal* 105, no. 6 (1992). <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%28199204%29105%3A6%3C1153%3ATS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6>

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 "MORRISON v. OLSON, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)," *FindLaw*, <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=487&invol=654>.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 John C. Yoo. "The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers," *California Law Review*, 84, no. 2, (1996): 167-305.

44 Ibid., 218.

45 Ibid., 304.

46 Ibid., 170.

47 John C. Yoo, "The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers," *California Law Review* 84, no. 2 (1996), 1676.

48 Ibid., 1676.

49 U.S. Department of Justice, *Memorandum to the Litigation Strategy Working Group*, 1986, (Washington, DC: The National Archives).

50 Steven G. Calabresi and Daniel Lev, "The Legal Significance of Signing Statements." *BePress*, http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?context=forum&article=1131&date=&mt=MTENjYzNDg4OQ==&access_ok_form=Continue, Calabresi and Lev.

51 "President v. Congress: Signing Statements and Non Enforcement," *American Bar Association*, <http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/conference/2006/handouts/signing.pdf>.

52 Christopher S. Kelley, "The Law: Contextualizing the Signing Statement," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 37, no. 4 (2007): 737-748.

53 John Wooley and Gerhard Peters, "Presidential Signing Statements," *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63928>.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

56 "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003," *GovTrack*, <http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/107/s/s2506.pdf>.

57 John Wooley and Gerhard Peters, "Presidential Signing Statements," *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63928>.

58 "President Signs Justice Approps Authorization Act," *The White House*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021104-3.html>

59 "21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Act," *United States Patent and Trademark Office*, http://www.uspto.gov/web/trademarks/PL107_273.pdf.

60 "President Signs Justice Approps Authorization Act," *The White House*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021104-3.html>.

61 Laura Jakes Jordan, "Facing troubled agency, attorney general sworn in," *Philly.com*, <http://www.philly.com/philly/news/>

nation_world/20071110_Facing_troubled_agency__attorney_general_sworn_in.html.

62 John Wooley and Gerhard Peters, "Presidential Signing Statements," *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63928>.

63 "Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004," *Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction*, http://www.sigir.mil/About/pdf/pl_108-106_sec3001.pdf, 1-2.

64 John Wooley and Gerhard Peters, "Presidential Signing Statements," *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63928>.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.

67 John Wooley and Gerhard Peters, "Presidential Signing Statements," *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63928>.

68 "Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005," *GovTrack*, <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h108-4200>, subtitle—C—counterdrug matters, mid.

69 Stephen Johnson, "Helping Colombia Fix Its Plan to Curb Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Insurgency," *The Heritage Foundation*, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/BG1435.cfm>

70 Ibid.

71 "President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, "The Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006," *The White House*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html>.

72 "Roll Call Vote: On the Amendment (McCain Amdt. No. 1977)," *United States Senate*, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=109&session=1&vote=00249

73 "Red Cross saw 'widespread abuse'," *BBC World News*, May 8, 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3694521.stm>.

74 “2006 Defense Appropriations Bill,” *GovTrack*, <http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/109/h/h2863.pdf>.

75 “President’s Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the “Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006,” *The White House*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html>.

76 Craig Whitlock, “Torture Alleged at CIA Prisons Abroad,” *Washington Post*, December 2, 2007, <http://www.journalgazette.net/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20071202/NEWS04/712020389>.

77 “President’s Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the “Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006,” *The White House*. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html>.

78 “2006 Defense Appropriations Bill,” *GovTrack*, <http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/109/h/h2863.pdf>

79 James Risen, “Bush Lets US Spy on Callers Without Courts,” *The New York Times*. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1196535932-2ZJq3yYs5UNPUO+1VEYSLg

80 “President’s Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006.” *The White House*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html>

81 Henry Weinstein, “Court Rejects Challenge to Wiretap Program.” *The Los Angeles Times*., <http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/front/la-me-secrets17nov17,1,4344124.story?coll=la-headlines-frontpage&track=crosspromo>

82 John Wooley and Gerhard Peters, “Presidential Signing Statements,” *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63928>.

83 “Red Cross saw ‘widespread abuse’,” *BBC World News*, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3694521.stm>.

84 John Wooley and Gerhard Peters, “Presidential Signing Statements,” *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presi->

dency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63928.

85 John Wooley and Gerhard Peters, "Presidential Signing Statements," *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63928>.

86 "Intelligence Authorization for the Fiscal Year 2004," *GovTrack*, <http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/108/h/h2417.pdf>

87 John Wooley and Gerhard Peters, "Presidential Signing Statements," *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63928>.

88 John Wooley and Gerhard Peters, "Presidential Signing Statements," *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63928>.

89 "Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act," *GovTrack*, <http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/109/h/h4681.pdf>

90 John Wooley and Gerhard Peters, "Presidential Signing Statements," *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63928>.

91 "Foreign Relations Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2003," *GovTrack*, <http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/107/h/h1646.pdf>.

92 Ibid., 41.

93 Ibid., 49.

94 Ibid., 103.

95 John Wooley and Gerhard Peters, "Presidential Signing Statements," *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63928>.

96 Ibid.

97 "President Signs H.R. 4986, The National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2008." *The White House*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080128-10.html>

98 "H.R. 1585: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008," *GovTrack*, <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill-text.xpd?bill=h110-1585>.

99 Charlie Savage, "Bush asserts authority to bypass defense act," *The Boston Globe*, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/01/30/bush_asserts_authority_to_bypass_defense_act/

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid.

102 Terry M. Moe, "The Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The Presidential Advantage," In *The Presidency and the Political System*, ed. Michael Nelson (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000), 433.

103 "Presidential Signing Statements Accompanying the Fiscal Year 2006 Appropriations Acts," *Government Accountability Office*, <http://www.gao.gov/decisions/appro/308603.pdf>.

104 Ibid.

105 Bob Woodward, "Cheney Upholds Power of the Presidency," *MSNBC*, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6846348/>.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aberbach, J.D. "The Contemporary President: Who Wants Presidential Supremacy? Findings from the Institutions of American Democracy Project." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 37, no. 3 (2007): 515-530.

Bush, George W. "President's Statement on the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act, 2005." *The White House*. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/10/20041029-6.html>.

Bush, George W. "President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the "Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006." *The White House*. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html>.

Bush, George W. "President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006." *The White House*. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html>.

Bush, George W. "President Signs H.R. 4986, The National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2008." *The White House*. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080128-10.html>.

Bush, George W. "Presidential Signing Statements Accompanying the

- Fiscal Year 2006 Appropriations Acts." *Government Accountability Office*. <http://www.gao.gov/decisions/appro/308603.pdf>.
- Bush, George W. "Presidential Signing Statements Accompanying the Fiscal Year 2006 Appropriations Acts." *Government Accountability Office*. <http://www.gao.gov/decisions/appro/308603.pdf>.
- Bush, George W. "President Signs Justice Approps Authorization Act." *The White House*. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021104-3.html>.
- Bush, George W. "President Bush Holds Press Conference." *The White House*. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020313-8.html>.
- Bush, George W. "President v. Congress: Signing Statements and Nonenforcement." *The American Bar Association*. <http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/conference/2006/handouts/signing.pdf>.
- Calabresi, Steven G., and Kevin H. Rhodes. "The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary." *Harvard Law Review*, 105, no. 6 (1992). <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%28199204%29105%3A6%3C1153%3ATSCUEP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6>.
- Calabresi, Steven. G., and Daniel Lev. "The Legal Significance of Signing Statements." *BePress*. http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?context=forum&article=1131&date=&mt=MTESNjYzNDg4OQ==&access_ok_form=Continue, Calabresi and Lev.
- "Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan." *Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction*. http://www.sigir.mil/About/pdf/pl_108-106_sec3001.pdf.
- "Foreign Relations Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2003." *GovTrack*, <http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/107/h/h1646.pdf>.
- Goldsmith, Jack. *The Terror Presidency*. New York: Norton, 2007.
- "H.R. 1585: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008." *GovTrack*, <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h110-1585>.

- "Intelligence Authorization for the Fiscal Year 2004." *GovTrack*, <http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/108/h/h2417.pdf>.
- Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003," *GovTrack*. <http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/107/s/s2506.pdf>.
- Jordan, Laura L. "Facing troubled agency, attorney general sworn in." *Philly.com*, November 1, 2007. http://www.philly.com/philly/news/nation_world/20071110_Facing_troubled_agency_attorney_general_sworn_in.html.
- Johnson, Stephen. "Helping Colombia Fix Its Plan to Curb Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Insurgency." *The Heritage Foundation*. <http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/BG1435.cfm>.
- Kelley, Christopher S. "Rethinking Presidential Power: The Unitary Executive and the George W. Bush Presidency." Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 7-10, 2005. Quoted in Cageprisoners.com, <http://www.cageprisoners.com/downloads/kelleypaper.pdf>.
- Kelley, Christopher S. "The Law: Contextualizing the Signing Statement." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 37, no. 4 (2007): 737-748.
- "MORRISON v. OLSON, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)." *FindLaw*. <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=487&invol=654>.
- "Memorandum to James Baker." *The Washington Post Online*. http://blog.washingtonpost.com/cheneys/sidebars/cheneys_advice_to_baker/comments.html.
- Moe, Terry M. "The Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The Presidential Advantage." In *The Presidency and the Political System*, edited by Michael Nelson, 433. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000.
- "Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act." *GovTrack*. <http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/109/h/h4681.pdf>.
- Prakash, Saikrishna B. "Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and the President's Administrative Powers." *The Yale Law Journal*, 105, no. 6 (1992). <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%28199204%29105%3A6%3C1153%3ATSCUEP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6>.

- "Red Cross saw 'widespread abuse.'" *BBC World News*, May 8, 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3694521.stm>.
- Risen, James, and Eric Lichtblau. "Bush Lets US Spy on Callers Without Courts." *The New York Times*, December 16, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1196535932-2ZJq3yYs5UNPUO+1VEYSLg.
- "Roll Call Vote: On the Amendment (McCain Amdt. No. 1977)." *United States Senate*, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=109&session=1&vote=00249.
- "Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005." *GovTrack*. <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill-text.xpd?bill=h108-4200>, subtitle—C—counterdrug matters, mid.
- Savage, Charlie. "Bush asserts authority to bypass defense act." *The Boston Globe*, January 30, 2008, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/01/30/bush_asserts_authority_to_bypass_defense_act/.
- Savage, Charlie. "Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws," *Boston Globe*, April 30, 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/04/30/bush_challenges_hundreds_of_laws/.
- Savage, Charlie. *Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presidency*. New York: Little, Brown, 2007.
- "The Vice President Appears on ABC's This Week." *The White House*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20020127.html>.
- U.S. Department of Justice. *Memorandum for Bernard Nussbaum, Counsel to the President*. 1986. Washington, DC: DOJ, 1993.
- U.S. Department of Justice. *Memorandum to the Litigation Strategy Working Group*. 1986. Washington, DC: The National Archives.
- Weinstein, Henry. "Court Rejects Challenge to Wiretap Program." *The Los Angeles Times*. <http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/front/la-me-secrets17nov17,1,4344124.story?coll=la-headlines-frontpage&track=crosspromo>.
- Whitlock, Craig. "Torture Alleged at CIA Prisons Abroad."

The Washington Post, December 2, 2007, <http://www.journalgazette.net/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20071202/NEWS04/712020389>.

Woodward, Bob. "Cheney Upholds Power of the Presidency." MS-NBC. <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6846348/>.


Wooley, John and Gerhard Peters. "Presidential Signing Statements." *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/signingstatements.php>.

Yoo, John C. "The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers." *California Law Review*, 84, no. 2 (1996): <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%28199204%29105%3A6%3C1153%3ATSCUEP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6>.

"21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Act." *United States Patent and Trademark Office*. http://www.uspto.gov/web/trademarks/PL107_273.pdf.

"2006 Defense Appropriations Bill," *GovTrack*, <http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/109/h/h2863.pdf>.

"2006 Defense Appropriations Bill." *GovTrack*, <http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/109/h/h2863.pdf>.



The Baha'is of Iran

History of Repression, Stories of Resistance

DAVID HOSEY

The Baha'i faith, often referred to as the world's youngest major religion, is known for its emphasis on tolerance and its recognition of the validity of different forms of religious expression.¹ It is thus ironic that since its founding in 19th century, the Baha'i faith in Iran has been faced with extensive religious persecution, both at the hands of religious authorities and the state. With the advent of the 1979 revolution, these two institutions have become essentially identical, and there is evidence that persecution has worsened, or at the very least has been institutionalized and systematized. Although the Baha'is represent "Iran's largest non-Muslim religious minority," they "are not mentioned in the Constitution and have the status of unprotected infidels."² The Shi'a state religion grants Judaism, Christianity, and Zoroastrianism the status of "true religions," which allows their followers a certain degree of civil and political freedom; the same does not hold true for those who adhere to the Baha'i faith.³ This legal difference is both a reflection of the historical situation of the Baha'i faith in Iran and a current cause of discrimination and repression. The systematic nature of this persecution has led one Baha'i scholar, Moojan Momen, to argue that the Iranian Baha'i community is the target

of a “suspended genocide.”⁴ Whatever the merits and deficiencies of this position, it is evident that the Baha’i have been faced with a consistent and systematic violation of their rights to practice their faith and to live as full citizens of Iran.

In order to understand the development of the Baha’i as a repressed religious minority in the Islamic Republic of Iran, it is necessary to explore the history and sources of this repression. An examination of this history reveals that despite the severely limited rights of Baha’is in Iran, a surprising variety of creative responses have been utilized by this minority religious population in order to survive continuing persecution, revealing the ability of minority groups to resist repression without resorting to violent means.

The Baha’i faith has approximately 5 million followers worldwide, making it the “second-most geographically widespread religion after Christianity.”⁵ Within Iran, where the religion was founded, estimates of the Bahai’s numbers vary widely, ranging from 150,000 to 300,000.⁶ As previously mentioned, this makes Baha’ism the largest non-Muslim minority religion in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The development of Baha’ism in Iran can be traced to the Babi religion, a 19th century movement with its roots in Shaykhism, a sect of Shi’a Islam which “expected the return of the hidden Twelfth Imam.”⁷ In 1844, a Shaykhi by the name of Sayyid Ali Muhammad Shirazi declared himself to be the “Bab,” meaning gate, of the Hidden Imam.⁸ The Babi movement which subsequently formed held that the Bab was in fact the Twelfth Imam in the flesh, as well as a “prophet and the herald of ‘him whom God shall manifest,’” who was to be “a messenger and bearer of a new revelation.”⁹

Perhaps due to its initial popularity, the Babi movement was doomed to a violent end. The Bab was imprisoned and, from 1848-1850, the Shah of Iran used military force to attack Babi communities. By 1850, it was decided that the best way to eliminate the Babi movement was to execute the Bab himself.¹⁰ In response, a small group of Babis attempted to assassinate the Shah. The attempt was unsuccessful and led to a massive violent response against the entire Babi community, in which between 3,000 and 20,000 Babis were killed.¹¹ This massacre represented the effective end of the Babi movement in Iran.

Although the Babi movement as it had originally appeared would never regain popularity, a new religious movement rose from its ashes. In 1866, an exiled leader of the Babi movement, Mirza Hussein Ali Nouri, declared himself "he whom God shall manifest," the coming of whom had been promised by the Bab. Ali Nouri renamed himself Baha'u'llah, meaning "Glory of God," and began promoting a new religious revelation. The majority of the remaining Babis followed Baha'u'llah and took the name Baha'is, and from the 1860s through the 1920s the new religion spread first throughout Iran, then throughout the Third World, and finally to Europe and the United States.¹² Baha'u'llah prohibited participation in politics, especially armed struggle, and promoted "a pacifist stand advocating world peace, universal education, an end to racial and religious prejudice, and several fundamental social reform issues."¹³ Central to the Baha'i belief system is the concept of progressive revelation, which accepts all world religions as representations of a divine truth which must be continuously revealed in order to reflect changing social and historical contexts.

Not surprisingly, Baha'u'llah's acceptance of Islam as a valid form of religious belief did not placate the Iranian clergy, who saw the new religion as a heretical assault on the unique position held by Muhammad,¹⁴ the last of the prophets. Already in exile in Baghdad, Baha'u'llah was sent first to Constantinople, then to Adrianople, then to Acre (now the city of Akko in Northern Israel, although at the time it was a part of Ottoman Palestine). At the same time, a renewed wave of persecution confronted the growing Baha'i population in Iran: "By the end of the nineteenth century the Baha'is found themselves under constant pressure from ecclesiastical and governmental authorities, and they were attacked on theological and moral grounds."¹⁵ As the 20th century dawned, it was evident that despite Baha'u'llah's efforts to avoid the wrath of the Iranian power structure, the persecution that had been faced by the Babi movement would continue to plague the quickly growing Baha'i community.

During the first half of the 20th century, changes in Iranian politics led to corresponding changes for the Baha'i community. Before the 20th century, the ability of Persian authorities to exercise strong cen-

tral authority was limited, and tribal identity remained much stronger than allegiance to the central government. The Pahlavi dynasty, which began with the ascension of Reza Shah as the new ruler of Iran in 1925, ushered in a new era of modernization and secularization:

Western influences flooded Iran in the twentieth century. While the masses remained largely under clerical influence, the bureaucracy, the officers' corps of the newly created national army, and the intellectual elite began to lose interest in the intricacies of the Sharia and in theological disputations....The clergy that had helped Reza Khan ascend the throne (out of fear of a republic such as the one Mustafa Kemal Ataturk had established in Turkey) found itself marginalized and with greatly diminished influence in public life.¹⁶

At first it seemed that a secularizing government in Iran would lead to an increase in religious freedom for the Baha'is as "[d]irect, violent, and public persecution of Bahais [sic] ceased during Reza Shah's rule."¹⁷ Nevertheless, the Baha'i International Community records repression, including the banning of Baha'i literature and the non-recognition of Baha'i marriages, during Reza Shah's reign.¹⁸ These restrictions were related to the wider efforts of the Shah to replace particular identities with a national Iranian identity.¹⁹

The passing of power to Reza Shah's son, Mohammad Reza Shah, signaled the end of this superficial respite. According to Eliz Sanasarian of the University of Southern California, the "popular notion among Iranian Muslims and other non-Muslims is that the Baha'is enjoyed a privileged status during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah."²⁰ This impression probably arose from the fact that high levels of education and a record of loyalty to the government among the Baha'i made them good candidates for government jobs.²¹ However, the Pahlavi shahs were also perfectly willing to use the Baha'i community as a scapegoat to relieve tension between the 'ulema (Muslim clergy) and the regime. The Pahlavi regime quickly realized that in order for it to advance its secularizing, modernizing, and nationalizing agenda it would need a way to pacify the powerful, traditionalist clergy:

[The monarchy] found it convenient in moments of crisis to placate the clergy by allowing it to attack the Baha'is, even permitting an occasional pogrom, provided it did not turn into a large-scale disturbance that would endanger public order or unduly increase the power of the clergy. The stronger the Pahlavi dictatorship grew, the more repressive it became toward the Baha'is.²²

It is thus evident that there is a significant disparity between the popular perception of the freedom granted to Baha'is during the Pahlavi era, and the actual treatment of the Baha'i community that was prevalent throughout the pre-Revolutionary period. In fact, the consolidation of centralized power led to the systematization of persecution: "where previously the persecutions had some element of mob action, they now acquired a more bureaucratic character and were often accompanied by government directives and edicts through the courts."²³

Perhaps the most significant anti-Baha'i move made by the Pahlavi regime was to allow conservative clergy to found the Hojjatiyeh Society in 1953. This vehemently anti-Baha'i society was aided by SAVAK, the Pahlavi secret police, and quickly "became the principle antagonist of the Baha'is" by the "publication of anti-Baha'i pamphlets, denunciation of Baha'is to the authorities, and the disruption of Baha'i gatherings by gangs of toughs."²⁴ The hostile environment promoted by the Hojjatiyeh Society paved the way for the infamous "Falsafi episode of 1955":

The most serious episode of persecution during the Pahlavi era took place in 1955 when a minor cleric, Falsafi, was given the freedom to broadcast on the government radio station inflammatory speeches rousing the mob to action against the Baha'is. There was a country-wide outburst of harassment of Baha'is with much looting and some deaths. This episode probably occurred because the Shah felt obligated to the religious establishment which helped him back to power after the coup against him by Mossadeq in 1953.²⁵

It is evident that if the Baha'i enjoyed a special status under Mo-

hammad Reza Shah, it was not a status to be envied. The Hojatiyeh Society continued to operate through the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979 and "would play an important role in the persecution of the Baha'is after the Islamic revolution."²⁶

From the beginning of the Iranian revolution which overthrew the Pahlavi regime in 1979, it was obvious that the situation of the Baha'is in Iran would only worsen. In an interview in December 1978, Ayatollah Khomeini denied that the Baha'i faith was a religion, identifying it instead as a politically subversive group, and asserted that the Baha'i would not have religious freedom in the new Islamic Republic.²⁷ This accusation was not new, as the 'ulema had long argued that the Baha'i served Russian interests in Iran; however, with the victory of the Revolution evident, it was obvious that what had previously been a propaganda tool of the conservative 'ulema would soon become government policy. What had once been the threat of "sporadic government actions" had transformed into "a specific and planned programme [sic] for the elimination of the Baha'i community."²⁸ The Islamic Republic of Iran did not grant the Baha'i community the status of Recognized Religious Minority (RRM), which meant that they did not have access to the same rights as other religious minorities:

The policy concerning constitutionally recognized non-Muslim minorities has differed from those non-Muslims not recognized in the constitution. Armenians, Assyrians, Jews, and Zoroastrians possess some valuable rights (e.g., voting for their own deputies, the right to assemble, and so forth), yet are excluded (overtly or covertly) from others and are, as will be shown, clearly a subordinated collectivity. The other non-Muslim communities, the Bahais and the Christian converts, remain excluded.²⁹

This exclusion has taken a variety of forms in the Islamic Republic-era, and has forced the Baha'is, along with other religious minorities, to "fluctuate between annihilation, exclusion, and perpetual submission."³⁰

A number of particular forms of persecution since 1979 bear mentioning. Momen cites the United Nations Human Rights Com-

mission's report on Iran, which includes reports of "official banning of all Baha'i institutions and activities," "arrest and execution of the entire body of the national leadership of the religion," "arrest and execution of many members of local leadership councils," "confiscation of Baha'i properties and assets," and "confiscation, desecration, and destruction of Baha'i holy places and cemeteries."³¹ The most egregious example of the last is the confiscation of the House of Bab, the holiest Baha'i shrine in Iran, and its subsequent destruction by clerical and governmental authorities. In addition, individual Baha'is have been the target of harassment, theft, murder, and other criminal activities, with no recourse to legal defense due to their non-protected status.³² Baha'is have been prohibited from working for the government, from owning property, from collecting pensions, from practicing law and medicine, from electing spiritual assemblies, and from attending university or other institutes of higher learning.³³ Over 200 Baha'is have been killed since the revolutionary victory of 1979, including members of several elected Baha'i Spiritual Assemblies.³⁴

In an international context which increasingly makes government restrictions on freedom of religion difficult to maintain, the Iranian government has had to find reasons other than religion to target the Baha'i community. The Baha'is have consistently been identified as a political threat, rather than as a religious group, by the Iranian government, and have been accused of having subversive ties which "range from collaboration with the Pahlavi regime or SAVAK to espionage or other subversive activities on behalf of foreign powers, usually Britain, America, and Israel."³⁵ The contradictions of these accusations are obvious in light of the history of repression of the Baha'i. Baha'is are accused of colluding with the Pahlavi regime and its SAVAK police force, both of which targeted the Baha'i community and allowed attacks on Baha'is to continue.

The Iranian government has consistently denied accusations that it persecutes the Baha'i community. These denials have vacillated between statements that the Baha'i are perfectly free to practice their religion in Iran to accusations that the Baha'i are not a religion at all but a political group. A memorandum discovered and published by the Special Representative of the UN Commission on

Human Rights reveals the awareness of the Iranian leadership of the unpopularity of their persecution of the Baha'is, and indicates their desire to reframe their harassment of the community in a manner more consistent with international pressure. The memorandum prohibits the expulsion or detainment of Baha'is "without reason," but affirms that the "government's treatment of them shall be such that their progress and development shall be blocked."³⁶ The memorandum allows Baha'is to be enrolled in schools with a "strong religious ideology" and validates the policy of denying employment to "persons identifying themselves as Baha'is."³⁷ The document provides an inside look at the intentional formation of policy aimed at persecuting the Baha'i community in Iran.

With such a stunning litany of persecutions and human rights abuses, it is important to identify the sources of the vehemence directed against the Baha'i faith in Iran. The obvious source of conflict is based in religious differences: "Not surprisingly, the notion that Muhammad would be followed by additional prophets or that any text...could supplant the *Qur'an* was deemed heretical."³⁸ The popularity of the new faith, its active proselytizing, and the fact that in the history of Abrahamic religions "[e]ach religion seems to have perceived its greatest threat as coming from that faith which immediately followed it," meant that those Iranians who were devout supporters of the Muslim faith were likely to feel threatened by the growing Baha'i community.³⁹ Political excuses for attacks on the Baha'i community are mainly fabricated, and reveal little more than the important role that scapegoating can play in the political realm. The Baha'is were used by the Pahlavi dynasty as an escape valve for tensions between the shah and the 'ulema, and have subsequently been a convenient enemy to justify the importance of the clergy's role in politics.

There is, however, one other potential source of conflict between the Iranian government and clergy and the Baha'i community that requires exploration. Denis MacEoin, of Newcastle University, argues that are elements of Orientalism in the portrayal of the tension between the Iranian clergy and the Baha'i:

[W]e are presented with image and counter-image: on the one

hand, fanatical, intolerant Iranian Muslims untouched by the Enlightenment, on the other, gentle Iranian Baha'is representing a Christian-like creed that must automatically evoke the sympathy of Western observers. I do not wish to deny whatever elements of truth there may be in that portrayal (Baha'is *are* normally gentle, those who kill them *are* lacking in tolerance), merely to draw attention to its stereotypical quality. On the one hand, tolerance and compassion are seen as concepts 'alien' to Iran and Islam (but as peculiar glories of 'the Western Enlightenment;'); on the other, many illiberal features of Baha'ism that might not fit so well into a black-and-white scenario (such as its notion of an infallible, divinely revealed Shari'a or the absolute authority accorded its ruling institution) are ignored in favour [sic] of a clean, Westernized image.⁴⁰

MacEoin argues that the Baha'i, especially since the leadership of Shoghi Effendi Rabbani in the first half of the 20th century, have portrayed themselves as Westernized, but in doing so have accepted certain Orientalist assumptions. MacEoin thus compares the situation of the Baha'i in Iran to that of New Religious Movements in the West: in both cases, the strong reaction to these movements "appear widely disproportionate to the supposed level of threat or the size of the group," and in both cases "the basic nature of the perceived threat seems to be very similar: an alien challenge to the assumed values of the broader society within which the sect is situated."⁴¹ In the West, this challenge might take the form of Eastern philosophies; in Iran, a Western worldview is a direct challenge to Iran's definition of itself as a counterforce to Western influence. MacEoin's analysis of the cultural conflict inherent in the tension between Baha'ism and the Iranian clergy is supported by the work of James K. Wellman, Jr. and Kyoko Tokuno, who argue that the vitality of a religious movement is related to whether it is in conflict with a surrounding culture, ideology, or way of life.⁴² In the case of the Baha'i faith, this conflict manifests itself in the faith's ability to portray itself as a Westernized religion. This ability can be analyzed in the context of the variety of responses that the Baha'is have utilized in the face of consistent persecution.

In response to a history of repression, the Baha'i community of Iran has been forced to find and utilize a variety of creative survival strategies. These strategies demonstrate the ability of oppressed minorities to resist persecution while developing new avenues to articulate their interests and message. Iran's Baha'is have not resorted to armed resistance, in part because of the ideological basis of Baha'u'llah's teachings, and in part because of the failure of the Babi movement to survive by means of armed resistance. As with many other persecuted minority groups, they have often not been able to utilize the state apparatus in order to protest their treatment, as this is the very apparatus which is responsible for their persecution.⁴³ Momen notes that in "response to the developing situation in Iran...appeals were addressed to the local and national government...[but it] soon became clear that this was having no effect."⁴⁴ Instead, the Baha'is have turned to a combination of emigration, *taqiyya* (concealment of religious identity), the utilization of international channels, and creative resistance such as the establishment of an underground university.

Flight from the country is one obvious possibility for the Baha'i of Iran. Given the large population of Baha'is outside of Iran and their wide geographic dispersal, it is evident that many Baha'is have indeed chosen to leave the country. Due to the lack of official numbers of Baha'i in Iran, it is difficult to accurately report how many Baha'is have emigrated from Iran.⁴⁵ Baha'i scholar Firuz Kazemzadeh puts the number of Baha'is who have fled at 30,000, although he does not report a source for this information.⁴⁶ Many of the Baha'is who choose to stay in Iran—or who do not have the resources to leave—adopt a policy of *taqiyya*, which is defined as "concealing, or even lying about, one's religious identity, to protect one's self or one's coreligionists."⁴⁷ This strategy can be quite effective because it is often self-identification of one's Baha'i beliefs which leads to the loss of employment or schooling. Given this, it is remarkable how many Baha'i choose to make their religious affiliation known, risking loss of job, property, and life in order to remain true to their faith. Nevertheless, *taqiyya* remains a common and culturally acceptable practice for those Baha'i who are unwilling or unable to leave Iran.⁴⁸

The large number of Baha'i who have chosen to leave, as well as the large number of converts around the world, open the way for another response to repression, that of recourse to international pressure. Their belief system, with its emphasis on international law, unity, and peace, is particularly compatible with the stated goal of many international NGOs and with the United Nations' charter. MacEoin notes that the Baha'i faith, in addition to having a "highly organized and efficient bureaucratic structure" at the international level, is "represented as a non-governmental body [NGO] at the UN, with an office in New York, while national Baha'i organizations often have good relations with influential institutions and individuals in their countries."⁴⁹ Due to these international connections, the Baha'i community in Iran, while having little domestic power, has access to a degree of power which is quite rare for a minority group. While suffering from an almost total lack of domestic political power, the Baha'is of Iran have been able to utilize "the pressure of international public opinion, the actions of the United Nations, [and] protests of governments."⁵⁰ It appears that this international pressure has been quite effective in forcing the Iranian government to rethink its treatment of the Baha'i: Momen credits the "vigorous international campaign waged by the international Baha'i community," with the help of "resolutions both in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and in the United Nations General Assembly," with preventing the genocidal intentions against the Baha'is of Iran from turning into reality.⁵¹ This is no small feat, and is a testament to the comparative power that the Baha'i international community is able to bring to bear on the situation in Iran.

Within Iran, the Baha'i community continues to devise creative strategies for survival in the face of persecution. A particularly important example of such a creative strategy is the Baha'i Institute for Higher Education (BIHE). The BIHE is an underground university that was "begun in 1987 because Bahais [sic] were virtually excluded from the established universities after the revolution of 1979."⁵² Despite the clandestine nature of the university, it was able not only to survive but to flourish:

No Baha'i subjects were taught, thus avoiding the possibility of being accused of fostering the Baha'i religion....Classes were held in private homes, which also house books and laboratory equipment. Although the organization of this 'open university' was not illegal, participants had to act with caution so as not to draw undue attention and antagonize the authorities. The university...grew to 900 students and 150 faculty members by 1998. It had established informal connections with universities abroad and maintained such high standards that a number of its alumni and alumnae went to graduate schools in the United States.⁵³

Although the school was able to survive unmolested for a decade, the BIHE was not able to completely avoid the scrutiny of the Iranian government. The *Journal of Church and State* records that the school was shut down in 1999, with "Iranian security forces...arresting thirty-six faculty members."⁵⁴ Fortunately for the BIHE, the international connections that it had established led to intense pressure on the Iranian Minister of Education, who received "thousands of letters of protest from university students, faculty, and administrators (among them the presidents of Yale, Harvard, Stanford, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Duke)."⁵⁵ The government allowed the activities of BIHE to continue, but the incident forced the school to reduce the size of its operation. However, the BIHE still stands as a "unique example of the determination of a repressed community not to permit itself to be deprived of education,"⁵⁶ and emphasizes once again the importance of international connections and pressure to the survival of the Baha'i community of Iran.

Since its founding, the Baha'i faith in Iran has been under intense pressure from both the Iranian government and the clergy. With these forces combined in the Islamic Republic, the situation has been so severe that at least one scholar has argued for it to be classified as a "suspended genocide."⁵⁷ Despite this, the Baha'i faith has continued to survive, making international connections and finding creative means to promote the needs of its members. In studying the range of responses of the Baha'i community to this history of repression, there are a number of important conclusions to be drawn.

The first important thing to note is simply the wide variety of responses that a relatively powerless minority community can present in the face of high levels of pressure. Avoiding violence, the Baha'is of Iran have continued to worship, attend school, and work, despite the hostility of the Iranian government to all of these actions. Sometimes this has meant concealing the faith of members; at other times, it has meant the opposite, and individual Baha'is have sacrificed employment or even life in order to take a stand against the persecution of their community. With domestic political power severely limited if not nonexistent, the Baha'is have sought alternative means of political expression, such as their appeals to the international community. This is a powerful reminder that seemingly powerless groups often show greater creativity and determination in the face of struggle than the powerful governments of the modern world.

In an era of skepticism about the ability of the international community to positively affect domestic affairs around the world, the role of the international community in protecting the Baha'is of Iran is another important aspect to examine. Although persecution continues and the Baha'i community remains under pressure, the international community has been able to apply effective pressure to the Iranian government. The BIHE continues to operate, and although the death of 200 Baha'is since the 1979 revolution is a tragedy, the numbers could have been much greater without the influence of the international community on the situation. This ought to send an important message to the international community about its ability to protect threatened minority groups around the world. The Baha'i community is certainly rare in the extensive nature of its international representation. However, if the international community, in the form of NGOs, the UN, and member governments, have the political will, it is evident that they can create effective policy to protect minority groups from even the most recalcitrant governments.

There is also an interesting dynamic to be examined between a 'secular' Western world, a theocratic state, and a minority religious group. The complex relationships between these groups present a fascinating case study of the continuing importance of religious be-

lief in a supposedly secularizing world. Can the Baha'i continue to articulate their religious vision in a way that is attractive to the Western world, without sacrificing the prophetic emphasis of their faith? How does the case of the Baha'i in Iran compare with the hostility experienced by new religious movements in the West, as articulated by MacEoin?⁵⁸ And how does this shed light on the tension between religious freedom and the importance of religious 'fundamentalism' in world affairs? These are all questions that are raised by the situation of the Baha'i community in Iran.

It is evident that there are many questions left to be answered concerning the Baha'i faith in Iran. For the Baha'i faith, however, the question is simply one of how to continue to survive in the face of hostile authorities. In response to a history of repression, the Baha'i community of Iran offers a plethora of stories of creative, nonviolent resistance. It is not likely that the hostility of the Iranian authorities towards the existence of the Baha'i community will change drastically anytime soon. However, with the help of international pressure and the incredible ability of threatened minority groups to respond to repression, the Baha'is of Iran will continue to do what they need to in order to survive, with their faith, their education, and their community intact.

ENDNOTES

1 For more information on the Baha'i faith, see their official website: Baha'i International Community, *The Baha'is: The International Web Site of the Baha'i Faith*, <http://www.bahai.org/>. This website also includes an overview of the history of persecution faced by the Baha'is in Iran.

2 Firuz Kazemzadeh, "The Baha'is in Iran: Twenty Years of Repression," *Social Research* 67, no. 2 (2000), 537.

It should be noted that Kazemzadeh is a Baha'i, and from 1963-2000 served as a member of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahai's of the United States. This is not at all a reason to discount his scholarship, but does shed light on his interest—and possible bias—on the topic.

3 Ibid.

4 Moojan Momen, "The Babi and Baha'i Community of Iran: A Case of 'Suspended Genocide?'," *Journal of Genocide Research* 7, no. 2 (2005): 239, <http://web.ebscohost.com>.

5 Baha'i International Community, "Questions and Answers," *The Baha'is: The International Web Site of the Baha'i Faith*, <http://www.bahai.org/faq>.

6 Eliz Sanasarian, *Religious Minorities in Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2000), 53.

7 Ibid., 50.

8 Adam Berry, "The Baha'i Faith and Its Relationship to Islam, Christianity, and Judaism: A Brief History," *International Social Science Review* 76, no. 3/4 (2004): 137, <http://web.ebscohost.com>.

9 Kazemzadeh, "The Baha'is in Iran," 537.

10 Momen, "Suspended Genocide," 221.

11 Ibid., 222.

12 Sanasarian, *Religious Minorities*, 50.

13 Ibid., 51.

14 A brief note on spelling: due to the difficulties of transliterating from Persian and Arabic, different sources might utilize different spellings of the same names, i.e. Muhammad and Mohammad, 'ulema and 'ulama, Qur'an and Koran, etc.

15 Kazemzadeh, "The Baha'is in Iran," 539.

16 Ibid.

17 Sanasarian, *Religious Minorities*, 52. Sanasarian points out that there was pressure placed on non-Muslim minorities during this period, but that little of this was directed specifically against the Baha'i community except for the non-recognition of Baha'i marriages. Nevertheless, it bears noting that the community was under pressure even during the 'safest' period of its history.

18 Baha'i International Community, "A Community Under Siege," *The Baha'is: The International Web Site of the Baha'i Faith*, <http://www.bahai.org/dir/worldwide/persecution/>.

19 Sanasarian, "Religious Minorities," 5.

20 Ibid., 52.

21 Kazemzadeh, "The Baha'is in Iran," 540. Remember that

Baha'u'llah had urged his followers to be good citizens, in part because he had seen the havoc wreaked on the Babi movement by their attempts at armed resistance.

22 Ibid.

23 Momen, "Suspended Genocide," 223.

24 Kazemzadeh, "The Baha'is in Iran," 540.

25 Momen, "Suspended Genocide," 224.

26 Kazemzadeh, "The Baha'is in Iran," 540.

27 Berry, "The Baha'i Faith," 140.

28 Momen, "Suspended Genocide," 224.

29 Sanasarian, *Religious Minorities*, 6.

30 Ibid., 7.

31 Momen, "Suspended Genocide," 224-225.

32 Ibid.

33 Kazemzadeh, "Baha'is in Iran," 542-546.

34 Ibid., 547-552.

35 Denis MacEoin, "The Baha'is of Iran: The Roots of Controversy," *Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies)* 14, no. 1 (1987): 76.

36 Document Doc.E/CN.4/1993/Add.1, Commission on Human Rights, 49th Session, February 5, 1993, Agenda item 12, cited in Momen, "Suspended Genocide," 226-227.

37 Ibid.

38 Berry, "The Baha'i Faith," 138.

39 Berry, 147-148.

40 MacEoin, "The Roots of Controversy," 78.

41 Ibid., 80.

42 James K. Wellman, Jr. and Kyoko Tokuno, "Is Religious Violence Inevitable?," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 43, no. 3 (2004): 291-296.

43 See Sanasarian, *Religious Minorities*. Sanasarian discusses the Baha'i, but because they are not a RRM, she often cannot include them in her discussion of minority responses, which focuses on responses through the legal apparatus of the state.

44 Momen, "Suspended Genocide," 227.

45 Mohammad Hemmasi and Carolyn V. Prorok, "Demographic Changes in Iran's Officially Recognized Religious Minority

Populations since the Islamic Revolution," *African and Asian Studies* 1, no. 2 (2002): 63-86.

46 Kazemzadeh, "Baha'is in Iran," 558.

47 Cyrus H. Gordon, "The Substratum of Taqiyya in Iran," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 97, no. 2 (1977): 192.

48 Gordon, "Taqiyya in Iran," 192.

49 MacEoin, "The Roots of Controversy," 75.

50 Kazemzadeh, "Baha'is in Iran," 558.

51 Momen, "Suspended Genocide," 238.

52 "Notes on Church-State Affairs: Iran," *Journal of Church and State* 41, no.1 (1999): 166-167, <http://web.ebscohost.com>.

53 Kazemzadeh, "Baha'is in Iran," 546.

54 "Notes," 166.

55 Kazemzadeh, "Baha'is in Iran," 547.

56 Ibid., 546.

57 Momen, "Suspended Genocide."

58 MacEoin, "The Roots of Controversy."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Berry, Adam. "The Baha'i Faith and Its Relationship to Islam, Christianity, and Judaism: A Brief History." *International Social Science Review* 76, no. 3/4 (2004): 137-151. <http://web.ebscohost.com>.

Baha'i International Community. *The Baha'is: The International Web Site of the Baha'i Faith*. <http://www.bahai.org/>.

Gordon, Cyrus H. "The Substratum of Taqiyya in Iran." *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 97, no. 2 (1977): 192.

Hemmasi, Mohammad and Carolyn V. Prorok. "Demographic Changes in Iran's Officially Recognized Religious Minority Populations since the Islamic Revolution." *African and Asian Studies* 1, no. 2 (2002): 63-86.

Kazemzadeh, Firuz. "The Baha'is in Iran: Twenty Years of Repression." *Social Research* 67, no. 2 (2000): 537-558.

MacEoin, Denis. "The Baha'is of Iran: The Roots of Controversy." *Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies)* 14, no. 1

(1987): 75-83. <http://www.jstor.org/>.


---. "Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy in Nineteenth-Century Shi'ism: The Cases of Shaykhism and Babism." *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 110, no. 2 (1990): 323-329. <http://www.jstor.org>.

Momen, Moojan. "The Babi and Baha'i Community of Iran: A Case of 'Suspended Genocide?'" *Journal of Genocide Research* 7, no. 2 (2005): 239, <http://web.ebscohost.com>.

"Notes on Church-State Affairs: Iran." *Journal of Church and State* 41, no. 1 (1999): 166-167. <http://web.ebscohost.com>.

Sanasarian, Eliz. *Religious Minorities in Iran*. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2000.

Wellman, James K., Jr. and Kyoko Tokuno. "Is Religious Violence Inevitable?" *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 43, no. 3 (2004): 291-296. <http://web.ebscohost.com>.



“A Better Future for the World”

The Short-term and Long-term Vision of the Atlantic Charter

GILLIAN BOURASSA

It is clear to even the most casual observer of contemporary politics that statements by government officials carry great weight. The scrutiny applied to messages released by public officials demonstrates the influence these individuals and their words have, as well as our recognition of the fact that these statements not only reflect on those who speak them but also on their constituents. We expect these statements, regardless of the speaker's position, to accurately reflect our ideals and opinions, so it is not surprising that there is controversy when leaders make statements that do not accurately reflect the actions and opinions of the citizenry. This is especially true during times of war, as we expect officials to explain to listeners both at home and abroad our reasons for participation in the war. Some of the greatest and most well-known articulations of a nation's philosophical beliefs have occurred during times of war, but sometimes lesser-known statements, such as the Atlantic Charter, are just as profound and also carry significant implications. Influenced by President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" and former President Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points," the Atlantic Charter was a statement of the war aims of Great Britain and the United States,

but it primarily served to outline the Allies' vision of the post-war world. Even though many have criticized the document and its ideals have not been fully realized, it is a document that had the potential to be the foundation of a lasting peace.

The Atlantic Charter was produced at the Atlantic Conference, a meeting between President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, as well as their highest military officers and diplomats, in August 1941 aboard American and British battleships off the coast of Newfoundland.¹ By this time, Germany had been in control of most of Western Europe for well over a year and was advancing into Russia and the Ukraine, while Japan had been increasing its holdings in Asia for two years.² This meeting was kept extremely secret for dramatic effect and to prevent expectations and fears from becoming too high among the American public.³ In fact, Roosevelt's staff was not fully informed of plans, while other officials present had not learned the true purpose of their trip until they were well on their way to the Conference.⁴ This secrecy, however, might have hurt Roosevelt and his colleagues; historians Otis L. Graham and Meghan Robinson Wander wrote that because of the secrecy of the conference, the Americans did not have "an overall conference strategy."⁵

The primary topics of conversation during the Conference were war strategy against Hitler and Mussolini, peace aims, and diplomatic strategy concerning Japan; territorial, economic, and diplomatic considerations made it necessary for Britain and the United States to consider questions of war aims and post-war policy.⁶ Churchill specifically wanted an American war declaration, but Roosevelt would not address this during the Conference because he was not certain of the support of the American public for such a declaration. In fact, Roosevelt clearly asserted that the United States would not enter the war at that time and that the country was no closer to joining the Allies against Germany.⁷ Discussions between British Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs Sir Alexander Cadogan and American Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles produced a draft of the text that evolved into the Charter. This draft cited the need to defend countries from Nazi aggression and outlined both the policy that became the Atlantic Charter and, in the words of Sir

Cadogan's draft, these nations' "hopes for a better future for the world."⁸

The immediate purpose of the document, and Roosevelt's goal for the Atlantic Conference, was to respond in another way to Axis aggression and to articulate the reasons the nations who would become the Allies fought the war.⁹ In fighting the war, the Allies did not seek to add to their own territories, nor did they seek territorial changes unless the peoples involved wanted them.¹⁰ Roosevelt found that it was necessary to assure people in Asia and in Europe that the Allies fought for freedom, asserting in March 1941 that "any nationality, no matter how small, has the inherent right to its own nationhood."¹¹ The Charter also stated that the Allies sought to eliminate the threat of Nazism and the danger posed by "Nazi tyranny;" they sought peace for all nations and the elimination of all threats to national security so that people would be able to "live out their lives in freedom from fear and want."¹²

These purposes of war echoed President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points and President Roosevelt's Four Freedoms. In World War I, Wilson sought to make the world "fit and safe to live in...for every peace-loving nation" so that all peoples could make their own choices about their lives, could enjoy justice, and could live free from the aggression of other nations.¹³ Articles I and II of the Atlantic Charter echoed Wilson's commitment to restoring conquered territories. Wilson was the first to seek national security through international cooperation and national self-determination; all of the war aims of the Charter articulated and revived these principles. The notion of ending threats to national security also realized Roosevelt's desire to implement the Four Freedoms he had articulated first in a press conference in July 1940 and then more explicitly in his State of the Union address in January 1941.¹⁴ Article VI of the Charter envisioned peace for all and the elimination of threats of invasion and other breaches of national security so that all people could live free from fear and want,¹⁵ revealing Roosevelt's desire to extend these freedoms to all people through victory in the war.

The bulk of the Atlantic Charter details the values that the Allies believed should guide the creation of the peace after the war. In their

introduction to the Charter, Roosevelt and Churchill stated that they intended to enumerate the "common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base[d] their hopes for a better future for the world."¹⁶ They claimed that they were drawing upon their own nations' strengths in order to create a new world order founded on the principles they outlined in the Charter. The Charter described how the Allies believed the world should operate, and their statements revealed their intention to fight the war so that this vision could be implemented for the benefit of all peoples. Roosevelt later explained in more detail this commitment to a new order for all people in his Fireside Chat on February 23, 1942. In this address, he said that "The Atlantic Charter applies...to the whole world" and that all people have the right to the Four Freedoms and to enjoy the peace envisioned in the Charter.¹⁷ In Roosevelt's view, it was of the utmost importance that the Charter's protections and freedoms be granted to all peoples, as these principles would create a more secure future for the world after the war.

The first characteristic of the post-war world was articulated in Article III of the Charter: all people should have the right to choose their form of government, and the Allies should fight to restore the right of self-government to those conquered by the Axis.¹⁸ This response opposed Axis rule and the Axis puppet regimes established in conquered territories and demonstrated a commitment to restoring sovereignty to victims of Axis aggression. In the Allies' vision, this conquest should never occur again, and no country should impose a government on another, because all peoples have the absolute right to choose their own forms of government.

Many observers went beyond the Charter's explicit statements about national self-determination and interpreted the document in a way that extended this principle to the colonized peoples of the world. Basil Rauch called the Charter "the most sweeping statement of anti-imperialism a British Prime Minister had ever given the world."¹⁹ Foster Dulles and Gerald Ridinger noted that Roosevelt was "a vigorous and persistent" opponent of colonialism who thought that the peoples of Asia were also entitled to the right of self-determined government articulated in Article III of the Charter.²⁰ They explained that Roosevelt believed that imperialism was

no longer appropriate and did not want to aid Britain so that it could preserve its colonial empire. He believed that foreign authority should not be reestablished in Asia after liberating it from Japanese occupation, since promoting a lasting peace required an end to imperialism and greater political and economic participation of colonized peoples.²¹ Roosevelt also believed that Churchill's desperation for U.S. assistance in the war would give Roosevelt the leverage he needed to promote "an entirely new approach to colonial problems everywhere."²² Churchill, however, disagreed and believed that the British were still entitled to rule India and Burma and that this provision applied only to the European peoples conquered by the Nazis.²³ Former presidential candidate Wendell Wilkie sided with Roosevelt in opposing imperialism and announced that Asian peoples had demanded that the Atlantic Charter be applied to them, even though Roosevelt had already affirmed the extension of the Charter's principles to Asia.²⁴ Despite opposition and the potential for further opposition from European colonial powers, Roosevelt believed that dismantling colonial empires and promoting national self-determination was necessary for peace and should be pursued in rebuilding the world after the war.

The Atlantic Charter also articulated a vision for new economic practices that would be of greater benefit for all peoples. In addition to the end of colonization implicit in Article III, Articles IV and V conceived of new economic relationships among nations that would be the foundation of greater prosperity for all. Article IV called for equal access to trade and raw materials for all nations in order to promote the economic growth and well-being of all nations, not just the more powerful ones. Article V called for economic cooperation among all nations in order to promote "improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security" for all peoples.²⁵ These points articulated a commitment to the type of free-market economies in which all nations could participate equally, in contrast to centuries-old mercantile and colonial systems. These points also echoed the progressivism of Roosevelt's New Deal and similar measures enacted in Great Britain while extending the New Deal vision and programs to the rest of the world so that all peoples could achieve maximum economic growth and prosperity.

An interesting extension of these ideas about equal access of all nations to raw materials was explored at a conference of British scientists in July 1942 about the world's mineral resources and the Atlantic Charter. In a review of the conference's discussions, Charles Behre described the keynote speaker's assertion that nations should cooperate to plan the production, distribution, and use of mineral resources so that each nation could develop its own mineral resources while working with other nations to ensure that all have equal access to raw materials and to finished products. This speaker also found it necessary to gather information about the world's mineral resources in order to help develop these policies.²⁶ Other presenters emphasized the importance of understanding that nations are interdependent for mineral resources and that technological advances had changed the world's mineral needs, making it less likely that a country could produce all the raw materials it needed, the Soviet Union being the possible exception because of its vast untapped resources.²⁷

These presenters believed that economic cooperation was essential in the post-war world, as they thought that in order to maintain peace, mineral resources had to keep flowing among nations. If nations could easily acquire the resources they needed, they would not need to resort to aggression in order to meet their economic needs. Some presenters at the conference believed that one of the reasons that the peace at the end of World War I failed was because mineral economists were not part of the negotiations, reflecting the peacemakers' failure to consider the importance of mineral resources and the role that access to these resources has in maintaining peace.²⁸ Some of the presenters also believed that there should be an international agency that would plan and control mineral flow and trade and would have the power to levy sanctions that would ensure complicity with regulations and would hinder what they referred to as "aggressor nations."²⁹ While sanctions could have been effective in ensuring the cooperation of all nations with efficient mineral policies developed by an international organization, it seems contrary to the opening of the world economy envisioned in the Atlantic Charter to reintroduce, in the words of one scientist present at the conference, "arbitrary governmental restrictions" on

resources and on trade.³⁰ Despite this contradiction, this conference raised important issues that further demonstrate the implications of the Atlantic Charter's statements on the post-war world and the issues that nations would have to consider as they planned and rebuilt after the war's end.

The Atlantic Charter's last articles directly reiterated principles from both the Fourteen Points and the Four Freedoms. Article VII of the Charter stated that all people should have the ability to travel at sea "without hindrance," echoing Wilson's Fourteen Points, which called for "absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas."³¹ This clause also cited Roosevelt's freedom from fear; he sought to ensure that no one would again be prevented from traveling because they feared other nations' aggression or because they feared for their safety in general. The Charter's final article called all nations to "come to the abandonment of the use of force" and to disarm, as peace could not endure if hostility among nations continued. The Charter also envisioned a new and enduring system of international security in order to maintain the peace expressed in Article VI.³² These articles clearly describe what the Allies wanted the world to be like after their victory. They drew upon Wilson's idea of an end to war and aggression and restated his desire to reduce armaments and institute an international organization that would promote collective security and maintain peace.³³ They also illustrated another fear Roosevelt wanted to eliminate from the world: the fear of aggression and the use of force by other countries that he called a "crushing burden."³⁴ Roosevelt repeated these points in his Fireside Chat of February 23, 1942, and again called for aggressors to disarm and for nations to realize they were entitled to self-determination and to the Four Freedoms.³⁵

Observer L. H. Woolsey further explained the implications of the Charter's provisions on the post-war world. In late 1942, he wrote that the Axis powers sought to unify and organize their respective regions, which was the same goal of the United Nations in promoting international cooperation, but he believed that the United Nations differed from the Axis in that it wanted to promote and protect, not suppress, freedom, peace, and the rule of law.³⁶ He also believed that Allied governments expressed a desire to create

“an organized Europe” so that they could rebuild from World War II and avert the outbreak of another war, but he thought that the possibility of an organized Europe might be far in the future and would not immediately result.³⁷ He also realized that war created unusual allies, which demonstrated that nations who are very different can work together if they have similar purposes and interests. Woolsey understood that the contrary belief, that nations with different ideologies were incapable of working with one another, had always prevented international organization and cooperation.³⁸ In his view, governments should be able to endure based on “their individual virtues” as long as these governments did not practice force or aggression,³⁹ implying that this was the Axis’ crime. It was not their form of government that was objectionable; instead, it was the fact that they disrupted the peace. This shows that Woolsey, like Roosevelt and Churchill, valued peace above all else and saw the maintenance of peace as the principle purpose of the post-war world.

Another observer, L. L. Bernard, suggested that after the war’s end, a better way to preserve the peace was to limit the world’s population to the level that could be supported by existing supplies of food and resources; he believed that the need for resources to support a population causes aggression, and that if everyone had equal access to wealth, profit would be removed from the table and “imperialistic wars” would end.⁴⁰ He also believed that an international organization should institute democracy and prevent power struggles among nations.⁴¹ His ideas extend the vision of the Charter and call for additional reforms; however, the removal of the economic causes of war and the opening of the world’s resources to all nations on an equal basis was already a goal of the Charter’s economic provisions. The Allies intended that an international organization would provide collective security and solve disputes before they turned into aggression and war.

Not only did the Allies lay out their goals for the war in the Atlantic Charter, they continued to emphasize these goals in statements made after the Conference concluded. In their “Statement on the Atlantic Charter Meeting” issued on August 14, 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill expressed their understanding of the threat that

Axis conquest posed to "world civilization" and that in the Charter, they enumerated the actions they had taken to ensure their own safety "in the face of these dangers."⁴² This statement shows that the Charter is first and foremost a response to Axis aggression and that the Allies' primary goal was to end this aggression, a statement intended to be more palatable to isolationist America than would any statement that promoted a more imperialistic reason for intervention.⁴³ Roosevelt sought to give isolationists little reason to protest, and in presenting the United States and Great Britain as doing nothing more than responding to aggression, Roosevelt increased the chances that the document and the American response to Axis aggression would be well-received.⁴⁴ In his message to Congress reporting on the Conference, Roosevelt called the eight points of the Charter the only "sound basis for genuine world tranquility," and cautioned against a peace in which the Nazis would control conquered territories and have the opportunity to prepare for another war.⁴⁵

Similar statements of purpose were made in the "Joint Declaration of the United Nations on Cooperation for Victory," issued on January 1, 1942. In this declaration, the 26 signatories pledged themselves to the "common program of purposes and principles" articulated in the Charter and promised all their resources to the response to Axis aggression. These nations also promised to cooperate, to act unilaterally, and to refrain from making separate peace treaties with Axis powers. In this declaration, these nations also stated that they pledged themselves to a "complete victory...to defend life, liberty, independence, and religious freedom" while seeking "to preserve human rights and justice" everywhere.⁴⁶ These statements were extensions of the moral principles outlined in the Atlantic Charter and applied these principles to the aims of other nations, reflecting the adoption of the Charter's goals by each nation as its own goals in fighting the war. The "Joint Declaration" also showed that the Charter was a guide for other nations to follow as they aided the Allies and opened the way for these nations to officially join the Allies at a later time.⁴⁷ President Roosevelt also continued to discuss the Charter's principles and articulated the purposes of the war in his Fireside Chat of February 23, 1942. He

called the United Nations “an association of independent peoples of equal dignity and equal importance” devoted to the “common cause” of stopping Axis aggression and united in “the anguish and the awful sacrifices of war.” In Roosevelt’s view, the purpose of the war was to stop Axis aggression, and all nations had to respond to this aggression in order to end the pain brought by war.

American political rhetoric consistently rearticulated the ideals of the Atlantic Charter throughout 1943 and 1944, demonstrating a continued commitment to this vision. On January 1, 1943, Roosevelt marked the first anniversary of the signing of the “Joint Declaration” with a statement that reminded the world of the United Nations’ commitment to destroying “military aggression, treaty violation, and calculated savagery” and to re-establishing life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness as the “cherished ideals of mankind” and the foundation of peace, again naming these as the principles that should govern the post-war world. In this statement, Roosevelt also rearticulated that the purposes of the war were to end “the present bandit assault upon civilization,” to prevent such an assault from ever happening again, and to use international cooperation to achieve a lasting peace.⁴⁸ In his State of the Union address that year, Roosevelt repeated his belief that disarmament of Germany and Japan was necessary, and later in 1943, he called for unconditional surrender followed by political and economic security, not “ruin under the United Nations,” as was the result of the peace after World War I.⁴⁹ These statements again show Roosevelt’s intentions in fighting the war, his vision for peace and his consistent commitment to fulfilling the aims of the Atlantic Charter.

Roosevelt was not the only person continuing to articulate the ideals of the Atlantic Charter in 1943 and 1944. In November 1943, the United States Senate issued a “Resolution on War and Peace Aims” that repeated the desire to secure a “complete victory” and “a just and honorable peace.” This shows that the Senate acknowledged the need for an international organization that recognized the “sovereign equality of all peace-loving states” in order to maintain peace after the war, reflecting the continuation of the philosophies expressed in Wilson’s Fourteen Points and the Atlantic Charter.⁵⁰ At Tehran in December 1943, Roosevelt, Stalin,

and Churchill clearly restated the ideals of the Atlantic Charter as they pledged that their countries would cooperate in the war and in the peace following the war. They also recommitted themselves to achieving an "enduring Peace" that would eliminate "the scourge and terror of war for many generations" and to creating "a world family of Democratic Nations."⁵¹ The Democratic Party Platform of 1944 pledged the Party to continuing the war in order to defeat enemies, to usher in a lasting peace, and to provide the force needed to maintain peace and to prevent other nations from preparing for war. The Platform also expressed the Party's desire to form an international body in which all states would be equal and able to join in order to ensure peace and security as well as the desire to develop an international court of justice to settle international disputes.⁵² Finally, the Platform articulated the Democratic Party's support for the Atlantic Charter, the Four Freedoms, and the goal of extending these principles to the United Nations and to all the countries of the world,⁵³ statements which demonstrate the influence of these ideals and the enduring commitment of the United States to preserving and spreading the principles Roosevelt and Churchill had articulated in the Atlantic Charter.

In the days following the Atlantic Conference, there were many expressions of praise and support for the Conference and the Charter. Senate Majority Leader Alben Barkley lauded Roosevelt's emphasis of "the high aims set forth" in the Charter and believed they would resonate "in the hearts of all lovers of human freedoms."⁵⁴ A group of sixteen influential Americans holding political and civil power spoke in support of the Charter and of the necessity of guaranteeing peace and collective security.⁵⁵ A newspaper in Switzerland called the document a "Magna Charta of freedom" that would affect "the course of the war" and "the future history of mankind," while American journalist P.J. Philip reported that Canadian Prime Minister William MacKenzie King supported the Charter and the Canadian people's solidarity with the United States and Great Britain in their vision for the post-war world, even though the Canadian public was more concerned with how the war would be fought.⁵⁶

Even though many praised the values expressed in the Atlantic Charter, the document also had its critics. American isolationists

opposed the Charter, fearing that the United States would have to protect Great Britain again, and newspapers such as the *Chicago Tribune* and the *New York Journal-American* condemned Roosevelt for discussing strategy with a leader of a nation at war.⁵⁷ Isolationists also accused Roosevelt of making an alliance with Great Britain and were angered by the Charter's aims, as they believed that these principles, especially those in Article VI, could be accomplished without going to war.⁵⁸ In their view, the document omitted Roosevelt's freedom of religion, demonstrating the influence of "the godless Soviet Union" over "the cynical Roosevelt and Churchill." Robert Sherwood, however, called this an "oversight" on the part of the Allies and reminds us that the "Joint Declaration" specifically pledged these nations to the protection of religious freedom.⁵⁹ In the days after the Conference, Roosevelt stated that the freedoms of religion and of information were "implicit in the eight points," even though Senate isolationists did not believe he could deliver on this promise given the presence of Stalin's government.⁶⁰

Criticism also came from abroad, from both the Axis and the Allies. The Axis press responded to the Charter and its "generalities...with ridicule," and Axis governments withheld the full text of the document, which, in the observation of William Langer and S. Everett Gleason, revealed the degree to which the Charter had value as propaganda.⁶¹ Nicholas Halasz, a foreign observer of Roosevelt, wrote that the Nazis feared the Charter would inspire subject peoples to rise up against Nazi rule.⁶² He reported that the German newspaper *Völkischer Beobachter* called Roosevelt and Churchill war criminals and accused Roosevelt of betraying the German people, while Mussolini believed that Roosevelt only hurt himself with the American people and Hitler believed the Charter was evidence of Jewish influence over Roosevelt.⁶³

In addition to his opposition to the destruction of Great Britain's colonial empire, Churchill was uncomfortable with the desire to destroy trade barriers; he feared that Britain would be at an economic disadvantage after the war and believed it was necessary to protect the country's economic opportunities.⁶⁴ Churchill also wanted Article VIII to contain an explicit statement defining an international peacekeeping organization, but Roosevelt wanted to avoid such a

statement, as he feared the response of Congress and the American public.⁶⁵ Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin also initially opposed the Charter's principles of self-determination and equality of economic opportunity; he later desired a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and became angry when the United States insisted on maintaining pre-war territorial boundaries.⁶⁶ In September 1941, Russia's ambassador to Great Britain agreed to adhere to the Charter, even though Stalin still wanted to lay claim to Poland and believed that the territorial provisions of the Charter attacked Soviet dominance in the Baltic.⁶⁷

In 1942, L. H. Woolsey made more significant criticisms of the Charter. He recognized that the foundation for a world order was beginning to appear and it was clear that each nation had a different view of the post-war world order.⁶⁸ He faulted the Charter for not having a provision to settle disputes or to use means other than force to solve problems, and he instead believed world leaders had the opportunity to make existing structures more effective in resolving conflict.⁶⁹ He also thought that there should have been some provision for a legislative method in order to ensure peaceful responses to post-war economic and social concerns and that the Charter omitted details describing how an international organization would be funded and would use peacekeeping troops.⁷⁰ While his criticisms were accurate to a point, he did not see that the Atlantic Charter was only supposed to be the vision and the outline for the war and for the world after the war; it was not supposed to cover the specifics in the way a United Nations Charter or a peace treaty would. To make these claims is the same as faulting the Founding Fathers for not including in the Declaration of Independence the form of government that the colonies wanted and the details of political organization that were appropriately saved for the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution.

Paul Einzig's criticism was not as stark as that of L. H. Woolsey, but he made important comments that reveal other potential weaknesses of the Atlantic Charter. He wrote in 1942 about Germany's economic disarmament and believed that it was necessary to develop a way to protect Europe from future German aggression without ruining the German people's living standards, in keeping

with the Atlantic Charter's pledge to respect nations vanquished by the Allies.⁷¹ He believed that economic disarmament was a crucial part of instituting peace because it prevented a country like Germany from rapidly rearming as soon as it was politically feasible.⁷² Einzig argued that one of the reasons the Versailles treaty failed was because it provided only for Germany's military disarmament; as a result, the country no longer had the need for defense spending, making it easier for the government to pay reparations and borrow capital while failing to reduce the capacity to produce arms.⁷³ Einzig recognized that economic disarmament could harm the German population; he believed that it was necessary to eliminate only the country's reserves of raw materials and the industries that could contribute to rearmament while providing for European independence from German trade and for German dependence on overseas imports.⁷⁴

While these seemed like logical measures and certainly would have reduced the German capacity to produce weapons, there was not, as Einzig himself observed, any way to guarantee that Germany would not rearm.⁷⁵ His argument also assumed that a strong Germany was the cause of war and a weak Germany would eliminate war, two assumptions that oversimplify political conflicts. Einzig thought it would be most effective to reduce the ability of Germany to participate in the world economy, but in following his recommendation, the world would have failed to uphold the ideal in the Atlantic Charter of guaranteeing to all nations equitable participation in the world economy. Theoretically, a disarmed Germany could ask the United Nations for economic assistance, but this would open the door for exploitation and further punishment of Germany by nations who chose to ignore the ideals of the Charter, creating the potential for future conflict.

It is clear that the ideals of the Atlantic Charter have not been fulfilled; indeed, deviation from the Charter's ideals began during the war. The idea of having a world free from militarism and spheres of influence was not fully embraced by Stalin or Churchill; only Roosevelt believed that the world could be governed by an international organization that used democratic values to resolve disputes and preserve world peace and security.⁷⁶ L. L. Bernard explained

that at the Yalta Conference, the Allies promised territories to the Soviet Union and in their post-war diplomacy failed to respect the rights of the peoples of Indonesia, Greece, Italy, Belgium, and other nations to choose their own governments while many Jews in Palestine, Europeans, and Asians did not have freedom from fear.⁷⁷ Walter LaFeber also described how the United States had come to seek its own interests in the course of the Yalta Conference and wanted to preserve its own access to the world's resources.⁷⁸

This failure to uphold Charter's ideals continued after the war. Bernard further accused the United States and Great Britain of standing for national self-determination only in areas in which the Russians sought to establish Communist states and accused the United States of failing to work toward improving labor standards or reducing discrimination within its own borders.⁷⁹ He also believed that the world failed to deliver on the Charter's promise of freedom of sea travel since prices of transportation were high when he wrote in 1946.⁸⁰ He did not realize, however, that the Charter envisioned protection from hostile forces, not market forces. Bernard saw veto power in the United Nations, the production of atomic bombs, U.S. military spending, and "a new Holy Alliance" as symptoms of a failure to practice collective security and the abandonment of force.⁸¹ Foster Dulles and Gerald Ridinger also realized that the United States had backed down on its promise to extend the Charter to colonized peoples in an effort not to alienate necessary allies among the European colonial powers.⁸² Even Roosevelt realized that none other than his coauthor Winston Churchill had pulled away from the Charter's ideals; Dulles and Ridinger explained that Roosevelt believed that the Charter brought hope to England at a time when the outcome of the war did not look very favorable, but that by the time of Yalta, Britain was winning the war and therefore in a position to do whatever it wanted, including turning away from the vision articulated in the Atlantic Charter four years earlier.⁸³ Looking back on the history of the second half of the 20th century, it is evident that these moments in the mid-1940s were the first of many that showed how the Atlantic Charter's ideals were largely put aside as the peace was negotiated and as the Cold War and its associated conflicts began to develop and how the Charter's

principles largely did not become the principles that governed the post-war world.

Some scholars question the importance of the Atlantic Charter as well as its status as a binding statement of policy. John Flynn believed the Charter was merely a "screen to hide what had actually been done at Placentia Bay," and Warren Kimball saw the Charter as the best-known result of the Conference but "a less important accomplishment" in the long-term. In his view, the document was written for the public and "to ward off the attacks" of isolationists.⁸⁴ Kimball agreed with Otis Graham and Meghan Robinson Wander in saying that the Conference's importance lay in the establishment of cooperation between Churchill and Roosevelt and their respective countries.⁸⁵ Graham and Wander also believed that the document only "papered over" areas in which Churchill and Roosevelt had yet to find common ground, responded to isolationist concerns, and kept Britain from advancing more specific war aims.⁸⁶ John Gunther reported that the British "did not take the charter as seriously" as did the Americans, while Robert Sherwood called the Charter a "publicity handout" that ended up being more powerful than the British anticipated.⁸⁷ Eric Larrabee noted that the Atlantic Charter was nothing more than a press release that "seems to have had little impact on public opinion."⁸⁸ He may have been correct in this assertion if we are to believe James Burns's statement that shortly after the Conference, three-quarters of Americans were aware of the meeting and the Charter but by five months after the Conference, less than one-fourth of the population claimed to know what the Charter was.⁸⁹

Franklin Roosevelt himself made a surprising statement in 1944 on the status of the Charter; he claimed that the document did not carry the authority of an executive order or a treaty because he and Churchill had not officially signed it and the Senate had not ratified it (Robert Sherwood pointed out that this course of action would have risked rejection of the Charter by the Senate). Roosevelt went on to say that the Charter was issued as a press release and that others had given it its "honorific" title, and soon after, it was learned that the framed copy of the document on the wall of the National Museum had been ordered removed.⁹⁰ This was a surprising state-

ment on Roosevelt's part, especially considering the many occasions on which he emphasized the values and ideals embodied in the Charter. All of these perspectives help to demonstrate possible reasons why the Charter was so easily abandoned in the later years of the war, as well as the absence of substantial discussion of the Charter from many histories of the era. However, this view does not acknowledge the many times in which Roosevelt spoke in support of the Charter and its principles and the support it earned from people around the world, most notably in the Joint Declaration of the United Nations. Even if the Charter did not carry the weight of a more "official" document, its principles were important motivators to these nations as they responded to Axis aggression in the early years of the war.

Even though the promise of the Atlantic Charter has not yet been realized and many do not consider it a momentous or legitimate document, it is still an important document in the history of World War II. It revealed Roosevelt's attitude toward the Axis and toward fighting the war and anticipated the principles he likely would have brought to the post-war peace discussions had he lived to see the end of the war. The document showed that world leaders understood that there was an alternative to the political order that had arisen under totalitarian governments, reemphasized the idealism of democratic ideology, reaffirmed the belief that principles of equality and cooperation were necessary for the collective benefit of all peoples, and demonstrated how wars would continue if these ideals were ignored. It provided a legitimate solution to the problem of war and outlined clear alternatives to future wars. Yes, the Charter's principles have not been fulfilled, and nations, including the Allied powers and their descendents, have not embraced these principles in the way that Roosevelt envisioned, but this document shows what it takes for people to end war and aggression, serves as a guide and a resource for all those who choose to work toward this vision, and is available as a model for those who renew the quest to maintain peace, for those nations that count themselves among "peace-loving nations," and for individuals who want the dream of an end to all war to become a reality.

ENDNOTES

1 William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941* (New York: Harper, 1953), 663.

2 James L. Stokesbury, *A Short History of World War II* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1980), 118, 120, 164.

3 James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 125.

4 Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War*, 664.

5 Otis L. Graham, Jr., and Meghan Robinson Wander, *Franklin D. Roosevelt: His Life and Times. An Encyclopedic View* (Boston: G. K. Hall and Co., 1985), 12.

6 Basil Rauch, *Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor: A Study in the Creation of Foreign Policy* (New York: Creative Age Press, 1950), 358; Burns, *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom*, 129.

7 John Charmley, *Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship, 1940-57* (London: Harcourt Brace, 1995), 39; Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Press Conference on the U.S.S. Potomac," August 16, 1941; John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project* [online], Santa Barbara, CA: University of California (hosted), Gerhard Peters (database), <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=16156/> (accessed 9 January 2008).

8 Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War*, 665, 681-682.

9 Walter LaFeber, *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1989), 380.

10 Articles I and II, "The Atlantic Charter (1941)," Samuel Rosenman, ed., *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. 10 (1938-1950), 314. Accessed through United States Department of State USINFO. <http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/53.htm/> (accessed 30 October 2007).

11 Foster Rhea Dulles and Gerald E. Ridinger, "The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt," *Political Science Quarterly* 70, no. 1 (March, 1955): 4. www.jstor.org/ (accessed 30 October 2007).

12 Article VI, "The Atlantic Charter."

13 "President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points," *World War I Document Archive*, eds. Richard Hacken and Jane Plotke. <http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/1918/14points.html/> (accessed 8 November 2007).

14 "Excerpts from the Press Conference., Hyde Park, New York," July 5th, 1940, from *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15976/> (accessed 30 October 2007); "State of the Union: 'Four Freedoms,'" January 6, 1941. http://www.millercenter.virginia.edu/scripps/digitalarchive/speeches/spe_1941_0106_roosevelt/ (accessed 15 November 2007).

15 Article VI, "The Atlantic Charter."

16 "The Atlantic Charter."

17 Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Fireside Chat," February 23rd, 1942, from *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16224/> (accessed 30 October 2007).

18 Article III, "The Atlantic Charter."

19 Rauch, *Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor*, 363.

20 Dulles and Ridinger, "The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt," 1.

21 Dulles and Ridinger, "The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt," 1, 5, 18.

22 Dulles and Ridinger, "The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt," 5, 6.

23 Dulles and Ridinger, "The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt," 6.

24 Dulles and Ridinger, "The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt," 8.

25 Article IV and V, "The Atlantic Charter."

26 Charles H. Behre, Jr., "Mineral Resources and the Atlantic Charter," *Geographical Review* 33, no. 3 (Jul. 1943): 482. www.jstor.org/ (accessed 30 October 2007).

27 Behre, "Mineral Resources and the Atlantic Charter," 483, 484.

28 Behre, "Mineral Resources and the Atlantic Charter," 486.

29 Behre, "Mineral Resources and the Atlantic Charter," 485, 483.

30 Behre, "Mineral Resources and the Atlantic Charter," 485.

31 Article VII, "The Atlantic Charter"; "President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points."

32 Articles VIII and VI, "The Atlantic Charter."

33 "President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points."

34 Article VIII, "The Atlantic Charter."

35 Roosevelt, "Fireside Chat."

36 L. H. Woolsey, "A Pattern of World Order," *The American Journal of International Law* 36, no. 4 (Oct. 1942): 622, www.jstor.org/ (accessed 30 October 2007). The use of the term "United Nations" here refers to the nations who signed the Joint Declaration of the United Nations in January, 1942, not the international organization formed after the war.

37 Woolsey, "A Pattern of World Order," 621.

38 Woolsey, "A Pattern of World Order," 621.

39 Woolsey, "A Pattern of World Order," 622.

40 L. L. Bernard, "Some Dynamics of Present World Relations," *Phylon* (1940-1956) 7, no. 2 (2nd Quarter, 1946): 118. www.jstor.org/ (accessed 30 October 2007).

41 Bernard, "Some Dynamics of Present World Relations," 118.

42 Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Statement on the Atlantic Charter Meeting with Prime Minister Churchill, August 14th, 1941," from *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16154/> (accessed 30 October 2007).

43 Roosevelt, "Statement on the Atlantic Charter Meeting"; Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War*, 690.

44 Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War*, 690. This favorable opinion did indeed come to pass; Langer and Gleason note that most Americans responded positively to the Charter, saw it as a source of optimism for those nations under Axis oppression, and supported international security through cooperation.

45 Frank L. Kluckhohns, "Religion secure, Roosevelt says," *New York Times* (1857-Current file); Aug. 22, 1941; ProQuest His-

torical Newspapers, The New York Times (1851-2004), 1. <http://proquest.umi.com/> (accessed 9 January 2008).

46 "Joint Declaration of the United Nations on Cooperation for Victory," January 1st, 1942, from *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16169/> (accessed 30 October 2007).

47 "Joint Declaration of the United Nations on Cooperation for Victory."

48 Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Statement on War and Peace," January 1st, 1943, from *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16308/> (accessed 30 October 2007).

49 United States Department of State, *Making the Peace Treaties, 1941-1947* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1947), 3.

50 "Senate Resolution on War and Peace Aims," *The American Journal of International Law* 38, no. 1, Supplement: Official Documents (Jan. 1944): 2, www.jstor.org/ (accessed 30 October 2007).

51 "Conference of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin at Tehran," *The American Journal of International Law* 38, no. 1, Supplement: Official Documents (Jan. 1944): 9, www.jstor.org/ (accessed 30 October 2007).

52 "Democratic Party Platform of 1944," July 19th, 1944, from *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29598/> (accessed 30 October 2007).

53 "Democratic Party Platform of 1944."

54 Kluckhohns, "Religion secure, Roosevelt says," 4.

55 "Group of 16 Backs 8-Point Program," *New York Times (1857-Current file)*, Aug. 20, 1941; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2004), 9, <http://proquest.umi.com/> (accessed 9 January 2008).

56 Nicholas Halasz, *Roosevelt through Foreign Eyes* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1961), 196; P. J. Philip, "Canadian Premier hails Conference," *New York Times (1857-Current file)*, Aug. 15, 1941; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2004), 3, <http://proquest.umi.com/> (accessed 9 January 2008).

57 Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War*, 689-690; Warren F. Kimball, ed., *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, vol. 1: Alliance Emerging, October 1933-November 1942 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 228.

58 Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War*, 689-690.

59 Kluckhohns, "Religion secure, Roosevelt says," 4; Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), 361.

60 Kluckhohns, "Religion secure, Roosevelt says," 4.

61 Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War*, 692.

62 Halasz, *Roosevelt through Foreign Eyes*, 199.

63 Halasz, *Roosevelt through Foreign Eyes*, 199.

64 LaFeber, *The American Age*, 381.

65 Charmley, *Churchill's Grand Alliance*, 38.

66 LaFeber, *The American Age*, 396.

67 John T. Flynn, *The Roosevelt Myth* (New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1948), 337; Kimball, *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 228.

68 Woolsey, "A Pattern of World Order," 621.

69 Woolsey, "A Pattern of World Order," 624.

70 Woolsey, "A Pattern of World Order," 624, 625.

71 Paul Einzig, "A Plan for Germany's Economic Disarmament," *The Economic Journal* 52, no. 206/207 (Jun.-Sept. 1942): 176, www.jstor.org/ (accessed 30 October 2007).

72 Einzig, "A Plan for Germany's Economic Disarmament," 176.

73 Einzig, "A Plan for Germany's Economic Disarmament," 177.

74 Einzig, "A Plan for Germany's Economic Disarmament," 179-180.

75 Einzig, "A Plan for Germany's Economic Disarmament," 181.

76 Editor's introduction, "The Atlantic Charter."

77 Bernard, "Some Dynamics of Present World Relations," 114, 115.

78 United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1955), 237. Quoted in LaFeber, *The American Age*, 417.

79 Bernard, "Some Dynamics of Present World Relations," 115.

80 Bernard, "Some Dynamics of Present World Relations," 115-116.

81 Bernard, "Some Dynamics of Present World Relations," 116.

82 Dulles and Ridinger, "The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt," 14-16.

83 Dulles and Ridinger, "The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt," 17.

84 Flynn, *The Roosevelt Myth*, 300-302; Kimball, *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 227-228.

85 Kimball, *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, 227; Graham and Wander, *Franklin D. Roosevelt: His Life and Times*, 11.

86 Graham and Wander, *Franklin D. Roosevelt: His Life and Times*, 13.

87 John Gunther, *Roosevelt in Retrospect: A Profile in History* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), 16; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 362.

88 Eric Larrabee, *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and their War* (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 625.

89 Burns, *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom*, 467.

90 Rauch, *Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor*, 362; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 362; Flynn, *The Roosevelt Myth*, 385-386.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- "The Atlantic Charter (1941)." Samuel Rosenman, ed., *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*. vol.10 (1938-1950). 314. Accessed through United States Department of State USINFO. <http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/53.htm/> (accessed 30 October 2007).
- Behre, Jr., Charles H. "Mineral Resources and the Atlantic Charter." *Geographical Review* 33, no. 3 (Jul. 1943): 482-486. www.jstor.org/ (accessed 30 October 2007).
- Bernard, L. L. "Some Dynamics of Present World Relations." *Phylon* (1940-1956) 7, no. 2 (2nd Quarter, 1946): 105-119. www.jstor.org/ (accessed 30 October 2007).
- Burns, James MacGregor. *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970.
- Charmley, John. *Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship, 1940-57*. London: Harcourt Brace, 1995.
- "Conference of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin at Tehran," *The American Journal of International Law* 38, no. 1, Supplement: Official Documents (Jan. 1944): 9-10. www.jstor.org/ (accessed 30 October 2007).
- "Democratic Party Platform of 1944," July 19th, 1944. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters. *The American Presidency Project* [online]. Santa Barbara, CA: University of California (hosted), Gerhard Peters (database). Available from World Wide Web: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29598/> (accessed 30 October 2007).
- Dulles, Foster Rhea and Gerald E. Ridinger. "The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt." *Political Science Quarterly* 70, no. 1 (March, 1955): 1-18. www.jstor.org/ (accessed 30 October 2007).
- Einzig, Paul. "A Plan for Germany's Economic Disarmament." *The Economic Journal* 52, no. 206/207 (Jun.-Sept. 1942): 176-185. www.jstor.org/ (accessed 30 October 2007).
- "Excerpts from the Press Conference. Hyde Park, New York," July 5th, 1940. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters. *The American Presidency Project* [online]. Santa Barbara, CA: University

- of California (hosted), Gerhard Peters (database). Available from World Wide Web: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15976/> (accessed 30 October 2007).
- Flynn, John T. *The Roosevelt Myth*. New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1948.
- Graham, Jr., Otis L., and Meghan Robinson Wander. *Franklin D. Roosevelt: His Life and Times. An Encyclopedic View*. Boston: G. K. Hall and Co., 1985.
- "Group of 16 Backs 8-Point Program," *New York Times* (1857-Current file), Aug. 20, 1941; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2004). <http://proquest.umi.com/> (accessed 9 January 2008).
- Gunther, John. *Roosevelt in Retrospect: A Profile in History*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950.
- Halasz, Nicholas. *Roosevelt through Foreign Eyes*. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1961.
- "Joint Declaration of the United Nations on Cooperation for Victory," January 1st, 1942. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters. *The American Presidency Project* [online]. Santa Barbara, CA: University of California (hosted), Gerhard Peters (database). Available from World Wide Web: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16169/> (accessed 30 October 2007).
- Kimball, Warren F., ed. *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, vol. 1: Alliance Emerging, October 1933-November 1942. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Kluckhohns, Frank L. "Religion secure, Roosevelt says," *New York Times* (1857-Current file), Aug. 22, 1941; ProQuest Historical Newspapers, The New York Times (1851-2004). <http://proquest.umi.com/> (accessed 9 January 2008).
- LaFeber, Walter. *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750*. New York: Norton, 1989.
- Langer, William L. and S. Everett Gleason. *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*. New York: Harper, 1953.
- Larrabee, Eric. *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and their War*. New York: Harper and Row, 1987.
- Philip, P. J. "Canadian Premier hails Conference," *New York Times*

(1857-Current file), Aug. 15, 1941; ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2004). <http://proquest.umi.com/> (accessed 9 January 2008).

"President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points." *World War I Document Archive*, eds. Richard Hacken and Jane Plotke. <http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/1918/14points.html/> (accessed 8 November 2007).

Rauch, Basil. *Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor: A Study in the Creation of Foreign Policy*. New York: Creative Age Press, 1950.

Roosevelt, Franklin D. "Fireside Chat," February 23rd, 1942. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters. *The American Presidency Project* [online]. Santa Barbara, CA: University of California (hosted), Gerhard Peters (database). Available from World Wide Web: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16224/> (accessed 30 October 2007).

Roosevelt, Franklin D. "Press Conference on the U.S.S. Potomac," August 16, 1941. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters. *The American Presidency Project* [online]. Santa Barbara, CA: University of California (hosted), Gerhard Peters (database). Available from World Wide Web: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=16156/> (accessed 9 January 2008).

Roosevelt, Franklin D. "Statement on the Atlantic Charter Meeting with Prime Minister Churchill, August 14th, 1941. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters. *The American Presidency Project* [online]. Santa Barbara, CA: University of California (hosted), Gerhard Peters (database). Available from World Wide Web: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16154/> (accessed 30 October 2007).

Roosevelt, Franklin D. "Statement on War and Peace," January 1st, 1943. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters. *The American Presidency Project* [online]. Santa Barbara, CA: University of California (hosted), Gerhard Peters (database). Available from World Wide Web: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16308/> (accessed 30 October 2007).

"Senate Resolution on War and Peace Aims," *The American Journal of International Law* 38, no. 1, Supplement: Official Documents

- (Jan. 1944): 2. www.jstor.org/ (accessed 30 October 2007).
- Sherwood, Robert E. *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948.
- "State of the Union: 'Four Freedoms,'" January 6, 1941. http://www.millercenter.virginia.edu/scripps/digitalarchive/speeches/spe_1941_0106_roosevelt/ (accessed 15 November 2007).
- Stokesbury, James L. *A Short History of World War II*. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1980.
- Woolsey, L. H. "A Pattern of World Order." *The American Journal of International Law* 36, no. 4 (Oct. 1942): 621-628. www.jstor.org/ (accessed 30 October 2007).
- United States Department of State. *Making the Peace Treaties, 1941-1947*. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1947.



Machiavelli, the Medici, and the Making of *The Prince*

BRIAN TAYLOR

An overlooked aspect of political discourse is the extent to which political analysts are influenced by the climate in which they operate. Regimes throughout history have both directly and indirectly influenced the political attitudes of even their most prominent and public citizens. This point is visible in the writings of Niccolo Machiavelli, a Florentine statesman, politician, author, and one of the most salient figures to emerge from the Italian Renaissance of the 15th and 16th centuries. Though he was a key player in the politics of the day, the source of his long-lasting fame, of course, was not his activities as a politician, but his literary output. During his lifetime, Machiavelli produced many notable works, including his *Discourse on Livy*, *The Art of War*, *Madrangola*, *Florentine Histories*, and his greatest, *The Prince*. A multitude of volumes have been written concerning this work, for which he is often hailed as one of the most influential figures of political philosophy. *The Prince*, however, was written with an underlying motive, the existence of which must be acknowledged before it can truly be understood. Machiavelli, a man accustomed to the privileges and luxuries of public court life had, by the time of his writing *The Prince*, been exiled from Florence and forced out

of public life; as such, much of what he wrote afterward, including *The Prince*, was prepared with an eye towards ingratiating himself to Florence's ruling family, the Medici, in hopes that he might gain their favor and return to the politics of his beloved city. Thus, while Machiavelli's writing certainly does contain valid and sincere political analysis, it also represents an attempt on his part to return to the public arena for which he longed dearly, and clearly illustrates the extent to which public political figures can be influenced in their opinions by regime attitude.

In order to understand Machiavelli's desire to return to the political sphere following his exile, one must understand something of his early career. Machiavelli's formative years found him longing for the chance to serve in public office, a chance which was granted him upon his election to the position of secretary to the Second Chancery in Florence in 1498 at the age of 29. Machiavelli held this position for 14 years, during which time he traveled on diplomatic missions both within Italy and beyond, became acquainted with many of Europe's leading power players, including Cesare Borgia and Louis XII, learned invaluable lessons concerning the ways of power politics, and served as a military advisor and organizer, assembling infantry forces for Italian military campaigns as well as the Florentine militia. Machiavelli, however, a dedicated servant of the Florentine republic since the beginning of his public career, eventually fell victim to a change of political fortune: in 1512 Florence once again came under the domination of the Pope, who restored the city's former ruling family, the Medici, to power. Machiavelli found himself without a job.¹

Following the loss of his position, Machiavelli's fortunes only continued to worsen. In February of 1513, he was included on a list of public figures thought to be unfriendly to the Medici, and was arrested and subsequently tortured on the rack. This is an important point to understand, that even before he began work on *The Prince*, Machiavelli had experienced not only rejection but also violence and pain at the hands of the Medici; Machiavelli's almost immediate efforts following his release to impress the Medici are thus even easier to understand. His release came upon the election

of a new pope, and, indeed, he very quickly made his first appeal to his friend Francesco Vettori to see if Vettori could assist him in getting a position within the new Medici government.² Vettori, a servant of the republic who had managed to attain the favor of the Medici and thus keep his position, was the principle outlet through whom Machiavelli would seek to gain the Medici's attention and favor Medici. "If it is possible," he wrote to Vettori on March 13th, "remind our Lordship about me in order that...either he or his family might start engaging my services in some way or other, because I believe I shall do honor to you and do something useful for me."³ Otherwise, as he wrote on March 18th, he would, "get on as I did when I came here: I was born in poverty and at an early age learned how to scrimp rather than to thrive."⁴ Vettori, for his part, replied to Machiavelli that he was not the right man to plead Machiavelli's case, and seeing no other avenues open to him at the moment, Machiavelli withdrew to his house at Sant' Andrea in Percussina, seven miles south of Florence, where he would begin what would later become *The Prince*.⁵

Clearly, from the first days and months of his exit from mainstream Florentine politics, Machiavelli was planning his return. The fact that Vettori was not optimistic did not damper Machiavelli's efforts; indeed, he continued urging Vettori to offer his services to the Medici. In the meantime, Machiavelli continued to talk politics. On April 9, before he left for Sant' Andrea, Machiavelli included this telling passage in a letter to Vettori, saying that, "Fortune has seen to it that since I do not know how to talk about either the silk or the wool trade, or profits or losses, I must talk about politics."⁶ This was a statement that Vettori immediately seized upon, as he shortly thereafter asked Machiavelli for his opinions concerning the state of European politics and the possibility of an alliance between France and Spain; the written exchange that ensued came to be known as the "peace correspondence," in which each proposed scenarios that would bring peace to Italy, inviting the other to criticize their proposals. Thus it was that, following his dismissal from public life, Machiavelli found himself in a position in which he sought to regain the favor of the Medici, and in which he had

both expressed his wish and been asked to continue discussing the political situation of the day. The stage for the writing of *The Prince* had been set.⁷

To treat *The Prince* as solely an attempt to remind the Medici of Machiavelli's political insight and potential usefulness would surely be ridiculous; to do so would be to dismiss a great literary work and one of the most astute analyses of politics ever written. Still, it must be noted that, even from the beginning, Machiavelli's great hope was that his work, which he initially called *De principatibus*, meaning "on principalities," would catch the Medici's attention. Medici, who at this point ruled Rome through Pope Leo X, formerly Giovanni dei Medici, and Florence through Lorenzo de' Medici and Giuliano de' Medici, one of Leo's top advisors. Machiavelli hoped that, if a member of the family could be coaxed into reading his work, it would become obvious that, better than any other political observer of the day, he was acquainted with the ways in which a prince must consolidate power, especially a prince who had recently taken power, as had the Medici.⁸

That *The Prince* was meant as more than a mere political tome is particularly evident in Machiavelli's letter of December 10, 1513 to Vettori, cited by author J.R. Hale as "perhaps the most famous letter ever written by an Italian."⁹ In it, Machiavelli describes daily life on his Sant' Andrea estate, and the solace he finds in returning to his study following a long day's work to write of the political lessons he had learned both from his experience and from that of the ancients. Toward the end of the letter, Machiavelli states his intention to dedicate his work to Giuliano, as he believes his work to be acceptable to a new prince. Machiavelli also wonders aloud whether he should present his work to Giuliano himself or have it sent to him, citing his fear that, should he present it to Giuliano, that it would not be read or that one of Giuliano's secretaries might take credit for it; on this point, he asks Vettori's advice. The most revealing part of the letter, in terms of Machiavelli's true intentions, comes in the final paragraph, in which he writes, "Besides, there is my desire that these Medici princes should begin to engage my services, even if they should start out by having me roll along a stone."¹⁰ Although this last statement is likely an exaggeration on

Machiavelli's part, it without doubt expresses his desire to find employment under the Medici, and the body of the letter confirms that Machiavelli's plan is to use his work as a springboard toward such employment.

As a work of literature, *The Prince* is one of the most important books ever written. It is first and foremost a discussion of princedom, and the ways in which such entities can be effectively ruled. As evidence for the assertions and recommendations he makes, Machiavelli uses examples from history, including recent Florentine history, but most importantly he utilizes his own political experience.¹¹ Indeed, biographer and historian J.R. Hale has written, "There is hardly a year from Machiavelli's career in the chancery that cannot be shown to have provided some evidence...that helped to shape *The Prince*."¹² The questions Machiavelli ponders are questions that have eternally vexed rulers and statesman and continue to do so today: whether it is better for a ruler to be feared than loved; what is the proper mode to run an army; how liberal or conservative a reputation a ruler should desire; do the ends justify the means? The material contained within *The Prince*, and the scholarly discussion it has generated in the centuries since its publication, has been of incalculable importance to the development of the study of political science and to the general understanding of the human condition, and as such to dismiss the work as merely an attempt to gain the favor of the Medici would be misguided. However, particularly when considered in conjunction with Machiavelli's personal correspondence, even within the text itself it is evident that *The Prince* was specifically meant for the Medici, with an eye towards Machiavelli's own political advancement.

As has already been established, Machiavelli sought to show the Medici, themselves new rulers, that he understood the ways in which a new prince should exercise power, and to this end he includes several chapters discussing how a ruler who has recently taken power should operate. To demonstrate his mastery of the subject, Machiavelli attacks it from several different angles: he includes chapters discussing "How Many Are the Kinds of Principalities and in What Modes They Are Acquired," "How Cities or Principalities Which Lived by Their Own Laws before They Were

Occupied Should Be Administered,” “Of New Principalities That Are Acquired through One’s Own Arms and Virtue,” and “Of New Principalities That Are Acquired by Others’ Arms and Fortune.” The most applicable to the situation of the Medici, who had returned to power largely through the machinations of the Pope and his allies, was the chapter discussing rulers who come to power through fortune or the arms of others. Here, Machiavelli discusses two historical examples: Alexander the Great and Cesare Borgia. Analyzing the actions of both men, Machiavelli concludes with little exception that, in such a situation, Borgia is the example which a new ruler should seek to emulate. Thus, Machiavelli suggests that the Medici follow the example of a man, who though reviled by history, was seen by many during this period as a strong leader and decisive actor, despite his quick decline following the death of his father, Pope Alexander VI. This was clearly a suggestion which he hoped would appeal to the Medici.¹³

Further evidence of Machiavelli’s intention that *The Prince* impress upon the Medici his keen understanding of Italian affairs and his suitability as an advisor on this topic comes in *The Prince*’s final chapter, called “Exhortation to Seize Italy and to Free Her from the Barbarians” by Machiavelli but known to history as the *exhortatio*. This chapter, termed by author Charles D. Tarlton a “daydream narrative,” describes a scenario in which a strong leader emerges on the Italian scene and leads Italy back to her former glory, a task made easier by the counsel Machiavelli himself has provided within *The Prince*’s pages. Machiavelli additionally criticizes past Italian military customs and practices, but highlights Italian courage and details the weaknesses he has observed in foreign armies, especially the French and the Swiss, which would allow for an Italian triumph.¹⁴ Leading such a movement, Machiavelli assures his reader, will bring “reputation and prestige,” and he ends his work by urging action and impressing upon the reader that the time is right for such action. Throughout this final chapter, Machiavelli refers to a “you” whom he never names as well as “your illustrious house” and, although he never explicitly states this, it is clear both from the text and the analysis of Machiavelli’s own situation and his

personal correspondence that the unnamed prince he writes of is a member of the Medici household.¹⁵

Thus, this final chapter provides more clear evidence of Machiavelli's hope that his work would lead to his being welcomed back into Florentine politics by the Medici. Surely other factors played into the writing of this chapter, including Machiavelli's own sense of Italian patriotism, and one could argue that the *exhortatio* represents Machiavelli's solution to the problems he describes throughout the text, but there is equally no denying that Machiavelli hoped that the Medici would read this chapter and employ him to aid in the completion of the mission he sets forth.¹⁶ Uniting Italy under a common banner, Machiavelli writes, "is not very difficult if you summon up the actions and lives of those named above."¹⁷ In writing this, his message to the Medici is that, by examining the examples and analyses Machiavelli has alluded to in the *exhortatio* and described at length earlier in his work, Italy might be freed from her distresses with ease. It is no great leap, then, to postulate that Machiavelli hoped the Medici would extrapolate on this point, and deciding to embark on the course of action described in this final chapter, seek his counsel and take him on as an advisor to their campaign.

The Prince as a general work of political theory has often been called cynical and even evil, and while the more cynical aspects of the work have received some unfair criticism and those less cynical have been overlooked, there is an extent to which its overall philosophy lends itself to the conclusion that Machiavelli wanted dearly to impress upon the Medici his potential usefulness. The Medici's influence is most clearly understandable in this point: Machiavelli, previously a staunch enemy of tyranny and a servant of the republic, advocates courses of action throughout his book which can easily be described as tyrannical. This apparent contradiction has led commentators on his work to wonder whether or not Machiavelli really believed in the policies and strategies he advocated in *The Prince*. This position takes the idea that Machiavelli wrote *The Prince* primarily for the eyes of the Medici and suggests that, in addition, he merely wrote what he believed would be palatable to Florence's

ruling family, hoping that through a detached and cynical appraisal of the Italian political scene and politics in general he could work his way back into their good graces. This position is strengthened too by the fact that Machiavelli wrote *The Prince* during somewhat of a respite from writing one of his lengthier works, his *Discourses on Livy*. The timing of this respite, occurring as it did when a new pope reigned in Rome and during the early stages of the Medici's resurgence in Florence, suggests that Machiavelli recognized that these changes might afford him a new lease on his political career. This all lends itself to the idea that Machiavelli wrote less of what he truly believed about politics, concentrating more on what he thought most likely to be acceptable to the Medici.¹⁸

Upon the completion of *The Prince*, Machiavelli was no less hopeful that his work would earn him a return to Florentine politics. In his previously mentioned letter of December 10, 1513, Machiavelli had requested that Vettori review his work and provide feedback; Machiavelli did not receive a reply until December 24, in which Vettori mentioned that he saw no position for Machiavelli in Florence, but that he would reconsider this statement upon seeing the full manuscript. Machiavelli, resigned to the conclusion that Vettori was not the strong advocate who could best present his works to the Medici, relented in his correspondence, turning to other subjects.¹⁹ It is worth noting here that, prior to any attempted presentation of the book to a member of the Medici house, the death of Giuliano necessitated that Machiavelli rededicate the book to Lorenzo de' Medici.²⁰

It is almost certain that Lorenzo neglected to read *The Prince* upon receiving it in 1516, and certainly its pages did not usher Machiavelli back into Italian politics, as he had hoped.²¹ There does, however, exist a story in which Machiavelli presents a member of the family with the book on the same day that another presents the family with a fine pair of hunting dogs, which interests this particular family member far more. Edmond Barincou, the recorder of this story, reports that, seeing the lack of interest in his work, Machiavelli verbally threatened the Medici, saying, "that though he was not a man to plot against princes, his book would avenge him." In any case, Machiavelli was never hired by the Medici in the capac-

ity he sought, despite later patronage as an author; indeed, many Florentines of the day believed that he had written *The Prince* “to delude the Medici with counsel that would have ruined them.”²²

So it was that Machiavelli's work never achieved for him the end he desired, a return to the politically powerful status he had once enjoyed. Still, the influence of the Medici on his work has colored the way in which his work has been viewed by historians. “He owed *The Prince*...to the Medici,” wrote biographer Roberto Ridolfi, “who drove him out of office, interned him, and left him for a long time in poverty and neglect;” indeed it is impossible to truly understand the book without considering the factor of regime influence.²³ In terms of *The Prince*'s value as a work, there is no doubt as to its merit. Machiavelli's relationship with the Medici and his hopes that the book might facilitate his return to mainstream Italian politics are important to the story of the work, and inform the modern-day reader's interpretation. One must conclude that, if Machiavelli really did tell the Medici that his book would one day avenge him, he was correct; despite its failure to regain him political power, his book has ensured that his name is mentioned whenever discussion of political theories and strategies are mentioned, and that he is revered by historians and political scientists as one of the ablest and most astute observers of political behavior ever to put pen to paper.

ENDNOTES

1 Vincent Barnett, “Niccolo Machiavelli – the Cunning Critic of Political Reason,” *History Review* no. 56 (2006): 2.

2 J.R. Hale, *Machiavelli and Renaissance Italy*. (Collier Books: New York, 1963), 121-23.

3 Niccolo Machiavelli, *Machiavelli and His Friends: Their Personal Correspondence*. Translated and Edited by James B. Atkinson and David Sices. (Northern Illinois University Press: DeKalb, Illinois, 1996), 221.


4 Machiavelli, *Machiavelli and His Friends*, 222.

5 Hale, 124.

- 6 Machiavelli, *Machiavelli and His Friends*, 225.
- 7 Hale, 126-127.
- 8 Maurizio Viroli, *Niccolo's Smile: A Biography of Machiavelli*. Translated by Antony Shuggar. (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux: New York, 2000), 153-154.
- 9 Hale, 130.
- 10 Machiavelli, *Machiavelli and His Friends*, 265.
- 11 John M Najemy, "Machiavelli and the Medici: The Lessons of Florentine History," *Renaissance Quarterly* 35, no. 4 (1982), 556.
- 12 Hale, 134.
- 13 Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince: Second Edition*. Translated by Harvey C. Mansfield. (University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London, 1998), 25-33.
- 14 Charles D Tarlton, "Machiavelli's *The Prince* as Memoir," *Texas Studies in Literature and Language* 46, no. 1 (2004), 9.
- 15 Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 105.
- 16 Tarlton, 16.
- 17 Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 103.
- 18 Barnett, 3.
- 19 Hale, 139-40.
- 20 Cary Nederman, "Niccolo Machiavelli." *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2005. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/machiavelli/#1>, 2.
- 21 Nederman, 2.
- 22 Richard W Byrd, "Machiavelli to the Medici; 'Take My Prince Please!'" *Lamar Journal of the Humanities* 22, no. 2 (1996), 35.
- 23 Roberto Ridolfi, *The Life of Niccolo Machiavelli*. (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1954), 150.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Barnett, Vincent. "Niccolo Machiavelli – the Cunning Critic of Political Reason." *History Review* no. 56 (2006).
- Byrd, Richard W. "Machiavelli to the Medici; 'Take My Prince Please!'" *Lamar Journal of the Humanities* 22, no. 2 (1996), 31-44.
- Hale, J.R. *Machiavelli and Renaissance Italy*. Collier Books: New York, 1963.
- Machiavelli, Niccolo. *Machiavelli and His Friends: Their Personal Correspondence*. Translated and Edited by James B. Atkinson and David Sices. Northern Illinois University Press: DeKalb, Illinois, 1996.
- . *The Prince: Second Edition*. Translated by Harvey C. Mansfield. University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London, 1998.
- Najemy, John M. "Machiavelli and the Medici: The Lessons of Florentine History." *Renaissance Quarterly* 35, no. 4 (1982), 551-576.
- Nederman, Cary. "Niccolo Machiavelli." *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. 2005.<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/machiavelli/#1>.
- Ridolfi, Roberto. *The Life of Niccolo Machiavelli*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1954.
- Tarlton, Charles D. "Machiavelli's *The Prince* as Memoir." *Texas Studies in Literature and Language* 46, no. 1 (2004), 1-19.
- Viroli, Maurizio. *Niccolo's Smile: A Biography of Machiavelli*. Translated by Antony Shuggar. Farrar, Straus, and Giroux: New York, 2000.



Steam Power To Space Technology

AMANDA KIRKLAND

The Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) was formed on October 1, 2003, as a strategic merger of three prominent Japanese scientific research institutions, each with a prosperous history spanning almost 50 years. The success of aerospace exploration by Japan has been both gradual and complex. Since its first rocket was launched in 1955, Japan has slowly come to achieve superiority in the field of rocket science as well as satellite capabilities, but rapid growth has only occurred since the formation of JAXA. JAXA focuses on research, development, and launch of satellites into orbit, asteroid exploration, and is planning a manned mission to the moon. JAXA's "Vision 2025" called for sustainable development within the field of space exploration in order to contribute to "peace and happiness for all mankind."¹ It may seem unusual that Japan today is a global leader in the space program; after all, so many countries, including the United States, accomplished much more in the exploration of space nearly 40 years ago. It is important to note, however, that Japan harnessed steam power in a mere five years in the late 19th century, doing so only after the exploitation of western technology. We shall see the same progress made by the newly-formed JAXA and Japan's quick rise

into one of the most powerful space exploration nations in the 21st century. When accomplished, JAXA's rise to power may well create major implications in the area of international space cooperation, such as complicate the relationship between JAXA and NASA, jeopardize Europe's position, and more worrisome- further fuel the contentious space race between Japan and China.

Japan began its journey to innovator and powerhouse in the 19th century. Unbeknownst to the world and to even Japan, Commodore Matthew C. Perry's arrival at Edo Bay on July 8, 1853, ignited the spirit of innovation that is even today still deeply embedded in the Japanese psyche. Bearing a letter from President Millard Fillmore, Perry forcefully requested that Japan open itself to trade with America, announcing that refusal would be met with force. Realizing that they could not defeat Perry and the modern weaponry of his "Black Ships," the Japanese allowed Perry to present the letter to the shogun.² Perry instructed the Japanese that he would return in 1854 with the expectation that a treaty would be completed according to the "suggestions" made by President Fillmore. The Japanese wearily obliged, and the treaty accomplished the re-opening of Japan after 200 years of isolation. Although this treaty heavily favored the United States, there were significant benefits to Japan in signing it. The Meiji Emperors understood that innovation and westernization was the only way to maintain a Japan free from colonization. The Meiji rulers' ambition and dedication indoctrinated their people with the drive and entrepreneurial spirit that led Japan to rapid industrialization, modernizing its military and improving transportation, most notably by harnessing steam power in only five years.³ By rapidly industrializing and utilizing western technologies, Japan became one of the world's foremost powers by the turn of the 20th century. Of course, by mimicking the West and becoming a global power, Japan became susceptible to the same problem the great European powers of the time were facing - the desire for more.

Japan's modernization led it into competition for lands and resources throughout the Asian continent. These policies, to the dismay of the world, eventually led to the destruction of the transformed and industrialized Japan. World War II severely damaged

Japan's economy and infrastructure. With the coming of the war, everything the Meiji rulers built between 1853 and 1945 was destroyed. But it was again the U.S. that aided in rebuilding Japan by turning it once more into one of the foremost economies in the world. The story of Japan's modernization is vital in the context of understanding the formation of JAXA.

Following World War II Japan was at the mercy of the United States, which occupied Japan after the war. As in the aftermath of Perry's monumental journey to Edo Bay, postwar Japan was forced to restructure and reshape its society based on recommendations by the United States. Once again, Japan began to rebuild both the spirit and structure of its society. The country took on an innovative spirit that accepted modern, western technology and used it to rebuild its industrial complex and economy. During the past century, the Japanese had come to perfect the keen ability to pull apart a piece of technology and rebuild it better at less expense. The idea of innovation and becoming a leader in the global economy transcended other aspects of Japanese policy. The Japanese space program was one beneficiary of this restored spirit of innovation. To fully comprehend and understand JAXA's Vision, it is necessary to analyze the history of the three institutions from which it was created in 2003.

JAXA's beginning can be attributed to Hideo Itokawa, whose rocket program launched the beginning of the Japanese space program. Itokawa began designing and building small solid-fuel rockets at the Institute of Industrial Science at the University of Tokyo in 1951. Itokawa and his students created rockets so small they were named "Pencil" rockets. The group made these tiny rockets with cheap, raw materials and, after an exhaustive number of firings, the group discovered the best type of fuel, nozzle configuration, and shape for the stabilizing fins.⁴ By 1955, the group had grown confident enough to display its hard work to the public. As other countries began to receive press coverage for the progress of their rocket development, the Japanese government realized the necessity of starting a program. Japan's response was the establishment of the National Aerospace Laboratory of Japan (NAL) in July 1955. NAL was created in order to vigorously pursue research on aircraft,

rockets, and other aeronautical transportation systems, and all necessary "peripheral technology."⁵ NAL also strived to provide superior testing facilities, making them available to all companies and organizations involved in Japan's space and aerospace industries.

Soon after the formation of NAL, the infamous "space race" between the United States and Soviet Union, an offshoot of the arms race, began with the Soviet launch of *Sputnik I* on October 4, 1957. The launch of *Sputnik* sent shockwaves across the world. The Soviets had beaten the U.S. to space, signifying a considerable threat to the security of all other nations because of the possibility of military actions from space. The Soviets had shown that they had the ideology as well as the technological and economic prowess to make these fears a reality. The race was not only about the Soviet possession of superior technology, but the idea that the Soviets possessed superior technology threatened the democratic world's culture and ideology. The race was thus undertaken not only to salvage U.S. general morale and to display American technical abilities, but also to generate public support for an aggressive and very costly space program and to promote math and science in the U.S. educational system.

Japan, like the United States, was both shocked and worried at the prospect of the Soviets ruling space. The Japanese government decided to pursue the development of a space program more aggressively. The Prime Minister's office established the National Space Activities Council in 1958 to investigate how to proceed with space research and development. The first step was to establish the University of Tokyo's rocket research program as an official organization, the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS), in 1964.⁶ ISAS merged the Institute of Industrial Science with the Institute of Aeronautics. This combination of forces allowed space science experts and engineers to collaborate effectively.

By 1968, ISAS had made substantial advances in both rocket science and scientific satellites. By this time, Japan was at the height of the "golden 60's." The nation experienced significant economic growth, especially in manufacturing, and advancements in science and technology. Realizing the profit potential of the space industry, many Japanese businesses were eager to get involved. They began

pressuring the Japanese government for an ambitious space program that would cultivate a robust private industry where space-oriented businesses could flourish. The economy's growth and this ambition in the private sector led the Japanese government to expand its goals in space.⁷ In June 1968, the Space Activities Promotion Council was created to design a Japanese space program. The Council brought together over 89 companies involved in space activities in order to present the needs of space-based companies to the government, recommend development ideas for space activities, and spread space-knowledge to the public.⁸ Topics discussed included applications satellites (television), liquid-hydrogen-fuelled rockets, and a space laboratory.

Further impetus was added to the development of a Japanese space program when American astronaut Neil Armstrong took the first step on the lunar surface on July 20, 1969. It was now imperative for the Japanese to quickly develop a serious space program if they desired a dominant position in the field of advanced, space-related technology. To accomplish the varied tasks discussed by the Space Activities Promotion Council, the Japanese government established the National Space Development Agency in 1969 under the National Space Development Agency Law, commonly referred to as the "1969 Law." NASDA would act as the main space program agency, leading the other agencies in the development of space and the promotion of space's peaceful usage.⁹ NASDA was comprised of the National Space Development Center of the Science and Technology Agency and the Radio Research Laboratory of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. The combination of these agencies would allow for the development of artificial satellites, the planning of space programs, the development and launch of rockets, the tracking and control of satellites, and the ability to develop the necessary technologies, facilities, and equipment for these purposes.¹⁰ NASDA's main responsibilities were the development of launch vehicles, as well as operations and the development of technology and applications satellites. NASDA's duties would later extend to include module development for the International Space Station and the training of Japanese astronauts.

By the late 1960s, the initial stages of the development of Japan's

space program were complete and the program had done well during the decade. Nonetheless, it was still lagging significantly behind the other space-faring nations in the world. Lodgson describes Japan's program at this time:

In the late 1960s, Japan had decided to accelerate its acquisitions of an autonomous capability for space launch and satellite construction for missions other than space science. Japan asked the U.S. government to allow U.S. aerospace firms to license space technology to Japan to "jump start" that capability development process.¹¹

With the U.S. moon landing, Japan realized that it needed help boosting its space program to avoid being left behind. In 1970, Japan approached the United States regarding cooperation on rocket technology. While the Japanese's spirit of innovation had led them to some advancements in rocket science, these did not measure up to the capabilities of either the U.S. or Soviet Union. Following the signing of its first international agreement with the U.S., Japan abandoned the rockets developed by its program and began to use the U.S. 1970 Thor/Delta rocket model, believing that it was more advantageous at this time to exploit U.S. rocket technology to help build its own program.¹² The need to borrow technology in order to compete, be taken seriously and be viewed as competent by the rest of the world was nothing new for Japan. Even before the arrival of Commodore Perry to Japan in the mid-19th century, the West had viewed Japan as weak. As previously noted, being viewed as inferior to the western world compelled the Japanese government to pursue ambitious industrial goals, such as steam power in the 19th century. In the 20th century, Japan was similarly led to exploit western space technology when it realized that the West had and would continue to treat it as inferior until it could prove its competence. By the end of the 20th century, however, this had still not happened.

Since the beginning of U.S.-Japan international space cooperation, Japan had been able to successfully exploit U.S. space technology to their advantage. By the 1990s, however, Japan had still

failed to find its own footing in terms of a space program. Almost all major successes up to this point were attributable to international cooperative activities with superior programs. For example, in 1992, the Japanese space program's budget was \$150 million, five times less than those of European space-faring nations.¹³ One reason for Japan's inferior performance in the space world was the institutionalized divide that remained since the creation of the 1969 NASDA law. Essentially, ISAS and NASDA carried on as parallel space programs, often focusing on the same goals. Not only was this a poor use of government resources, but a waste of both organizations' potential as well. Japan needed to make a drastic move to gain its own firm footing in the space world. By the mid-1990s, there was no evidence that such a move was in the offing.

In 1995, Lieutenant Colonel J. Barry Patterson, a career communications officer with extensive experience in space and satellite communications, presented a paper titled "China's Space Program and its Implications for the United States" to the faculty of the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Lt. Col. Patterson's paper not only warned of China's space program overtaking the U.S. space program, but also spoke about the implications for America concerning the potential being expressed by both Europe and Japan. At this time, Japan was still not considered a "strong contender for business."¹⁴ The evidence was in the numbers. In 1987, Japan only contributed 0.04 percent of its gross national product to its space program, compared with contributions of 0.52 percent by the U.S., 1.5 percent by the USSR's, and 0.11 percent by France.¹⁵

Lt. Col. Patterson warned that the U.S.-dominated international launch market would soon be saturated by Russia and Europe. Japan, however, was still not viewed as a major threat. Patterson claimed, "Japan started its venture into space by exploiting U.S. technology, and has used this technology to complete 24 successful launches."¹⁶ Even though the Japanese had made substantial advances since they had begun exploiting U.S. technology, they were still not competent enough to seriously compete in the space industry. Japan's H-2 rocket, for instance, was too complex and expensive and had recently failed twice. Japan was also not able to

“satisfactorily explain the reason for the catastrophic failures and thus is not a strong contender for business currently.”¹⁷ Lt. Col. Patterson continued, “to successfully compete, [Japan] will have to solve its technological problems, demonstrate a better reliability rate, and cut its launch costs.”¹⁸

Japan was well aware that its space program was lacking in comparison to those of the United States, Russia, and Europe. Even China’s space program was becoming a threat to Japan’s. In 2001, the Japanese government decided to undergo a major reorganization of its ministries in order to consolidate its power in the hopes of running government programs more efficiently. This merger created JAXA. Following this reorganization, the newly announced space agency prepared the “Law Concerning Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency,” which came into being as Law Number 161 on December 13, 2002. Article II defined the language contained within the Law. “Fundamental Research and Development,” is defined as research and development which falls within any of the following items:

- (1) Common research and development concerning science and technology;
- (2) Research and development concerning science and technology requiring facilities and equipment that are deemed, due to excessive cost, not appropriate to be installed redundantly at national experimental research institutes or incorporated administrative agencies (which means the incorporated administrative agencies as stipulated in Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the Incorporated Administrative Agency General Provisions Law (Law No. 103 of 1999, as amended; hereinafter referred to as the “General Provisions Law”); hereinafter the same) conducting research and development;
- (3) Integrated research and development concerning science and technology requiring the collaboration of multiple areas.¹⁹

The Japanese government’s rationale for the need for the merger lies

in item two. It was meant to reverse the damage done by the National Space Development Agency Law of 1969. While the law was originally thought to be a strategic move to expand the Japanese space program, the law only institutionalized the divide between the two agencies, ISAS and NASDA. Over 30 years later, the divide remained. Each had its own fields of specialization, but under the terms of the 1969 Law, the two different programs developed parallel to one another.²⁰ Scientists began demanding something be done, not only to avoid duplication, but also to ensure a smooth progression for the Japanese space program. Item three of the Law Concerning JAXA officially ended the institutional division created by the 1969 Law.

The newly established JAXA has an ambitious, confident outlook on its position in the world. The Japanese government pledges, "As a leading industrial nation, Japan is responsible for taking the initiative in the creation of scientific knowledge. JAXA endeavors to add a new page to the history of aerospace development, putting Japan on the same footing as other space-technology advanced nations."²¹ JAXA offers its own explanation for the merger, stating:

The consolidation of these three formerly independent organizations will allow a continuous and systematic approach to space exploration, from basic research to development and practical application. This also means that the best of Japan's advanced modern aerospace technologies are gathered together - a concentration of technologies that is expected to create new energy to propel Japan's efforts challenges to space.²²

Soon after the formation of JAXA, Japan would once again be challenged by the western world, which began to talk of man returning to the lunar surface. On January 15, 2004, President George W. Bush addressed the United States in the same spirit as former President John. F. Kennedy in his famous speech of September 12, 1962 in which he had stated that, "We choose to go to the moon." President Bush announced that the United States now had a renewed vision for space exploration, claiming, "The desire to explore and understand is part of our character."²³ Bush introduced a

very ambitious "Vision" for the U.S. space program, declaring that Americans would return to the moon by 2020 to begin preparation for a manned mission to Mars, with a goal now set for the year 2037. This announcement sent shockwaves across the scientific and aerospace world. The rest of the world was wondering what its part would be in the future of space exploration.

The first glimpse of Japanese reaction to this new American initiative came on June 21, 2004, when Kiyotaka Yashiro, the Director of JAXA's International Relations Department, participated in the "Space Exploration and International Cooperation Symposium." Yashiro presented "JAXA's Views on Space Exploration" to a group of space experts at the George Washington University. Yashiro began his presentation by acknowledging how "attractive and challenging" the U.S.'s "Vision for Space Exploration" was and that Japan greatly respected the United States' "frontier spirit."²⁴ Yashiro spoke about how the Vision would influence the rest of the world, as well as mankind.

Yashiro's presentation included information on programs JAXA was working on, including details of its two most successful programs, SELENE (a lunar-orbiting satellite) and LUNAR-A (a lunar surface probe). The most important part of the presentation was when Yashiro made it very clear that JAXA would soon be working on a "Vision" of its own, acknowledging national goals but emphasizing continued international cooperation, especially on the International Space Station. It was made clear that JAXA will cooperate while maintaining its identity, and that it has definite potential for exploring the Moon and Mars.²⁵ It was now clear to the space community that Japan was going to take considerable part in the "space frontier" President Bush spoke of in his address.

On March 31, 2005 JAXA released its own Vision, known as "JAXA 2025." It stated:

JAXA shall develop launch vehicles and satellites with the highest reliability and world-class capability, with a view to building a secure and prosperous society. JAXA shall also work toward taking a leadership position in the world in space science and begin preparations for Japan's own human space activities and

for the utilization of the Moon. JAXA shall further conduct flight demonstration of a prototype hypersonic aircraft that can fly at a speed of Mach 5. With the activities listed above, JAXA shall contribute to the establishment of aerospace industry as a key industry of Japan.²⁶

Its underlying goals are to maintain independence in the global society, promote Japan as a prestigious, technologically-advanced society, reap the economic benefits of space exploration, and make significant contributions to Japanese national pride by undertaking the challenge to explore space as the human frontier.

JAXA's contributions shall be to establish the capability to independently carry out space activities through the highest-level technologies in the world, to contribute to building a secure and prosperous society through the use of aerospace technologies, to advance the knowledge and expansion of the human frontier by exploring the mysteries and possibilities of the universe, to contribute to the growth of a self-sustainable space industry with world-class technological capability, and, finally, the facilitate the growth of its aviation industry and breakthroughs for future air transportation.²⁷ JAXA's Vision will be implemented over the next 20 years, broken into two parts consisting of 10 years each. During the first 10 years, JAXA plans to focus its efforts by prioritizing its contributions in order to build a secure and prosperous country, while the second 10 years will be used to develop its own human space activities, including a manned mission to the moon. Japan clearly states that it will pursue international agreements with the United States, Russia, and European countries to collaborate on space activities. Japan further states that it will build partnerships in Asia and the Pacific in hopes of accomplishing its goal of being viewed as the reliable leader of the region.²⁸

Over the years, Japan has made groundbreaking advances in rocket science and led the way in satellite capabilities. While acknowledging the advancements made by the Japanese space program, one must be also acknowledge that most of this success is due to the fact that Japan began cooperating with western nations to exploit their technology. The future of Japan's space program re-

mains unknown. We do know that JAXA's creation has resulted in an increase in potential for Japan, and JAXA will take another large step forward in space science. JAXA will be celebrating its five-year anniversary in 2008. If the analogy of Japanese steam power is any guide, we can expect a quick progression as Japan rises to the status of a powerful, space-faring nation in the 21st century. One may ask what this means for the rest of the world. For the United States, it could mean loss of business and superiority in the arena of space science and research. For Europe, it could mean losing its middle-ground position in space exploration to the east. Last, but certainly not least, Japan's advancements in space exploration could aggressively escalate China's military space program. All of these outcomes would greatly affect the dynamics of international space cooperation.

ENDNOTES

1 "About JAXA," *JAXA.com*, http://www.jaxa.jp/about/index_e.html.

2 "Commodore Perry and the Opening of Japan," *Naval Historical Center*, <http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/teach/ends/opening.htm>.

3 Howard Stein. *Asian Industrialization and Africa: Studies in Policy Alternatives to Structural Adjustment*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 21.

4 Brian Harvey, *The Japanese and Indian Space Programs: Two Roads into Space*, (Cornwall, UK: Praxis Publishing, 2000), 9.

5 "About JAXA."

6 Harvey, 9.

7 Harvey, 17.

8 Harvey, 18.

9 "About JAXA."

10 Harvey, 19.

11 John M. Logsdon, "Together in Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station", *Monographs in Aerospace History*, vol. 11 (Washington, D.C.: NASA History Division, 1998), 6.

12 Logsdon, 7.

13 Roger M. Bonnet, and Vittorio Manno, *International Cooperation in Space: The Example of the European Space Agency*, (Boston: Harvard Press, 1994), 70.

14 Lieutenant Colonel J. Barry Patterson, "China's Space Program and its Implications for the United States," Air War College Research Report Presentation, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: 1995), 12.

15 Patterson, 4.

16 Patterson, 12.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency, *Law Concerning Japanese Exploration Agency*, (Tokyo, Japan: JAXA, 2002), 1.

20 Harvey, 19.

21 "About JAXA."

22 "About JAXA."

23 George W. Bush, "New Vision for Space Exploration," *The White House*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040114-3.html>.

24 Kiyotake Yashiro, "JAXA's Views on Space Exploration," Space Exploration and International Cooperation Symposium, (George Washington University, Washington: 2004).

25 Yashiro.

26 Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency, *JAXA Vision: JAXA 2025*, (Tokyo: JAXA, 2005), 1.

27 JAXA Vision, 2.

28 JAXA Vision, 2-4.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- “About JAXA.” *JAXA.com*. October 2007. http://www.jaxa.jp/about/index_e.html.
- Bonnet, Roger M. and Manno, Vittorio. *International Cooperation in Space: The Example of the European Space Agency*. Boston: Harvard Press, 1994.
- Bush, George W. January 2004. *The White House*. “New Vision for Space Exploration.” <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040114-3.html>.
- “Commodore Perry and the Opening of Japan.” *Naval Historical Center*. November 2002. <http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/teach/ends/opening.htm>.
- Harvey, Brian. *The Japanese and Indian Space Programs: Two Roads into Space*. Cornwall, UK: Praxis Publishing, 2000.
- Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency. *JAXA Vision: JAXA 2025*. Tokyo: JAXA, 2005.
- Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency. *Law Concerning Japanese Exploration Agency*. Tokyo: JAXA, 2002.
- Logsdon, John M. “Together in Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station.” *Monographs in Aerospace History* 11 (1998): 6.
- Patterson, Barry J., Lt. Col. “China’s Space Program and its Implications for the United States.” Air War College- Research Presentation. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: 1995.
- Stein, Howard. *Asian Industrialization and Africa: Studies in Policy Alternatives to Structural Adjustment*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995.
- Yashiro, Kiyotake. “JAXA’s Views on Space Exploration.” Space Exploration and International Cooperation Symposium. George Washington University, Washington: June 2004.



Revitalizing Civil Society

Non-Governmental Organizations in Cambodia post-UNTAC

TRICIA BONMAN

*"...Greetings had changed with regimes. Under Sihanouk, people would say to friends they had not seen for some time, "How many children have you?"; under Lon Nol, "Are you in good health?"; under the Khmer Rouge, "How much food do you get in your co-operative?"; under Heng Samrin, "How many of your family are still alive?"*¹

Cambodia has experienced decades of political instability, which have created a country ravaged by war and a people exhausted by conflict and loss who have learned trust is a liability. This lack of trust is one of many obstacles that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are contending with today as they attempt to help rebuild Cambodian society. NGOs have proliferated in Cambodia since the emergency period of 1979-81. NGOs now form an integral part of Cambodian society. They supplement and occasionally serve as surrogates for government functions, provide employment for educated Cambodians, help regenerate civil society, raise awareness of issues among the Cambodian populace, and advocate for the people. However, they have their shortcom-

ings. NGOs also unconsciously perpetuate the patronage system ingrained in Cambodian culture, display a lack of clarity in their objectives, and often have agendas set by donor agencies that are detached from local interests. Despite all this, NGOs have a tremendous opportunity in Cambodia; they have at their disposal the means to restore civil society, a key requisite to a functioning civilization. They are able to do this through their ability to mobilize populations into participation, provide local opportunities for educated Cambodians, serve as an advocate for the people to the government, and encourage the growth of local organizations.

Cambodia's first constitution was drafted in 1947, establishing it as a parliamentary monarchy under Prince Norodom Sihanouk, in which "all powers emanate[d] from the King."² Development stagnated in the 1960s, and in 1970 Sirik Matak and General Lon Nol orchestrated a coup d'état. The Khmer Republic was created with Lon Nol at its head, backed by the United States. Prince Sihanouk took refuge in Beijing. In 1975, unrest seized the country once more, giving rise to Democratic Kampuchea, headed by Pol Pot. During this regime, "the entire urban population was forced to relocate to rural areas for agricultural work" and nearly all of Cambodian intelligentsia was killed or starved to death.³ The regime targeted "educated civil servants, military officers, and policemen in previous regimes, and ordinary citizens...More than 1 million people died of executions, starvation, disease and overwork."⁴ Death toll estimates range as high as 2 million.

Vietnamese and Cambodian resistance forces ousted Pol Pot's regime and overthrew the Khmer Rouge in 1979. The Vietnamese and the Soviet Union backed the new government, The People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), led by Heng Samrin and controlled by a party that would later become the Cambodian's People's Party (CPP). Unsurprisingly, the West supported the Khmer Rouge. The PRK was renamed the State of Cambodia during reconciliation talks between Prince Sihanouk and Prime Minister Hun Sen. In 1991, the Paris Peace Accords, intended to bring peace to a conflict-weary Cambodia, were signed.⁵

The Accords resulted in the creation of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), a peace-keeping orga-

nization that was given unprecedented command powers over the Cambodian government.⁶ UNTAC was in power from 1992-1993, when it supervised The Kingdom of Cambodia's first general elections in which a coalition government was formed between the CPP, (associated with Hun Sen), *Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif* (FUNCINPEC, associated with Sihanouk), and the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP). The CPP and FUNCINPEC would go on to become Cambodia's main political parties. The Sam Rainsy party is the third main political player in Cambodian politics today, first appearing in the 1998 elections. UNTAC was a complex undertaking, involving the supervision of elections, the clearing of countless mines, and the oversight of the ceasefire. Grant Curtis writes the following of its achievements:

The key elements of the UNTAC operation – peace building; the repatriation of the border population, the electoral process, including basic democracy and human rights training; and the beginnings of concerted effort to rehabilitate and rebuild the country's basic infrastructure and services – all contributed to “Cambodia's New Deal.” ...It must be remembered that Cambodia's post-UNTAC future was determined largely outside the country and mostly by non-Cambodians. Imposed, at least initially, by foreign forces, Cambodia's future course was based to a great extent on ideals or precepts alien to the country and its recent history.⁷

UNTAC did make strides toward development in Cambodia through increased participation among citizens and the implementation of democratic principles in government, but ultimately its goals were too expansive for sweeping change to take hold in such a short time. Indeed, “somewhat paradoxically, rather than allowing the ready transplantation or grafting of new values, practices, and institutions, the weakening of traditional life seemed to reinforce or amplify the effects of the dislocations Cambodia and its people have endured.”⁸ Although well-intentioned, UNTAC was yet another interruption imposed upon the Cambodian people by outside

forces which served to hinder the development of an already diminished civil society. After UNTAC left, Cambodian government fell back into its traditional patterns of patronage and corruption.

The repercussions of decades of civil war, which did not end until 1998 when the Khmer Rouge resistance effectively ended with the death of Pol Pot, are still felt strongly in Cambodia today. The inadequate infrastructure, lack of a competent workforce, rampant corruption and domestic disquiet are exacerbated by the reality that "over 62% of Cambodia's adult population is illiterate...only 23% [of the rural population] has access to clean water...[and] approximately half of all children are malnourished."⁹ In addition, the years of war saw the entrenchment of patronage politics and dependency, channels which the elite worked through to hoard the resources of the country while the rest of the population suffered levels of incredible poverty.¹⁰ These are all conditions that the people of Cambodia and NGOs are struggling to overcome.

NGOs have had a strong presence in Cambodia since 1979, providing direly needed humanitarian and relief assistance during the emergency years of 1979-1981. They also offered vital support for the reconstruction process.¹¹ During UNTAC, international NGOs also helped with the formation of local NGOs. Their role in Cambodia has evolved over the years:

Throughout the 1980s, international NGOs had a special role and influence in Cambodia owing to the nonrecognition by the Western world of the Phnom Penh government... Apart from very limited funding provided through UNICEF and the World Food Program, the only Western support...was channeled through a core group of international NGOs...In the absence of other Western assistance, international NGOs working in Cambodia...served as an opening to the outside world.¹²

After UNTAC, when Cambodia was recognized by the Western world, NGOs began to cede some of the duties they had taken to arriving aid agencies and the government. They focused on their previously established roles, serving as the impetus for grassroots movements and aiding in the process of community-based develop-

ment. Some of these activities, mentioned earlier, include supplementing government roles, employing educated Cambodians, and regenerating civil society.

NGOs have occasionally found themselves in the position of providing for the people when the government fails or is unable to do so. This was especially the case during the 1980s, when "international nongovernmental organizations found themselves providing assistance directly to the Cambodian government in direct support of government programs and services."¹³ Critics of this system believe governments will never step in to take responsibility for activities NGOs are already undertaking, and therefore NGOs are exacerbating issues of institutional and administrative capacity. However, in more recent years their work has taken on an auxiliary rather than substituting function due to the government's failure to provide social services.¹⁴ NGOs still hold a considerable amount of influence with the government, working closely with it in an attempt to provide services in an efficient and consistent manner. The give and take between NGOs and the Cambodian government is demonstrated by the following quote from Grant Curtis: "The Royal Government eagerly accepted whatever assistance NGOs were prepared to supply to ensure maximum 'coverage' at the provincial level, thus enhancing its own credibility with the Cambodian electorate."¹⁵ The government provides a channel through which NGOs can reach their goals, and vice versa. This testifies to the sort of power NGOs are able to wield, described by John Boli and Thomas George as the ability of "transnational organizations [to] shape the agendas and behaviour of states."¹⁶ That much is clear in Cambodia.

Another function NGOs serve is as an employer of educated Cambodians. The educated class in Cambodia was all but destroyed in the late 1970s when the process of formal education halted. Thomas Clayton writes: "When the Khmer Rouge came to power in 1975, education as it had been known under Sihanouk and his successor Lon Nol ceased at all levels and in all locales...Whether because of future threats or past sins, Cambodia's students, teachers, and professors were killed in large numbers in Democratic Kampuchea."¹⁷ Basic ideologies about education were

reworked as well; there were attempts through broadcasts on the Khmer Rouge Radio to indoctrinate the Cambodian people with the idea that the only worthwhile pursuit was manual, agricultural work. Radio broadcasts claimed that the bourgeoisie had come to a revelation about the importance of manual labor over that of education and other intellectual pursuits.¹⁸ This attitude towards learning stagnated education in Cambodia, where it now “takes an average of 13.6 years to produce a primary school graduate.”¹⁹ The odds are stacked against Cambodians seeking education already, and once they have degrees, there are few opportunities to use their education as nearly 90 percent of graduates are unable to find work after completing their studies.²⁰ Working for the government is an unattractive prospect, since “the current scale of salary for public officials is still far below the subsistence level...This has led public officials to work in outside jobs, to work exclusively in aid-funded projects in return for salary supplements, or to abuse their authority to generate unofficial income.”²¹ Even if a recent graduate sought a job in civil service, job opportunities are few and far between and only available to the well-connected and those able to deal under the table.²² Thus, NGOs provide opportunities for educated Cambodians to stay in their country and work to improve the situation. Cambodia is “considered equipped with an education system whose quality is well below the average [in a regional context]. Yet Cambodia’s leading talents are willing to pursue opportunities within the country, an encouraging sign for Cambodia’s future development.”²³ It is a heartening prospect that Cambodia’s intellectuals are not abandoning the country in droves, a phenomenon colloquially known as “brain drain” that has afflicted other Southeast Asian countries like the Philippines.

Perhaps the most important service NGOs in Cambodia perform is aiding in the revitalization of civil society. Civil society was irrevocably damaged during Cambodia’s civil war years. Due to the decades of struggle for survival, “the very bases of traditional Cambodian society were destroyed, families were fractured, ‘old people’ were turned against ‘new people,’ and families, friends, and neighbors were forced to spy on one another as a matter of survival.”²⁴ The result was a society crippled, a people unable to have

confidence in anyone, even their closest relations. The subsequent upheaval resulted in an extreme lack of trust permeating all levels of Cambodian society, which has had tremendous implications on the country's stability.²⁵ This lack of trust has a debilitating effect on the resuscitation of civil society, as does the culture of thinking in the short-term that was necessarily propagated among the Cambodian people. A vibrant, abiding civil society takes a long time to form, and the lack of capacity to think in the long-term, on account of uncertainty about every possible outcome, is highly detrimental to the process.²⁶

Civil society had to "contend with deliberate efforts by the Khmer Rouge to destroy any social institution or form of identity. While at a basic level these institutions have been rebuilt, decades of conflict have clearly resulted in a depleted stock of social capital."²⁷ Indeed, the rebuilding of civil society has had to contend with conflicting tenets of Cambodian society itself, which was not highly structured, focused primarily on the family, and lacked interest in forming outside associations. The Khmer Rouge further suppressed any impetus toward social organization, as under its exceptionally repressive rule, one could not trust one's neighbor, friend, or even family member. This total lack of trust works against any kind of community organization and the "traumatically engraved passivity" adopted as a survival strategy is still inhibiting movement towards social participation and activism today.²⁸

Despite these extraordinary disruptions, Cambodian civil society is gradually being reconstructed. This gradual change is perhaps the only possible way to nurture such a delicate process and ensure it is sustainable. NGOs aid in the process by serving as advocates for the people to the government and spreading awareness among the people about the opportunities they have available to them in their newly democratic society. The ability of NGOs to "facilitate[e]... understanding of the dynamics that mediate access to food, education and decision-making processes...can yet provide the key to more meaningful grassroots development work in Cambodia."²⁹

As discussed earlier, NGOs can use their unique relationship with the government to speak for the people. They have the capacity to inform the government and donor agencies of economic and

social changes at the grassroots level, and ensure the issues of the most impoverished receive attention at the policy-making level.³⁰ NGOs are a useful channel between government and people, and can serve to enforce government accountability for its actions. An example of the success of NGO advocacy could be seen in 2000, when "due in part to advocacy initiatives of NGOs and local communities, the government undertook an alternative management strategy over the fishery resources and handed over control of local fishing grounds to village-level communities."³¹

Despite still-constrained participation, there are encouraging signs of the strengthening of civil society, with evidence in post-UNTAC Cambodia of "social reconstruction, including important efforts addressed to the resurrection of village-based social structures" by NGOs. There are also an increasing number of local NGOs and community groups, in addition to the presence of a dynamic and determined press.³² Civil society has been aided by the growth of the garment industry and unions that developed along with it.³³ The best approach NGOs can take is tackling the issue from the bottom up, attempting to rebuild trust and reintroduce long-term planning at the village level.

Unfortunately, "civil society in Cambodia cannot be disassociated with the prevalent patronage system which will seek inroads to influence emergent venues that can kindle alternative social organisations."³⁴ NGOs are often unconsciously guilty of preserving exactly the kind of hierarchy and patron-client relationships that need to be dismantled in order for civil society to function well. Issue has been taken with the way NGOs address poverty:

Villagers, especially the very poor, readily relinquish power and responsibility to people perceived as having something to offer them (i.e. development practitioners);...development assistance is bound to be paternalistic, dependence-creating, and non-developmental, if based on a relationship where a practitioner delivers a service to the "victim" (the poor)...NGO workers...inadvertently perpetuate hierarchical relations by unconsciously assuming positions of power.³⁵

Obviously the poor need services, but NGOs need to create systems by which villagers take responsibility for their well-being rather than relying on outside generosity. Although well-intentioned, such charity is not a viable, sustainable approach. The reinstated King Sihanouk is guilty of this as well, as most of his post-UNTAC efforts were charity-oriented rather than geared toward assuming the position of an effective advocate for the Cambodian people's long-term welfare. Instead, his actions, grounded in the short-term, bolstered traditional Cambodian customs of submission to authority.³⁶ This was a trend in the post-UNTAC period as countries fell over themselves to provide aid to Cambodia, and the Cambodian government struggled to ingratiate itself to the people. The intense attention to the situation in Cambodia prompted "public displays of charity or 'good works' [which] became a prominent part of the post-UNTAC political process, including through such political largesse as handouts to the poor and construction of 'personally financed' schools and clinics. Such practice only reinforced traditional patron-client relationships and contributed little to necessary efforts toward increased self-reliance."³⁷

NGOs often face difficulties within their own organizations as well. Often, their goals and objectives are not clearly formulated, and not understood by members of their staff, who may not be fully qualified. In addition, some members of NGO staffs do not clearly understand their role in development and how they can most effectively promote activity that strengthens development. In many cases they do not appreciate the difference between providing a service versus enabling a community-based organization to provide a service.³⁸ Beyond being unsure of what exactly they are supposed to be carrying out, NGOs have also been guilty of paying lip service to supporting local NGOs and community groups without actually doing so. Part of the problem with this lack of follow-up is insufficient or poorly managed planning, especially for crucial proposals for building local capacity and supporting local institutions.³⁹

Local NGOs have a plethora of obstacles to work through as well. They are characterized by "a poor understanding of development matters; lack training in project management, planning and monitoring; face financial difficulties; and have inadequate

experience [and a] scarcity of qualified Cambodians to run and administer development projects.”⁴⁰ In order to be fully effective, NGOs will have to ensure that their development goals are clearly understood at all levels of implementation, and have a clear picture of what it is they are working toward. According to “a study done by Mansfield...[among] the most frequently cited reasons for success...[was]...good management, expressed by having clear planning, policies and job descriptions, capable and committed leaders, and transparency.”⁴¹ NGOs need to have clear, sustainable platforms. International NGOs will also need to work towards improving the situations of local NGOs by helping them with their infrastructure.

International and local NGOs both must deal with the ever-present concern of finding sufficient funding for their activities. Most NGOs depend heavily on donor funds, and this presents the problem of having to carry out the donor’s wishes instead of what actually might benefit the community most; in this scenario, NGOs become mere conduits for donor funding and serve as an instrument for the donor.⁴² A gap exists between the agenda of NGOs in the field and that of the officials making the decisions. In order to get the funding, NGOs often bend to the will of the donor. Some donors understand their role in providing resources and expertise but not necessarily detailed guidance. However, more commonly, donors become too focused on their own agendas and objectives, akin to micromanaging, to the detriment of development goals and approaches that might be identified by local communities. Naturally, local entities would defer to a donor’s agenda in order to receive access to resources. This problem manifested itself after the UNTAC operation when it became evident that local agencies had difficulty developing their own unique approaches to development problems because they were accustomed to following a direction set by donor agencies rather than collaboratively generating a “unique development vision.”⁴³ In addition, this means that “the national NGOs that have emerged since 1993 have been professional service delivery or advocacy organizations which owe their existence more to support from donor and international organizations than to the outgrowth of grassroots association based on occupation or local-

ity.”⁴⁴ This suggests that the civil society forming in Cambodia has been imposed from the outside, which is not ideal. In order for civil society to endure, it must come from the people themselves.

Post-UNTAC, Cambodia still faces many daunting dilemmas. Not least among them is the persistent and entrenched violence in Cambodian society, which manifests itself in various forms, including political and domestic violence and sexual exploitation.⁴⁵ This violence, along with deep-seated and rampant corruption at all levels of government, is a huge impediment toward progress in the realm of economic development and political reform. Sustainable reform in both the economic and political realms appears to have remained out of the reach of the country.⁴⁶ In addition, 52 percent of Cambodia’s population is below the age of 18.⁴⁷ The day when they enter a labor market with no room to accommodate them is not far off. This is not to say progress has not been made, just that economic progress to date might be insufficient to meet future needs. The process of reestablishing civil society must be a continuous, accessible one. It requires ongoing participation from members of Cambodian society, and high levels of cooperation between NGOs themselves, the government, and the people. As Boli and Thomas write, “The opportunity for INGOs to expand their role is greater than ever, both to influence state policies and to bypass states altogether in seeking solutions to world-culturally defined problems.”⁴⁸ NGOs can help seek these solutions by aiding the Cambodian people in rediscovering their traditions, rebuilding their society, empowering them, and adapting the system to integrate, not exploit, their culture.

NGOs’ strength lies in their ability to work effectively at the grassroots level, organizing people and facilitating action that will eventually lead to their sustainable participation and investment in Cambodia’s development. NGOs have “demonstrated the concern, flexibility and experience to respond to humanitarian needs, to manage development projects and contribute to policy formation.”⁴⁹ These strengths are best utilized in the creation of an indigenous civil society, not one imposed from the international community, especially relevant in a country where civil society has been traditionally weak and further diminished by warfare. NGOs must

be aware of their weaknesses and of their tendency to be blinded by working towards a goal for the sake of reaching it. They must always be cognizant of the society they are working in, and constantly strive towards closing the gap between what is theoretically possible and what is in reality truly practical.⁵⁰ NGOs are in the best position possible to assist in the resurrection of a civil society buried by years of war, famine, loss, and untold sorrow.

ENDNOTES

1 William Shawcross, *The Quality of mercy: Cambodia, holocaust and modern conscience*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 38.

2 TAP Catalla and Rebecca F. Catalla, *Cambodia: A Situational Analysis*, (Unpublished manuscript, ActionAid International Cambodia, 2006), 18.

3 Ibid., 19.

4 Ibid.

5 Frederick Z. Brown. "Cambodia in 1992: Peace at Peril." *Asian Survey*, no 33 (1992): 83, <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0004-4687%28199301%2933%3A1%3C83%3ACI1PAP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U>.

6 Ibid.

7 Grant Curtis, *Cambodia reborn?: the transition to democracy and development*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998), 150.

8 Ibid., 123.

9 Irene V. Langran, Cambodia in 2000: New Hopes Are Challenged, *Asian Survey*, no 41 (2001): 156, <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0004-4687%28200001%2F02%2940%3A1%3C25%3ACI1YOH%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V>.

10 Abelardo L. Cruz, *The Political Economy of Cambodia: A Study Report*, (Unpublished manuscript, ActionAid International Cambodia, 2006), 16.

11 Curtis, *Cambodia reborn?*, 131.

12 Ibid., 132.

13 Ibid.

14 Catalla and Catalla, *Cambodia: A Situational Analysis*, 81.

15 Curtis, *Cambodia reborn?*, 140-2.

16 John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organization," *American Sociological Review*, no 62 (1997): 184. <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-1224%28199704%2962%3A2%3C171%3AWCITWP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H>.

17 Thomas Clayton, "Building the New Cambodia: Educational destruction and construction under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979," *History of Education Quarterly*, no 38 (1998): 6-7, <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0018-2680%28199821%2938%3A1%3C1%3ABTNCED%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6>.

18 Ibid., 14.

19 Catalla and Catalla, *Cambodia: A Situational Analysis*, 66.

20 Ibid., 25.

21 Ibid., 31.

22 Cruz, *The Political Economy of Cambodia*, 42.

23 Catalla and Catalla, *Cambodia: A Situational Analysis*, 99.

24 Curtis, *Cambodia reborn?*, 114.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Catalla and Catalla, *Cambodia: A Situational Analysis*, 70, as cited by The World Bank, 2006.

28 Curtis, *Cambodia reborn?*, 124.

29 Ibid., 81,90.

30 Ibid., 81.

31 Ibid., 43.

32 Curtis, *Cambodia reborn?*, 161.

33 Catalla and Catalla, *Cambodia: A Situational Analysis*, 70.

34 Cruz, *The Political Economy of Cambodia*, 24.

35 Catalla and Catalla, *Cambodia: A Situational Analysis*, 101, 108.

36 Curtis, *Cambodia reborn?*, 129.

37 Ibid.

38 Catalla and Catalla, *Cambodia: A Situational Analysis*, 89, 113.

- 39 Curtis, *Cambodia reborn?*, 135.
- 40 Catalla and Catalla, *Cambodia: A Situational Analysis*, 87.
- 41 Ibid., 86.
- 42 Curtis, *Cambodia reborn?*, 140.
- 43 Ibid., 119.
- 44 Catalla and Catalla, *Cambodia: A Situational Analysis*, 90.
- 45 Curtis, *Cambodia reborn?*, 161.
- 46 Sorpong Peou, "Cambodia in 1998: From Despair to Hope?" *Asian Survey*, no 39 (1999): 20, <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0004-4687%28199901%2F02%2939%3A1%3C20%3ACI1FDT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H>.
- 47 Catalla and Catalla, *Cambodia: A Situational Analysis*, 17.
- 48 Boli and Thomas, "World Culture in the World Polity," 187.
- 49 Curtis, *Cambodia reborn?*, 134.
- 50 Catalla and Catalla, *Cambodia: A Situational Analysis*, 94.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Boli, John and Thomas, George M. "World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organization." *American Sociological Review*, no 62 (1997): 171-190, <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-1224%28199704%2962%3A2%3C171%3AWCITWP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H>.
- Brown, Frederick Z. "Cambodia in 1992: Peace at Peril." *Asian Survey*, no 33 (1992): 83-90, <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0004-4687%28199301%2933%3A1%3C83%3ACI1PAP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U>
- Catalla, TAP and Catalla, Rebecca F. *Cambodia: A Situational Analysis*. Unpublished manuscript, ActionAid International Cambodia, (2006).
- Clayton, Thomas. "Building the New Cambodia: Educational destruction and construction under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979." *History of Education Quarterly*, no 38 (1998): 1-16, <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0018-2680%28199821%2938%3A1%3C1%3ABTNCED%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6>
- Cruz, Abelardo L. *The Political Economy of Cambodia: A Study Report*. Unpublished manuscript, ActionAid International Cambodia, (2006).
- Curtis, Grant. *Cambodia reborn?: the transition to democracy and development*. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998.
- Langran, Irene V. "Cambodia in 2000: New Hopes Are Challenged." *Asian Survey*, no 41 (2001): 156-163. <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0004-4687%28200001%2F02%2940%3A1%3C25%3ACI1YOH%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V>
- Peou, Sorpong. "Cambodia in 1998: From Despair to Hope?" *Asian Survey*, no 39 (1999): 20-26. <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0004-4687%28199901%2F02%2939%3A1%3C20%3ACI1FDT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H>
- Shawcross, William. *The Quality of mercy: Cambodia, holocaust and modern conscience*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984.



NOTES FROM
ABROAD



A Matter of *Hawiyya*

Jerusalem, Identity, and the Struggle for Things Unseen

DAVID HOSEY '07

The dark blue of my US passport stands out against the green West Bank IDs and the gray-blue of Jerusalem IDs. Our bus has been stopped, a routine occurrence especially during the heightened security resulting from the concurrence of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan with the high holy days of the Jewish calendar. Everyone on the bus holds up their IDs for the soldier to see. The Israeli soldier is young, younger than me. His automatic rifle doesn't quite fit between the seats, so he turns sideways as he checks the IDs. The Palestinian teenager sitting next to me watches me out of the corners of his eyes. He knows, as I do, that there is more than a color difference between our IDs. Mine makes me different. Here, even with the soldier's gun bumping against my thigh, I am in a position of relative power. Here, a soldier might ask me "Where are you from?" or "Are you just visiting?" But I won't be made to stand on the sidewalk for hours. I won't be turned back. I will go on my way, for now.

Learning Arabic in Palestine leaves me and other internationals here with a unique vocabulary list. The words for occupation, settler, and the Wall are not common textbook fare, but are as practical here as greetings and directions. By far one of the most im-

portant words in the Palestinian vocabulary is *hawiyya*—the word for identity card. Palestinian friends have told me of the panic of having a purse stolen with their *hawiyya* inside, and of the gripping fear that comes with having your *hawiyya* taken out of your sight, as I see happening from the bus. Young men line up along the wall, watching the soldier as he takes their *hawiyya* away. Sometimes, people have their IDs confiscated, and are left without rights, without freedom of movement and access. Without identity.

Such is the violent absurdity of life in East Jerusalem, and of life in Occupied Territory. The image of all those IDs, held up for scrutiny, drives home more firmly than any textbook ever could the divisions along identity lines that characterize the vast majority of modern conflict zones. These divisions are everywhere here in Israel-Palestine, where I am serving as an intern with the Board of Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church. My work here is with the Sabeel Ecumenical Liberation Theology Center, which works on issues of ecumenicism, interfaith cooperation, and peace and social justice among the Palestinian Christian community.¹ Among this community—and everywhere in this land that so many have called holy, and have fought and bled and died over—the struggle for identity lies just below the surface of every aspect of life.

There are the obvious divisions—the looming concrete monstrosity of the Wall, cutting Bethlehem off from Jerusalem, smashing through neighborhoods and cutting people off from their land as it worships the gods of demographics and land grabs; the armed checkpoints; the different colors and types of IDs, separating West Bank residents from Palestinian Jerusalemites from Israeli Arabs from Israeli Jews; the conflicts over ‘holy’ sites and access to the Old City. And there are the hidden tensions: the underlying struggle for whose narrative gets to be told, whose history recognized, whose suffering memorialized, whose dispossession granted reparation.

It is difficult to hold on to a sense of perspective in the midst of this silent—and not so silent—battle for identity. John Paul Lederach, a conflict transformation practitioner and one of the leading experts on peacebuilding and reconciliation, identifies the drawing of sharp identity lines as a foremost characteristic of violent conflict:

Cycles of violence are often driven by tenacious requirements to reduce complex history into dualistic polarities that attempt to both describe and contain social reality in artificial ways. People, communities, and most specifically choices about ways they will respond to situations and express views of the conflict are forced into either-or categories. We are right. They are wrong. We were violated. They are the violators. We are liberators. They are oppressors. Our intentions are good. Theirs are bad. History and the truth of history is most fully comprehended by our view. Their view of history is biased, incomplete, maliciously untruthful, and ideologically driven. You are with us or against us.²

Lederach's proposed remedy is the cultivation of a moral imagination that will allow peacemakers to transcend dualistic polarities, view relationships as central to conflict and peace, and respond creatively in situations of great risk.³ He never claims this as a simple task—indeed, he identifies the ability to grasp the underlying simplicity of a situation while simultaneously viewing its complexity as one of the foremost challenges of building peace⁴—and there is nothing simple or mathematical about challenging dualistic polarities in situations of great injustice.

I have seen the demolished ruins of Palestinian houses that are considered 'illegal' by the Occupation, and are thus destroyed over and over again. I have heard of just how impossible it is for Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank to get a building permit. I have seen olive trees older than the country of my birth cut down or ripped up in the name of land ownership and 'national security.' I have had friends attacked by settlers who are driven by an exclusivist and nationalistic religious ideology. I have stood at the checkpoints, have seen the humiliation and have felt the frustration. I have seen the ugly face of Occupation—and what I have seen pales in comparison to what others have seen and experienced. It makes you want to scream. It makes you want to forget the humanity of the people doing this to you and to your friends. It makes you want to see the other as a faceless menace with a machine gun and a bulldozer, not as a human being with a family and a story and dreams and thoughts and hopes.

So it hurts, sometimes, to wonder: what is the story of that soldier? What is he thinking? Does he want to be wearing his uniform and carrying his gun? Is he merely fulfilling his service requirement? What is his name? Where is he from?

Who are we, inside this microcosm of conflict?

People. People with stories. Behind the history, and the security, and the fear, and the anger, and the hate, and the prejudice, and the occupation, there are so many stories. Those who desire to be peacemakers are called to witness, that is, to listen and to experience and to share. It is difficult to be a faithful witness in this land of so many narratives, clawing at each other. There is a joint project between a group of Israeli and Palestinian educators here, in which a history book is written in three columns.⁵ The one column is the Israeli narrative, the other is the Palestinian. The middle is blank, for students to write their own story—the hopeful way of thinking about it. But some days, it feels like the purpose of the middle column is to keep the other two columns apart, to be a buffer, because even the words would rip each other to pieces if they had the chance.

It is sometimes difficult to understand how people can call this place the Holy Land. But perhaps it is not so incongruous that the Holy Land is a land of deep division and violence. In respect to all the pilgrims from many faiths who come here, I rarely experience holiness in terms of stones and tourist sites. The holy sites of this world are the people who are hurting. The occupied people, the displaced people, the people wounded by their past, by collective memory of genocide and pogrom, by collective memory of forced removal from their homes—a cycle of hurting each other to try to cleanse the wounds of the past—these holy sites are all over this land and all over this world.

At Sabeel, we strive to create community among Palestinian Christians, but we also work for cooperation and justice and peace across identity lines. People often ask what I think of the two-state solution or the one-state solution, or what my impression is of this meeting or that peace conference or of this politician or that statement. These are honest questions, and important questions, but in

large part they miss the true purpose of peacebuilding. If a political settlement is reached here, then the work is not finished—it has barely begun. The hard work remains. There is no peace accord, no political agreement among elites that can heal these divisions between people. There is no shortcut to reconciliation that can bypass those who have been hurt and divided for so long. There is nothing but the long, hard, frustrating, and mainly unquantifiable work of reconciliation that can make *hawiyya* cease to matter, and recover the deep interdependence at the center of our humanity.

There is no easy way to destroy the false identities of violence and to recover our true identities, as people who belong to each other.

Working for peace here, and in the rest of our dysfunctional global community, requires faith—what the anonymous epistle writer, so many years ago, called “the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen.”⁶ May we have faith. May we continue to hope and to work for justice, for peace, and for reconciliation—even when they are things unseen.

ENDNOTES

1 The views and opinions presented here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Methodist Church, the General Board of Global Ministries, or the Sabeel Ecumenical Liberation Theology Center. For more on the Mission Intern program, see <http://new.gbgm-umc.org/work/youth/>. To learn more about the work of Sabeel, visit www.sabeel.org.

2 John Paul Lederach, *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace* (New York: Oxford University, 2005), 35.

3 Ibid., 34-39.

4 Ibid., 33-34.

5 For more information on this project, see the Peace Research Institute in the Middle East (PRIME) website at <http://vispo.com/PRIME/index.htm>.

6 Heb. 11.1 (New Revised Standard Version).



Feet, Wheels, and Wings

BRENNAN SCHNEIDER '06

India has feet and wheels and wings. Sometimes its feet don't wear shoes. Sometimes its wheels roll one day into the next. And sometimes its wings are the source of incredible hope. I sometimes feel like I live in three separate worlds in India. All three call Bhuj their home.

I boarded a train in New Delhi and headed 27 hours west, where the tracks end. I arrived in Bhuj, the district capitol of Kachchh, Gujarat. Kachchh protrudes into the Arabian Sea like a set of lips. It is the western-most tip of India. Kachchh's desert, known as the Great Rann, is vast, harsh, and largely uninhabited. For generations, the region has been home to distinct nomadic communities whose traditional work of animal husbandry and craft have worked together to form a rich economic and cultural tapestry. Kachchh is renowned for its diversity, which is expressed through generations-old craft traditions which have become a predominant source of local livelihoods. It is a place unlike any in the world. I was placed here through an American India Foundation Fellowship. It has come to feel like home.

My small purple apartment is squeezed into a row of colorful cement homes on a dusty street in Bhuj. Cows wander freely and neighbors wander casually into my house to watch my attempts to cook Gujarati, speak Gujarati, and live Gujarati. Though 300,000 people live in Bhuj, it feels like a small town. It feels like rural India.

I work at KHAMIR Craft Resource Centre, a craft-based NGO located on a campus in the arid plains surrounding Bhuj. KHAMIR works to revitalize Kachchh's craft industry by addressing the inherent challenges of each craft sector, repositioning craft vis-à-vis the global marketplace, and preserving the deep-rooted traditions which are an integral part of craft livelihoods. My work is to develop a documentation service point for the artisans with whom we work. Living and working in Bhuj is both inspiring and challenging. Every day, the contrasts between India's feet, wheels and wings teach me about India's complexities and about the realities of international development work.

...
FEET
...

In November, a pilgrimage began. This is India on foot. Every year, pilgrims from across India walk hundreds of kilometers across Kachchh (sometimes starting as far away as Mumbai) to an Ashapura temple believed to have been built by the Hindu Mother Goddess herself. Orange flags wave *Jai Mata Ji*, "Victory to the Mother," into the hot desert air. Walking is a sign of devotion. I am in awe of the many pilgrims who leave their shoes at home and walk with bare feet as a sacrifice to the Goddess.

The end of my lane doubles as the place where the office jeep picks me up in the mornings as well as my neighborhood's designated garbage dump. In the morning sun, I watch barefoot women and children with dusty clothes and matted hair piece through our garbage. They stuff plastic bottles and any other reusables into Santa sacks on their backs. It is slow, tedious and back-breaking work; just one example of the hard-working and heartbreaking feet of India.

“Lac turned” wood is one of Kachchh’s traditional crafts. Seated with a simple set of tools at their feet, artisans turn wood between two rods with a violin bow-like tool. They carve and shape the wood with a simple metal tool and decorate it with brightly colored insect resin called lac. The artisans, whose families have been practicing the craft for centuries, use their feet like an extra pair of hands. The wooden spoons, furniture legs, and boxes they create are stunning. It is incredible to witness the production of finely crafted kitchenware without electricity, machine, or even a table. The skilled hands and feet of India are making sustainable livelihoods.

The other day, a colleague told me that my feet are beginning to look like Indian feet. He is talking about the unavoidable cracks and calluses that give character to my soles. To avoid depression over India’s toll on my delicate Western body, I took the liberty of looking for a deeper meaning. When I first arrived, I struggled with India’s slow side, its feet. I was challenged to various extents by village poverty, “wasted” and “unproductive” time, and the labor intensive nature of living here. I realize that I now see things differently. The last six months have taught me to take slow steps. Each step, with increasingly Indian feet, has been a teacher. There is a lot to learn as India continues its slow steps forward.

...

WHEELS

...

There are two wheels in Kachchh that are both symbolically and economically important: the spinning wheel and the potter’s wheel. These wheels represent India’s inherent wisdom, traditions, and grassroots economy. The spinning wheel is a symbol of Indian nationalism and pride. Gandhi used it to remind India of its rural capacities. Despite the prolific supply of machine-spun yarns, Kachchh weavers continue the generations-old tradition of hand-spinning local sheep wool. In Hindu mythology Bhrama, the Creator of the Universe, made a clay model of man into which he

breathed life. Thus the Indian potter is called *Prajapati*, the creator of man. In Kachchh, the potter sculpts local clay into environmentally sustainable earthenware: the potter's wheel is his tool.

I buy vegetables from the man who calls "Awooooooah!" between 8:45 and 9:15 every morning. He pushes a cart down my lane as women pour out of their homes to poke and prod the morning's fresh produce. This vegetable vendor's work is exemplary of India's vibrant wheeled economy which brings supply to the homes of demand. A steady stream of house plants, kitchenware, and snacks are pushed through my lane: this week I was most impressed by the salesman who sharpens knives on an ingenious wheeled machine. Each salesman has a distinct call or beep to signal his presence. Their calls are a constant reminder that even the cottage industries of India's economy are moving.

Only one road and one set of train tracks connect Kachchh to mainland India. Yet people, eager to work with the region's many artisans, have been rolling in and out of Kachchh for decades. They bring innovative designs, technologies, and methods to access new markets. But without a long-term investment in the region, the wheels of buses and trains carry them away leaving little that can be sustained in their absence. This has been a challenge to both artisans and local NGOs. Through Kachchh NGOs, designers, water management specialists, consultants, and museum directors work with sustainability at the forefront in mind. Thanks to their efforts, trust and capacities are being built. Wheels can bring good ideas but sometimes they have to stop long enough to leave sustainable change behind.

Some days I feel like my work is on a perpetual wheel that turns in circles without moving forward. One day rolls into the next and I hardly have time to do laundry, let alone push through roadblocks, inefficiencies, and language barriers. Work in Bhuj has taught me that spinning wheels do eventually move forward. They are, it seems, the nature of this work. I now push myself a little farther than before, but I know that you can't always push wheels. When they're ready to move, they will. In the meantime, I work on patience.

...

WINGS

...

Kachchh was the epicenter of the 2001 earthquake that shook Gujarat. The need to rebuild and overcome a devastating loss of life and infrastructure brought forth collaboration and a focus on the future of Kachchh's livelihoods. Its people's resilience has given Kachchh wings. These wings are taking a young generation of artisan entrepreneurs to new heights. They inspire young weavers to quit factory jobs and return to the work that has sustained their families for generations. They encourage craftswomen to submit their work for the national award for craftsmanship.

The Indian NGO sector is a vibrant and extremely well-connected network of movers and shakers. I would argue that the sector's leaders not only know the challenges India faces but have already proposed creative solutions to address them. Dialogues and efforts to ensure democratic rights, give a voice to minorities, strengthen local and government capacities, and provide essential services are having an impact. I watch the sector uplift rural India on the wings of social change. While the implementation of ideas remains a challenge, I can't help but be inspired by the ideas which are actively leading India closer to its greatest potential.

The international media spotlights Bangalore and India's booming IT sector. While Americans fear that their jobs are flying to India, I sit in my office deleting the 140 viruses that we've been transporting on the office's shared portable hard drive. The wings of change we read about aren't reaching peripheral India. New market access, development, and investment have brought change to Kachchh. A big, red, art deco hotel in town is advertised as "World Class Luxury, Now in Bhuj," but I wonder how many local families could afford to spend the night there. As clusters of Indian society fly sky high, I wait to see their impact on the rest of the country.

...

I experience the contrasts between India's feet, wheels, and wings every day. The space between them is a source of frustration, confusion, and injustice. There are days when I feel like all hope is lost. There are also days when I feel that there is so much hope that I could spend the rest of my life working here. Having slowed down and stopped looking at my watch so much, I have developed a new understanding of time and change. While I am still challenged by poverty, India's feet have taught me that it takes time to truly see and understand change. Because the wheels of change roll forward slowly, I am able to appreciate the efforts behind each step. And as India's most needy grow wings, I find hope and an opportunity to contribute.



Psychology: A Transcultural Perspective

SPENCER CASE '08

For centuries, the mysteries of the human mind have been researched and pondered. Though the search for the keys to unlock its secrets continues in our modern age, there is one certainty: mental processes are complex and have infinite potential. Since I started studying the mind, I have been told that therapeutic psychology is about helping people. I believe that when an individual is diagnosed with a mental illness, his or her treatment can be composed of a unique combination of therapeutic modalities and techniques. In order to gain perspective on the vast range of possibilities for helping those with a diagnosed mental illness, I compared two mental health facilities, one in the United States and one in The Netherlands. I spent many hours interacting with mental health professionals, facility administrators and patients at Akron General Medical Center in Akron, Ohio, and at De Geestgronden Psychiatric Hospital in Haarlem, The Netherlands to explore global and cultural perspectives on the subject of mental health and identify similarities and differences in terms of mental health disease and treatment.

Mental illness does not distinguish between sex, gender, religion, age, socioeconomic status, or culture. It can affect anyone.

However, before traveling to The Netherlands, I never considered culture to be one of the determinants of diagnosis and treatment of mental illness. I discovered that each culture has its own definition for culturally acceptable and unacceptable behavior. I saw firsthand abnormal functioning, relative to culture. Observing the ways that cultures deal with mental illness helped me realize that an infinite number of criteria exist for determining who should receive treatment. The United States and The Netherlands share similar cultural beliefs with regard to defining and treating mental illness. Both believe that many factors influence mental illness, and define mental illness as emotional and behavioral dysfunctions of thought which are associated with distress and/or impairment, leading to dysfunction in everyday life. Mental health professionals in both countries recommend ways for patients to reach their maximum abilities in order to function safely within their respective cultures. Regardless of the onset of the disorder, the maximum ability to function is estimated at the start of treatment. Evaluations of success and positive outcomes are based on progressive improvement during treatment.

According to the mental health professionals in both locations, inpatient hospitalization is the most aggressive treatment possible. Once admitted to the hospital, patients may reside there for a minimum of two weeks, but may stay their whole lives, depending on diagnostic severity, legal and safety issues and their individual prognoses. Progress after the initial treatment offers the opportunity for adjusting treatments to less intense levels. Depending on the diagnosis and the severity of the mental illness, inpatient treatment may include antipsychotic medication and the use of restraints.

As I interacted with people in various stages of recovery at both institutions, it was apparent that some individuals diagnosed with a consistent and lasting mental disorder may only show limited improvement and therefore regular evaluation is warranted (e.g. weekly, monthly, and quarterly). At De Geestgronden, I observed the first formal psychiatric evaluation that a particular patient had had in two years. Sadly, little progress was made and the patient would need to be re-evaluated in two more years.

I witnessed treatment progress. The improved patients I saw had the opportunity to move to a less intense level of treatment. At

Akron General Medical Center, the individuals who made progress were recommended for the partial hospitalization program, which is also available at De Geestgronden. The partial program at both locations requires that patients spend 6 to 8 hours per day with mental health professionals in a structured hospital location. During treatment, I was side by side with mental health professionals who teach life skills that cover topics from nutrition to the importance of consistently taking medications.

In both countries, mental healthcare providers work toward the goal of getting individuals to function in the real world. After partial hospitalization, patients who showed marked improvement were excited to move to an outpatient program. I am sure that doctors feel rewarded when a patient in the outpatient program is nearly independent of the mental health facility. Similarly, patients must enjoy only having to visit the hospital one day per week for evaluation and treatment. Interestingly, in The Netherlands, I had the opportunity to go with doctors to see clients on their houseboats.

The main differences I observed in mental healthcare between the two countries stemmed from the accessibility of healthcare and the ability to pay. Citizens of The Netherlands have universal health insurance. Throughout the day, I interacted with homeless people who receive welfare which pays for health insurance. I noticed that health insurance plans are more standardized and the differences in quality of care are minimal. I did not see any private practice. Regardless of your socioeconomic status, quality treatment is available. Long-term care really is long-term.

However, in the United States people were treated and sent on their way. Many people receive only medication, with minimal or no other treatment. This system is more common because it appeases a wide variety of health insurance providers. Socioeconomic status also plays a role in the quality of care in the U.S., as individuals receive better quality of care simply on the basis of their economic resources. Quality care is not always available to the people who need it the most, as exemplified by the homeless people who go without treatment in the United States. I saw many people in treatment for their third or fourth time, which I was told increases cost in the long-term. Also, the presence of armed security guards was

a notable difference at Akron General. When I asked about security in the Dutch hospital, I received a confused look.

In The Netherlands, it was heartening to see that long-term inpatient care for chronic cases of mental illness is based on the idea of community. Surprisingly, though a generally structured residential facility exists, structured daily routines are not required. In the cases that I observed, there was little to no commitment in regard to a structured long-term treatment plan. Daily living options for long-term care that I took notice of included life skills training, information/educational sessions, community service, and arts and crafts. Long-term care and reimbursement for treatment were not issues. Community living in which patients are free to come and go from the property allowed for consistent monitoring. It was again apparent that mental health treatment depends on insurance companies and their individual countries' policies regarding reimbursement of professionals.

Another notable difference in the U.S. was more structure in patients' daily routines. For example, I spent time with patients in long-term treatment programs required to attend planned, structured events throughout the day as I accompanied doctors to group support meetings in addition to group and individual therapy sessions with clinical psychologists. At De Geestgronden, I met with one clinical psychologist in the inpatient treatment department. On the other hand, I discovered that group meetings and group therapy are major components in treatment facilities in the United States.

Though some specific differences do exist, the two systems share more similarities. Fundamentally, I learned that both countries view mental illness as a treatable disease that with proper care can allow affected persons to reach their maximum potential and improve their quality of life. I would encourage health professionals, and people in general, to explore familiar concepts through a different light or cultural perspective. After all, is it not what we ask individuals with mental illness to do but to explore life through a different light and perspective using treatment?

Contributors

ARTICLE AUTHORS

Kim Proctor '08 is a Political Science major with a concentration in Latin American studies. She plans to pursue a doctoral degree in political science after graduation. She is particularly interested in issues of identity in politics and the influence of truth and reconciliation commission reports on transitional justice. She is a member of the Maryland Air National Guard, the Douglass Cater Society of Junior Fellows, Phi Beta Kappa, Pi Sigma Alpha, Phi Alpha Theta, the Vice President of Omicron Delta Kappa, and a sister of Alpha Omicron Pi.

Andrew Mehdizadeh '08 is a Political Science major and Economics minor. He was the first recipient of the The Robert W. and Louisa C. Duemling Presidential Fellows Program, which included the opportunity to study at The Center for the Study of the Presidency in Washington, D.C. He is also a member of the Executive Board of the Student Government Association. His interests include running, politics, and history. He has held internships with the Center for American Progress and the Delaware State Legislature. He plans on attending law school in the fall.

David Hosey '07 graduated from Washington College with a BA in International Studies with a concentration in Middle East and North African Studies, and a minor in Philosophy. He was the recipient of the Henry W.C. Catlin 1894 Medal and the 2007 Golden Pentagon Award. Since graduating, David has been participating in a three-year internship with the United Methodist Church's Mission

Intern Program and is currently working at the Sabeel Ecumencial Liberation Theology Center in Jerusalem.

Gillian Bourassa '09 is a History major pursuing teaching certification in secondary social studies. She is the Vice President of Phi Alpha Theta History Honor Society and a member of various other campus organizations. Her research interests include Medieval Europe and World History during and after World War II. Her work has previously been published in both the *Washington College Review* and the *Washington College International Studies Review*.

Brian Taylor '08 is a History major with a minor in Political Science. His main historical interests are Irish history and the American Civil War. He has served as a Junior Editor of the *Washington College International Studies Review* for the past two years, and serves this year as its Editor. During his four years at Washington College Brian has been a member of the Douglass Cater Society of Junior Fellows, Omicron Delta Kappa, Phi Alpha Theta, and the Order of Omega. He was recently asked to join Washington College's chapter of Phi Beta Kappa. Brian is also a brother and former President of the Kappa Alpha Order.

Amanda Kirkland '09 is an International Studies major with a regional concentration in Western European Studies and a minor in Philosophy. Her academic interests include the European Union, specifically as it informs business on the continent. While at Washington College, she has been an active member of the International Studies Council, serving as Secretary and President of the organization, as well as participating in three Model United Nations conferences. Amanda is also a member of Pi Sigma Alpha, and has worked as an intern for NASA. An avid traveler, she has visited Iceland and Thailand in addition to touring the European continent, and is currently studying abroad at the University of Copenhagen in Denmark.

Tricia Bonman '09 is majoring in International Studies and Hispanic Studies. She studied abroad in Granada, Spain and is going

abroad again in summer 2008 with the Washington College Summer Program in Tanzania. She is also headed to Phnom Penh, Cambodia to work with the international consulting firm Crossroads to Development before returning to Washington College to finish her studies. She is a member of the Douglass Cater Society of Junior Fellows.

NOTES AUTHORS

David Hosey '07 graduated from Washington College with a BA in International Studies with a concentration in Middle East and North African Studies, and a minor in Philosophy. He was the recipient of the Henry W.C. Catlin 1894 Medal and the 2007 Golden Pentagon Award. Since graduating, David has been participating in a three-year internship with the United Methodist Church's Mission Intern Program and is currently working at the Sabeel Ecumenical Liberation Theology Center in Jerusalem.

Brenna Nan Schneider '06 graduated from Washington College with a BA in International Studies. She was the recipient of the George Washington Medal. After graduating, she worked at Lehigh University's Iacocca Institute. In 2007, she was awarded an American India Foundation Service Corps Fellowship and is currently working with KHAMIR- Craft Resource Centre to develop a documentation service point for artisans in Kachchh, Gujarat.

Spencer Case '08 is a Psychology major. He continues to investigate a broad spectrum of liberal arts experiences at Washington College. His interests encompass the pursuit of balance among all the opportunities at Washington College. During summer 2007, he and three other Washington College students biked across the United States to encourage people to stop smoking. He recently returned from an expedition to Antarctica. He is a member of the Douglass Cater Society of Junior Fellows and Psi Chi. After graduation, Spencer wants to spend time with his family in Hudson, Ohio.

COLOPHON

This issue of the *International Studies Review* was designed and produced using Adobe InDesign on Apple Macintosh computers. The text is set in Sabon, developed by Jan Tschichold in 1964 and based on the sixteenth-century typefaces of Claude Garamond.

Original book design by Jennifer E. Lubkin
This volume designed by Diane Landskroener

Printed by Victor Graphics, Baltimore, Md.



Kimberly Proctor
Andrew Mehdizadeh
David Hosey
Gillian Bourassa
Brian Taylor
Amanda Kirkland
Tricia Bonman
Brenna Nan Schneider
Spencer Case

